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practice of European States. On a regular basis, LGBTI asylum seekers 
are returned to their country of origin because they purportedly 
can prevent persecution by concealing their identity. This denies, for 
LGBTI applicants, the fundamental notion which is at the heart of 
refugee law: if people have a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
on account of the legitimate exercise of a human right, they are 
entitled to international protection. To require them to renounce 
their human rights in order to be ‘protected’ negates the function of 
such rights. Similarly, LGB asylum applicants are regularly returned to 
countries where they have a well-founded fear of being imprisoned 
or sentenced to death for engaging in sexual activities with a person 
of the same gender. A further example is that serious human rights 
violations against trans people, occurring on a large scale in many 
parts of the world, often do not lead to asylum. 
S p E c i f i c  i S S u E S
In our study, we focused on eight concrete issues.
1. Criminalisation
Many LGBTI asylum applicants come from countries where their 
sexual orientation or gender identity is criminalised. This may take 
different forms. Same-sex sexual activity between consenting adults 
may be a criminal act; ‘unnatural’ acts may be criminalised, and 
this may be used against trans people or people having sex with a 
person of the same gender. 
In five European countries, LGBTI applicants from such countries are 
denied asylum even when these criminal law provisions are enforced. 
In most other countries, enforced criminalisation (prosecution) 
is sufficient for recognition as a refugee in theory. In practice, 
however, protection is often denied since lack of information about 
enforcement of criminal law provisions targeting LGBTIs is often 
mistakenly equated with non enforcement. In Italy, the mere fact of 
criminalisation is sufficient for granting refugee status. 
The situation in the other European countries, however, remains 
problematic. On the basis of Article 4(3)(a) of the Qualification 
Directive, the fact that a certain sexual orientation or gender identity 
is criminalised in a country should mean that LGBTI applicants fleeing 
from those countries have a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
on account of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 
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Thousands of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex (LGBTI) asylum 
seekers apply for international protection in Europe each year. The 
European Union and European States have already taken some 
concrete and positive steps, such as recognising sexual orientation 
as a persecution ground in Article 10 of the Qualification Directive. 
Some Member States have also explicitly added gender identity as a 
persecution ground in their national legislation (Portugal, Spain) or 
policy documents (Austria, the United Kingdom); the Qualification 
Directive may well be amended so as to include gender identity. 
There are cases in which persecuted LGBTI asylum seekers are 
recognised as refugees, receive subsidiary protection, or are granted 
another form of protection in Member States of the European Union. 
G E n E r a l  f i n d i n G S
This report, however, shows that there are considerable differences 
in the way in which European States examine LGBTI asylum 
applications. As Europe aims at creating a Common European 
Asylum System with a uniform status, this is highly problematic. 
The Dublin system, according to which only one EU Member State 
examines an asylum application, presumes an illusory common 
standard in the application of refugee law which is sadly lacking. 
To counter these differences in asylum application treatment, the 
European Asylum Support Office should give priority to promoting 
and coordinating the identification and pooling of good practices 
regarding the examination of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and 
intersex asylum applications. A second general conclusion which 
follows from the present comparative study is that on a number of 
points, European State practice is below the standards required by 
international and European human rights and refugee law.
European practice clearly shows that national authorities in many 
instances rely on stereotypes when examining LGBTI asylum 
applications. For example, legal decisions still frequently rely on 
the idea that the sexual orientation of an asylum seeker is only to 
be taken seriously when the applicant has an ‘overwhelming and 
irreversible’ inner urge to have sex with a person of the same gender. 
These stereotypes exclude persecuted bisexuals from international 
protection, in addition to other LGBTI people who do not behave 
in accordance with the stereotypes used by decision makers. 
Stereotypes may exclude lesbians who do not behave in a masculine 
way, non-effeminate gays, and LGBTI applicants who have been 
married or who have children. 
Furthermore, the fundamental character of the relevant human 
rights for LGBTI individuals is frequently denied in the asylum 
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be expected that people refrain from giving expression to sexual 
orientation or gender identity – or that they express them only in 
deep secret since that results in people being denied the legitimate 
exercise of fundamental human rights. By using this argument, 
European asylum authorities effectively collude with homo- and 
transphobic actors in the country of origin in violating the expression 
of LGBTI rights. Apart from this fundamental normative problem, the 
discretion requirement is also problematic for a second, empirical 
reason: which is that the closet is a very unsafe place. The sexual 
orientation or gender identity of LGBTIs may be made public against 
their will, and there is a permanent risk that this will happen. This may 
happen by sexual partners, or by suspicious neighbours or relatives. 
This permanent risk implies a permanent risk of persecution. It may 
also be argued that, even if an LGBTI successfully conceals her or his 
sexual orientation or gender identity, the permanent situation of 
anguish and fear, which concealing a fundamental aspect of one’s life 
brings with it, is inhuman and degrading in itself.
Therefore, the discretion requirement should be abolished in the 
States where it is still being used.
4. Internal protection
Though not part of the 1951 Refugee Convention, many States rely 
upon what is known as the internal flight alternative or internal 
protection alternative in refusing international protection. Again, 
there is no problem in applying to LGBTI cases, as to any other case, 
the notion that, if the well-founded fear of persecution is specific for 
only one region of the country of origin, an asylum applicant may be 
expected to go to another region of the country of origin, where she 
or he will be safe from persecution. However, one should be aware 
that internal protection is only applied in cases where the applicant is 
presumed to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted by non-
State actors in one part of the country. In other words: the applicant 
is in need of protection. The protection which the applicant 
needs, and to which she or he is entitled, must for that reason be 
effective. This excludes the application of the internal protection 
alternative in countries where sexual orientation or gender identity 
is criminalised, because no protection will be available in such 
countries. It also excludes application of the internal protection 
alternatives in situations where ‘discretion’ of the applicant is 
expected in order to prevent further problems. Notwithstanding, 
we found that 16 European countries applied internal protection in 
LGBTI cases, while in 9 of these countries this was accompanied by 
discretion reasoning. 
2. State Protection against non-State Persecution
When LGBTI people have been subjected to persecution by non-
State actors (like relatives, or gangs) it may well be reasonable 
to apply the notion which holds that, before turning to external 
protection which the Refugee Convention provides, they can be 
expected to turn to the authorities of their own country in order 
to get internal protection. From an LGBTI rights perspective, the 
principle at the basis of this notion is to be applauded, because it 
expresses the obligation of national authorities to protect LGBTI 
citizens against violence by fellow-citizens. However, European 
practice should acknowledge in a more realistic way that such 
national protection may not be forthcoming. In ten European 
States, LGBTI applicants are required to turn to the authorities 
for protection even if sexual orientation or gender identity is 
criminalised in their country of origin; in four European countries, 
this is not required if the applicant is from a ‘criminalising’ country of 
origin. In most European countries, LGBTI applicants are required to 
turn to the authorities for protection even if these are known to be 
homophobic or transphobic; only in two European countries, is this 
different. 
It is quite unlikely that protection will be provided by the national 
authorities (and in many cases it is possible that further persecution, 
this time by the authorities, will occur) if:
(a) LGBTIs are criminalised in that country; even if these laws are not 
applied, their mere existence makes it unlikely that the authorities 
will provide protection to people who face persecution by non-State 
actors for engaging in criminalised behaviour; or
(b) the police are homo- or transphobic.
3. Concealment of sexual orientation or gender identity
Concealment, also known as the discretion requirement, is not a 
formal requirement but is used without a clear legal basis in cases 
where, in principle, a risk of persecution is acknowledged. However, 
the applicant herself or himself is expected to ward off persecution 
by being ‘discreet’ about her or his sexual orientation or gender 
identity. In other words: the applicant should remain in, or return 
to ‘the closet’ – the closet becomes another internal protection 
alternative. In a few European States, the discretion requirement has 
been abolished. In the large majority of European States, it is still 
frequently applied. The asylum authorities of these States often rule 
that concealment of the applicant’s sexual orientation or gender 
identity can be reasonably expected in order to prevent persecution. 
This notion is problematic on two counts. First, it cannot reasonably 
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who is not familiar with the best gay bar in Dublin is not gay; or 
that a woman who is married with a man and has a child cannot be 
lesbian or bisexual. Although there is no ready-made ‘solution’ for the 
use of stereotypes, it is of great importance that asylum authorities 
are made aware of the fact that they are inherently predisposed to 
rely on stereotypes in practice; that they should be aware of the 
particular stereotype(s) they rely on in examining cases; and that 
they should be open to questioning the particular stereotype(s) 
they use. To this aim, there should be a training module specifically 
about LGBTI asylum issues at the beginning of the training of asylum 
adjudicators and LGBTI issues should be a standard part of their 
general permanent education. The European Asylum Support Office 
has an important role to play on this point.
6. Late disclosure
It regularly happens that applicants disclose their sexual orientation 
or gender identity to the asylum authorities only later during the 
initial asylum procedure, or through a subsequent application. This 
can be caused by feelings of fear and shame or even internalised 
homo- or transphobia; the applicant may be unable to name his/
her own sexual orientation or gender identity, whatever his/her life 
experience actually is, or may fear that the news will reach people 
from the community who will then pass this information back to 
family in the country of origin or people from the same community 
in the country of refuge; the applicant may only have become aware 
of her or his sexual orientation or gender identity in the environment 
of the country of refuge; or the applicant may initially have been 
unaware that sexual orientation or gender identity can be relevant in 
the context of asylum. This may lead to caution or disbelief by asylum 
authorities, in particular where applications are made in countries 
in relation to which the asylum authorities have acknowledged that 
LGBTI applicants may be refugees. However, this does not justify 
reliance on practices which are bound to disqualify LGBTI applicants 
who do not fabricate their sexual orientation or gender identity, but 
who disclose their actual sexual orientation or gender identity later 
and need protection. These overly disqualifying practices can take 
two forms. In two European countries, a res judicata principle is used 
which allows asylum authorities to disregard information or evidence 
which could – in theory – have been submitted at an earlier stage. 
This principle may be applied flexibly, as happens in Austria, in 
ways allowing asylum authorities to examine the reasons for the 
late submission of, in our context, being L, G, B, T or I. Such varieties 
of the res judicata principle are not per se problematic. However, 
Dutch case law completely excludes late submissions from judicial 
examination, regardless of explanation. Such a rigid application of 
the res judicata principle is unacceptable, because they are bound to 
lead to denial of asylum to LGBTI applicants desperately in need of 
5. Credibility assessment
Credibility issues, where there is an assessment of the genuineness 
of the narrative of an asylum seeker’s claim, have come to be at the 
core of many, if not most, asylum cases. Credibility assessment is 
notoriously difficult, because, owing to the absence of adequate 
awareness and sensitivity on the side of the adjudicator, her/his 
subjective sense of lived reality is used as a benchmark in order 
to assess the statements of a person from another country, often 
another culture, with other communication codes and value systems. 
In many LGBTI cases reported in this study, credibility assessment 
focuses on whether or not the applicant is LGBTI. Two things add 
to the complexity of credibility assessment in LGBTI cases. One: in 
many European States, remnants of the notion that LGBTI identities 
are deviant in a medical, psychiatric or psychological sense are very 
much alive in an asylum context, although the notion has been 
formally abolished for sexual orientation, and by now is seriously 
contested for trans and intersex people. Since LGBTI identities are 
not legitimate medical, psychiatric or psychological categories, the 
use of medical, psychiatric or psychological expert opinions in 
order to establish an applicant’s sexual orientation or gender identity 
is not legitimate or appropriate. Producing such opinions entails an 
invasion of the applicant’s privacy which may cause intense suffering, 
especially for applicants who have faced similar interrogative 
practices in their country of origin. Because such opinions serve no 
legitimate purpose, the invasion of the applicant’s privacy constitutes 
an unjustified infringement of the right to respect for their private 
life. We emphasise that this concerns not only the notorious 
‘phallometry’ method, but other medical, psychiatric or psychological 
investigation methods as well. Conversely, medical, psychiatric 
or psychological expert opinions about the consequences which 
homo- or transphobia may have had for LGBTI applicants can be 
useful in order to examine an asylum application. However, medical, 
psychiatric or psychological investigations should not be used as 
a means to ‘prove’ an LGBTI identity. Sexual orientation and gender 
identity are a matter of self identification, not a matter of medicine, 
psychiatry or psychology.
The second issue adding to the complexity of credibility assessment 
in LGBTI asylum cases is the use of stereotypes. People use 
stereotypes in order to structure the sensory impulses they 
receive. Such stereotypes may be incorrect but often that is of no 
consequence e.g. if we think that all Swedes prefer vanilla ice cream, 
the possibility that this is incorrect will only bother us if we are 
planning to market ice cream in Sweden. However, it is a problem if 
asylum authorities think that all gay men from Iraq are effeminate; or 
that a lesbian from Sierra Leone must know whether lesbian sexual 
activities are criminal acts in Sierra Leone; or that a man from Egypt 
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protection. The second way in which ‘coming out late’ is dealt with 
is in the context of credibility. As indicated below, this is not per se 
unacceptable so long as it does not imply that late disclosure per 
se leads to a negative finding of lack of credibility. The moment at 
which facts are disclosed is merely one of many elements to be taken 
into account in credibility assessment. The reasons for late disclosure 
of information should always be taken into account.
7. Country of Origin Information
Country of origin information (COI) is crucial for the determination 
of asylum claims. It should be objective, complete and reliable. 
Therefore, it is necessary that all country reports contain information 
about the position of LGBTIs. This information should not only 
concern, or primarily focus on, gay men, but should also deal with 
lesbians, bisexuals, trans and intersex individuals. Furthermore, 
this information should not only provide facts about criminal law 
provisions. It should also provide data about the legal position of 
LGBTIs in family law, labour and social security law, affirmative action, 
in addition to possible protection, in policy as well as in practice, of 
LGBTIs against discrimination and violence. The European Asylum 
Support Office can play an important role in this matter. Moreover, 
it is crucial that available COI is used appropriately. Clearly, it may 
be difficult to access information about LGBTIs in some countries 
of origin precisely because of their poor human rights position. 
In particular, the absence of information – for example about the 
enforcement of criminalisation, or about the position of lesbians, 
trans or intersex people – should not be taken to mean that there 
is no risk. In such cases, more information must be gathered, for 
example from grass roots LGBTI organisations in the country of 
origin, or – if that is impossible – decisions should take into account 
the lack of accurate information, in particular by relying on the 
principle of ‘the benefit of the doubt’.
8. Reception
In reception and detention centres in Europe, LGBTI asylum 
applicants are frequently confronted with homophobic and 
transphobic behaviour, ranging from discrimination to abuse and 
violence. This stems from other asylum applicants and, in some cases, 
from reception or asylum authorities. The specific needs and issues 
of LGBTI asylum applicants should be addressed by developing 
appropriate procedures and guidelines. Among these, a proper and 
effective complaint system is crucial. Other appropriate measures 
include giving LGBTI applicants a form of control over their housing 
situation, and training the staff of reception, accommodation and 
detention centres.
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m a i n  r E c o m m E n d a t i o n S
The report contains recommendations on all the following points, 
some of which are very specific. These can be found in the text of 
each chapter, and the complete text of all recommendations can be 
found on page 79. The main recommendations are the following.
1. Refugee status should be granted to lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
trans and intersex applicants originating from countries 
where sexual orientation or gender identity are criminalised 
or where general provisions of criminal law are used in order 
to prosecute or persecute sexual orientation or gender 
identity. 
2. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants should 
not be required to invoke State protection against non-State 
actors of persecution when in the country of origin sexual 
orientation or gender identity are criminalised, or when 
authorities are homo- or transphobic.
3. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants should 
not be required or presumed to conceal their sexual 
orientation or gender identity in order to avoid persecution.
4. An internal protection alternative should not be raised in 
cases of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or intersex applicants 
from those countries which criminalise sexual orientation or 
gender identity.
5. Establishing sexual orientation or gender identity should, 
in principle, be based on self-identification; these are not 
medical or psychiatric categories. Interviewers, decision 
makers, the judiciary and legal aid providers should be 
trained to have better understanding of sexual orientation 
and gender identity, thereby preventing unhelpful reliance 
on stereotypes.
6. Late disclosure of sexual orientation or gender identity 
should not lead to denial of asylum. This should happen 
neither by inflexible application of a res judicata principle, 
nor by considering a ‘late coming out’ per se as an indication 
of non-credibility of an applicant’s sexual orientation or 
gender identity.
7. Country of origin information should always include 
information on the situation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans 
and intersex persons and not merely on criminal law. As 
long as little or no reliable country of origin information is 
available on the human rights situation of lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals, trans and intersex individuals in a particular 
country, this should not be considered as a sign that 
human rights violations against these groups do not occur. 
The principle of the benefit of the doubt is of particular 
importance in such situations.
8. In reception, accommodation and detention centres, 
measures must be taken in order to protect lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, trans and intersex asylum applicants against 
homophobic and transphobic violence.
9. The European Asylum Support Office should give priority to 
promoting and coordinating the identification and pooling 
of good practices regarding the examination of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, trans and intersex asylum applications. 
12
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i n t r o d u c t i o n
The present study seeks to help in closing this gap by providing 
a more extensive and qualitative research with data from lawyers, 
governments, academics and NGO’s, by describing policy and 
practice concerning LGBTI asylum seekers. On the basis of this 
information, we have sought to identify: 
 – issues on which policy and practice concerning LGBTI asylum 
applicants are similar or divergent in different EU Member States;
 – problems and dilemmas which Member States face when they 
seek to examine LGBTI asylum applications in a fair and efficient 
manner;
 – solutions which Member States may have found for these 
problems and dilemmas: ‘good practices’;
 – recommendations, which are based on the good practices of EU 
Member States, as well as on international and European human 
rights and refugee law.
In this way, we aim to contribute to a European practice in examining 
LGBTI asylum applications which is (a) in full accordance with 
international and European law, and (b) harmonised.
The attention to LGBTI human rights has developed significantly in 
recent years. This is illustrated by the fact that the first comprehensive 
report on homophobia in the EU Member States was published as 
recently as 2008.4 On a global level, the Yogyakarta Principles, on 
the application of existing international human rights standards 
to issues of sexual orientation and gender identity, were drafted in 
2007.5 In 2006, 54 Member states presented a joint statement to the 
Human Rights Council (HRC), addressing violence based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity.6 This was preceded by an earlier 
attempt led by Brazil to pass a resolution at the Commission on 
Human Rights in 2003. In 2008, France and the Netherlands took the 
initiative for a joint statement at the UN General Assembly, which 
was supported by 66 States.7 In March 2011, support for a resolution 
Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation in the EU Member States Part II – 
The Social Situation (updated version), 2009, p. 129. 
4 Supra, note 2. 
5 International Panel of Experts in International Human Rights Law and on 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Principles on the Application of 
International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity (2007), www.yogyakartaprinciples.org.
6 Norway et al., Joint statement on Human Rights violations based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity, 1 December 2006, Human Rights Council 3rd 
Session. 
7 Argentina et al., Joint statement on sexual orientation and gender identity, 18 
December 2008, United Nations General Assembly, 70th Plenary Meeting.
1  i n t r o d u c t i o n
HT, a gay man from Cameroon, had a relationship with another 
man for three years. After he and his partner were seen kissing 
by a neighbour in his back garden, he was subjected to serious 
violence by way of mob ‘justice’. Instead of helping him, the police 
joined the assault. The British asylum authorities denied asylum, 
arguing that he could move to another part of Cameroon where 
he was not known. It would be reasonably tolerable for him to 
conceal his sexual identity there. However, the Supreme Court 
quashed the decision, holding that lesbian, gay and bisexual 
people have a right to live freely and openly.1
1 . 1  W h y  l G B t i  a S y l u m  a p p l i c a n t S ?
The present study presents the first comparative research ever 
undertaken on the way in which LGBTI asylum claims are examined 
across Europe. Each year, thousands of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans 
and intersex (LGBTI) people apply for asylum in EU Member States. 
As the above example illustrates, asylum decisions may be based 
on problematic notions, and correcting these misguided notions 
requires paying explicit attention to the LGBTI aspects of the asylum 
applications concerned. Yet, little is known about the different ways 
in which the asylum applications of LGBTI people are dealt with in 
the different EU Member States. The European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) has issued several reports on Homophobia 
and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity in the EU Member States.2 One of the conclusions of the 
FRA’s social report is: “There is a significant lack of both academic 
research and unofficial NGO data regarding homophobia, 
transphobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and 
gender identity in many Member States and at the EU level. (...) The 
data gap analysis shows that there is a profound lack of quantitative 
and qualitative research and statistics on all the thematic areas 
covered in this report.” According to this report, asylum is one of the 
issues which “appear to be profoundly under-researched in all EU 
Member States.”3 
1 UK Supreme Court 7 July 2010, HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department , [2010] UKSC 31; [2011] 1 A.C. 596.569.
2 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Homophobia and 
Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation in the EU Member States Part 
I – Legal Analysis, 2008; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation in the EU 
Member States Part II – The Social Situation, 2009; European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds 
of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Comparative Legal Analysis (updated 
version), 2010; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Homophobia, 
transphobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender 
identity in the EU Member States, Summary of findings, trends, challenges and 
promising practices, 2010.
3 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Homophobia and 
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an obvious lacuna because Member States may assume now that 
gender identity is not a relevant persecution ground. In the most 
recent proposals for a recast of the Qualification Directive, gender 
identity is explicitly included.15
Because LGBTI asylum cases have only recently become the subject 
of debate, it is not surprising that, on this point, divergent practices 
exist in Europe, as is noted by the Commissioner for Human 
Rights,16 and as will become clear from this study. This divergence 
can be close to non-implementation of European law.17 This is a 
problem from the perspective of European policy. A harmonised 
interpretation and application of the concepts of refugee status and 
international protection is at the core of European asylum policy. 
However, it is a human rights issue as well. If the interpretation and 
application of asylum law in one or more European States is below 
the level required by European law, this is not only a violation of 
European law itself but may also make the transfer of asylum seekers 
to such States a violation of European law. This has already become 
evident in the context of human rights law: if the standards in one 
State are below the minimum level set by the European Convention 
on Human Rights, this can make the transfer of an asylum seeker to 
that State a violation of the Convention.18 The present study indicates 
that also in LGBTI cases, divergence between Member States may 
interfere with transfer of an asylum seeker to the Member State 
which is responsible for the examination of the claim.19 Therefore, 
it is urgent to find a solution for the divergences, not only from the 
15 Council of the European Union, Presidency’s Note to the Permanent 
Representatives Committee, Brussels, 6 July 2011, 2009/0164 (COD), ASILE 56, 
CODEC 1133.
16 Supra, p. 62-69.
17 Our national expert reported that Bulgaria has not implemented the Article 
10(1)(d) Qualification Directive definition of sexual orientation as a persecution 
ground into the national Law on Asylum and Refugees.
18 ECtHR 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Appl. No. 30696/09.
19 We do not elaborate on this further because we did not succeed in 
gathering sufficient empirical information on LGBTI Dublin cases. However, 
see the Belgian questionnaire (Chechenyan asylum seeker not removed to 
Poland because of great influx of homophobic Chechenyans); the German 
questionnaire (Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Schleswig-
Holstein 7 September 2009, 6 B 32/09: interim measure staying the transfer 
of an Iranian gay applicant because of the risk he would have to undergo 
phallometric testing “the conformity of which with human rights standards 
seems at least very much in doubt”; the Dutch questionnaire (litigation 
about the physical safety of two gay applicants in Slovenia), Rechtbank 
(Regional Court) Zwolle, 15 December 2008, 08/27847; 08/27850; Afdeling 
bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Administrative Jurisdiction 
Division of the Council of State) 7 September 2009, 200809455/1/V3; an 
Iranian gay applicant was rejected in the UK; the Netherlands did not 
assume responsibility, decision upheld by courts, Rechtbank (Regional Court) 
Zwolle, 14 December 2007, nr. 07/38475, Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak 
van de Raad van State (Judicial Division of the Council of State) 11 March 
2008, 200800250/1. Applicant was granted asylum in UK after subsequent 
re-examination, after pressure of the European Parliament http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/47da75002.html. In a Finnish intersex case, the applicant 
was not transferred for health reasons; the applicant was in need of hormonal 
and psychological treatment, which had been started in Finland already; this 
seems unrelated to the (non)availability of treatment in Italy.
condemning violence had built up to 85, while still falling short of 
the support of a majority of HRC Member States.8 Only three months 
later, a break-through came when South Africa successfully proposed 
a resolution in the HRC requesting a study on discrimination and 
sexual orientation.9
In light of the recent nature of these developments, it can scarcely 
be surprising that LGBTI asylum issues have only recently begun to 
receive attention. The UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims 
Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity was published 
in 2008. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe published a report on LGBT discrimination in June 2011. In 
the paragraph on asylum, the report identifies as challenges and 
obstacles the following issues: the way in which criminalisation 
of LGBTs in the country of origin is addressed, including the 
requirement that LGBTs conceal their sexual orientation or gender 
identity; credibility findings; and the position of LGBT asylum seekers 
in reception centres for asylum seekers.10 The first three topics are 
dealt with extensively in this study.
As yet, there are only two admissibility decisions by the European 
Court of Human Rights, both finding no systematic ill-treatment of 
gay men in Iran.11 The only outstanding application that has been 
communicated is a case of a gay asylum seeker from Iran.12 
Another aspect to which the Commissioner for Human Rights report 
calls attention to is that gender identity has not been addressed 
explicitly in either European law or legislation of EU Member 
States.13 However, the present research shows that ‘gender identity’ 
is explicitly mentioned in the context of membership of a particular 
social group in the asylum laws of Portugal and Spain, as well as 
in the policy guidelines of Austria and the UK.14 Although gender 
identity may be subsumed under the ‘gender-related aspects’ 
mentioned in Article 10(1)(d) of the Qualification Directive, this is 
8 Colombia et al., Joint statement on ending acts of violence and related human 
rights violations based on sexual orientation & gender identity, 22 March 2011, 
Human Rights Council 16th Session.
9 Human Rights Council, Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, 
A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1 (17 June 2011).
10 Commissioner for Human Rights: Discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation and gender identity in Europe, Council of Europe Publishing, 
Strasbourg, June 2011, p. 62-69.
11 ECtHR (Dec) 22 June 2004, F. v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 17431/03; ECtHR 
(Dec) 20 December 2004, I.I.N. v. the Netherlands, Appl. No. 2035/04.
12 ECtHR K.N. v. France, Appl. No. 47129/09 (gay Iranian); ECtHR D.B.N. v. the UK, 
Appl. No. 26550/10 (lesbian from Zimbabwe) was withdrawn following exit 
from the United Kingdom.
13 Commissioner for Human Rights: Discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation and gender identity in Europe, Council of Europe Publishing, 
Strasbourg, June 2011, p. 65.
14 See UK Home Office, Asylum Instruction: Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity in the Asylum Claim, 6 October 2010, revised on 13 June 2011; 
Austria explicitly mentioned gender identity as part of a social group in the 
“Regierungsvorlage”, a binding document.
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Throughout this report (see specifically Chapter 7) we see examples of 
LGBTI claimants ‘coming out’ to the asylum authorities only after their 
first application for asylum has been denied. Understandably, asylum 
authorities are cautious that these claimants fake being LGBTI in order 
to be granted asylum. But undeniably, there will also be people who 
fled their country of origin on account of LGBTI based persecution, but 
tried to be granted asylum on other grounds. They may have remained 
silent about their LGBTI related problems initially out of shame or fear 
or they may not have known that their LGBTI related experiences 
could be a ground for protection. Again, others may have been 
granted asylum on non-LGBTI related grounds, with the consequence 
of the LGBTI basis of their flight remaining invisible. Although this 
probably also happens in cases of gay applicants, it is particularly likely 
in cases of lesbian, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants, in light of 
their under representation (see further par. 1.6 below). There will also 
undeniably be a number who will live in the country with no legal 
status and never apply for status determination due to shame, stigma 
and fear. Therefore, we assume there is a dark number.
The difference between the number of LGBTI asylum seekers in 
Norway and Belgium is striking, and hard to explain. If we extrapolate 
the Belgian average percentage of 3,58% of the decisions to the total 
number of asylum applicants in the European Union in 2010 (which 
amounted to 235.90022), we would estimate there were about 8.450 
LGBTI asylum seekers in the EU annually. However, on the basis of 
22 UNHCR, Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2010, Statistical 
overview of asylum applications in Europe and selected non-European countries, 
2011, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4d8c5b109.html. 
perspective of LGBTI applicants, but also from the perspective of EU 
Member States and of the European Union as a whole.
1 . 2   n u m B E r  o f  l G B t i  a p p l i c a n t S ;  c o u n t r i E S  o f 
o r i G i n
The great majority of EU Member States does not collect statistical 
data about the number of LGBTI asylum applicants. Therefore it is 
not possible to give precise information about the number of LGBTI 
applicants in the EU. However, both Belgium and Norway do have 
statistics.20
Table 1: LGBTI decisions in Belgium
Table 2: LGBT decisions in Norway
There are more approximate data. The Swedish Migration Board 
in 2002 estimated the number of applicants seeking asylum in 
Sweden on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity to be 
approximately 300 per year. In the Netherlands, the applications 
of homosexual and transgender asylum seekers amount to 
approximately 200 per year. In Italy, according to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, in the period from 2005 to the beginning of 2008, at 
least 54 cases were filed, of which at least 29 were granted refugee 
status or humanitarian protection.21
There are reasons to believe the number of LGBTI claimants is higher. 
20 From 1 July 2011, also the UK will compile statistics on their Casework Information 
Database (source: Bill Brandon, Deputy Director Asylum, 9 June 2011).
21 Commissioner for Human Rights: Discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation and gender identity in Europe, Council of Europe Publishing, 
Strasbourg, June 2011, p. 66.
Year Total asylum decisions LGBTI asylum decisions Percentage of LGBTI asylum 
decisions
2008 8.964 226 2,52%
2009 8.883 362 4,08%
2010 13.170 522 3,96%
Total 2008-2010 31.017 1.110 3,58%
Source: Commissariat Général aux Réfugiés et aux Apatrides, Annual Reports, www.cgra.be/fr/Publications/2_Rapport_annuel/, last accessed 28 July 2011
Year Total asylum decisions LGBT asylum decisions LGBT %
2008 9.700 2   1  3 0,03%
2009 15.686 17  0  17 0,11%
2010 16.455 19  7  26 0,15%
Total 2008-2010 41.841 38  8  46 0,11%
Source: Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, www.udi.no/Norwegian-Directorate-of-Immigration/Oversiktsider/Statistikk-/Asylum/Asylum-decisions-in-first-instance-
by-outcome-and-nationality--/, last accessed 28 July 2011
16
i n t r o d u c t i o n
the networks of COC Netherlands; of the Migration Law Research 
Programme of VU University Amsterdam; and of the partners in this 
project: the European Council on Refugees and Exiles and (ECRE, 
and the European Legal Network on Asylum, ELENA) the Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee, and the Italian LGBT Lawyers Association 
(Avvocatura per i diritti LGBT/ Rete Lenford). We were assisted in this 
by The European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA-Europe), as well as the Geneva 
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.26 
Each national questionnaire indicates on which sources it is based. 
Most of the national questionnaires will be published on the project 
website.27 For some Member States, the national experts felt they 
were unable to publish the national questionnaire – even when 
anonymised – without disclosing confidential information, and 
for this reason, withheld consent for publication of the national 
questionnaire concerning their country. The questionnaires 
concerning Finland, Ireland, Romania and Spain are not published 
for that reason. Readers interested in seeing the material we relied 
on may contact the national experts of these countries for more 
information. In the report, whenever information about the situation 
in a particular country is not footnoted, it is based on the national 
questionnaire of the country in question, to which readers can turn 
for the sources we relied on.
A major advantage of research based on questionnaires is that it can 
have a wide geographical scope. That is the case in this research. The 
project includes many countries we could not possibly have covered 
without relying on questionnaires. Notably, however, research 
based on questionnaires is characterised by two problems. First, 
the way in which the national experts have understood the text of 
the questionnaire is hard to control. Due to differences in context, 
they may have given a different interpretation to the questions 
than we intended; or we may have given a different interpretation 
to the information presented in the national questionnaires than 
the national experts intended. We have tried to deal with this risk 
of misinterpretation by (a) using EU asylum law as the frame of 
reference of the questionnaire; (b) encouraging national experts 
to discuss the questions they had about the questionnaire in joint 
email discussions so as to develop a joint conceptual framework; 
(c) asking further questions about the national questionnaires we 
received, and requesting national experts to adapt their national 
questionnaire where appropriate; (d) by having a two day meeting 
about a first draft of the research report with all national experts, 
so as to ensure consistency; and (e) circulating the final draft of the 
report among all national experts, so as to enable them to avoid 
26 The list of the national experts we relied on is included as Annex I. The 
members of the Advisory Panel are included as Annex II.
27 www.rechten.vu.nl/fleeinghomophobiareport 
the Norwegian average percentage of 0,11% we would conclude 
that there were some 260 LGBTI applicants in Europe. However, this 
is an improbably low number, as the Swedish and Dutch asylum 
authorities estimated the number of LGBT asylum applicants at 300 
and 200 annually respectively. Therefore, more research on the issue 
is necessary. In the mean time, the Belgian percentage should be 
taken as a more reliable indicator of the number of LGBTI claimants. 
In addition to the latter, the ‘hidden’ number has to be reckoned with. 
Based on these assumptions a crude estimate is that there are up 
to 10.000 LGBTI related asylum applications in the European Union 
annually.
Because there are no reliable statistics, it is impossible to say how 
many LGBTI asylum applicants originate from which countries. 
However, on the basis of the examples mentioned by the national 
experts involved in this study, it is clear that LGBTI applicants 
originated from at least 104 countries in the world.23 It is not 
possible to quantify their numbers, because in this study the data on 
countries of origin were not collected with a quantitative aim, and 
therefore cannot be used for that purpose.
1 . 3  m E t h o d o l o G y
In order to map existing practices in the EU Member States, in 
October 2010 a questionnaire24 was sent to national experts in 
all Member States except Estonia, Latvia and Luxemburg, where 
the experts we contacted reported they were unable to report 
about LGBTI applicants. We included Norway (not an EU Member 
State, but participating in the EU asylum acquis in some ways) and 
Denmark (an EU Member State presently not participating in the 
asylum acquis).25 The national experts were identified by relying on 
23 These countries include Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo 
(DRC), Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia*, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Conakry, Guyana, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania*, Macedonia, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania*, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia*, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. 
Vincent & the Grenadines, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, 
Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab 
Emirates, United States, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia 
(FRY), Zambia, Zimbabwe. Countries that are now EU Member States have 
been marked with an asterisk.
24 Published on www.rechten.vu.nl/fleeinghomophobiareport. 
25 Switzerland answered our questionnaire partially. Israel, an associated state, 
was also included because we happened to know active LGBTI asylum 
advocates there, and decided to include it in order to show the situation in a 
State with a refugee determination system which is not influenced in any way 
by EU Directives and Regulations.
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context. It does bring us, however, to the third term we use: practice. 
In this study, this term is used loosely. It refers to individual cases and 
covers both individual instances as well as consistent patterns of 
behaviour. In the latter case, this will be indicated in the text. Good 
practice is the term we use for legislation, policy or practices which are 
conducive to the realisation of LGBTI rights. 
1 . 4 . 2  l G B t i
Central concepts in this study are sexual orientation and gender 
identity.28 Sexual orientation refers to a person’s capacity for 
emotional, affectional or sexual attraction to, and intimate relations 
with, individuals of a different gender (in which case a person has 
a heterosexual orientation), of the same gender (in which case 
someone is lesbian or gay) or more than one gender (in which case 
someone is bisexual). We try to stay away from the political and 
theoretical debates surrounding these terms, but sometimes we 
cannot. In some asylum cases, it is crucial whether (for example) a self-
identified lesbian or gay person who marries and has children actually 
is lesbian or gay; or whether that person is bisexual or heterosexual.
Gender identity refers to a person’s experience of gender, which may 
or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth. It includes 
the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if freely chosen, 
modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical 
or other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, 
speech and mannerisms. In this study we refer to gender identity as 
an umbrella term for trans and intersex people.
Intersex refers to having a body that is not considered standard for a 
male or female. Intersex can be used as an umbrella term covering 
differences of sexual development, which can consist of diagnosable 
congenital conditions in which development of chromosomal, 
gonadal or anatomic sex is atypical. 
Coming out refers to the process of self-acceptance of LGBTI people. 
People forge a lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or intersex identity 
first to themselves; and then may or may not reveal it to others. 
We emphasise that self-identification is crucial. A person in a 
monogamous heterosexual marriage may, nevertheless, experience 
her- or himself as lesbian, gay or bisexual. Publicly identifying oneself 
as LGBTI may or may not be part of coming out.
Criminalisation is a term that will be used frequently in this study. 
By criminalisation we mean laws that define sexual acts between 
persons of the same gender (among consenting persons above 
28 We have relied on the Yogyakarta Principles for the terms sexual orientation 
and gender identity. For other terms, we have sought to follow the usage of 
those terms by ILGA-Europe.
errors and inaccuracies concerning their countries. The second 
problematic aspect of research based on questionnaires is that the 
national questionnaires are inevitably different. This is caused by 
different factors, most notably the different research environment 
(in some Member States, most relevant information was available 
in online databases containing policy guidelines and case law; in 
others, the national experts had to start data collection from scratch), 
and the kind of expertise and background of the national expert 
(academic, lawyer, NGO). Nevertheless, this methodology enabled us 
to write the first comprehensive, Europe-wide study on LGBTI asylum 
cases. The limitations inherent in our approach indicate that further 
research, using other methodologies, is needed in order to further 
address the scarcity of data on LGBTI asylum issues in Europe.
As will be clear from the above, we have involved many experts 
in the drafting of this report. It should be clear, however, that the 
analysis presented here is that of the two authors alone. We have 
discussed our analyses with the national experts and with our 
advisory panel, and we have sought to include as many viewpoints 
as possible. Nevertheless, this text does not necessarily reflect the 
views of the people we consulted, or those of the organisations they 
work for.
1 . 4  t E r m i n o l o G y
In this report, three sets of terms are used. One set of terms is used 
in order to classify what happens in Member States. A second set of 
terms concerns LGBTI issues. The third set of terms concerns asylum.
1 . 4 . 1  l E G i S l at i o n ,  p o l i c y,  p r a c t i c E
In the questionnaire, we enquired about Member State legislation, 
policy and practice. By legislation we primarily mean written and 
binding legal rules which have been adopted in a procedure involving 
national parliaments. However, in most European countries legislative 
instruments adopted by parliament empower the executive to 
adopt binding written legal rules, which we classify as legislation as 
well. Examples are the Dutch Aliens Act (adopted by Parliament), on 
which the Aliens Decree and the Aliens Regulation (both adopted 
by the executive) are based. Policy is the term we use for the way in 
which the executive uses the decision making power it has been 
granted by legislation. Often, these are laid down in written form, 
which however have not been adopted by Parliament in the way 
formal legislation is; for this we use the term policy guidelines. In some 
jurisdictions, the term policy can also be used for an actual practice of 
civil servants which is so consistent that, because of the principle of 
equal treatment, it is required that this standing practice is followed in 
other cases as well. As far as we have seen, this is not relevant for our 
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death penalty, or to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. This has been stipulated explicitly in one Convention 
(UN Convention Against Torture, Article 3) while in other cases 
international supervisory bodies have formulated a rule to this effect 
on the basis of norms prohibiting the death penalty and torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment.34 In order to harmonise and 
modify this practice, the Qualification Directive has introduced the 
concept of subsidiary protection. This is the protection to be granted 
on the basis of Article 15 Qualification Directive to persons who, 
when returned to their country of origin, would face a real risk of 
being subjected to 
 – the death penalty or execution;
 – torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
 – or a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by 
reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or 
internal armed conflict.35
The term persecution in the refugee definition refers to threats to life 
or freedom (comp. Article 33(1) of the 1951 Geneva Convention). The 
notion of ‘threat to freedom’ is vague. Over the years, the concept 
of persecution has increasingly been interpreted and applied by 
reference to human rights norms. This is reflected in the Qualification 
Directive, which in Article 9 (1)(a) defines acts of persecution as 
acts which are sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to 
constitute a severe violation of a basic human right. Provision (b) of 
the same paragraph refers to the possibility that an accumulation of 
various measures constitutes persecution because it is sufficiently 
severe so as to affect an individual in a similar manner.
In the classical case, persecution consists of acts performed by 
government officials (such as police or secret service agents 
torturing suspects) as agents of persecution. If, however, human rights 
violations do not emanate from formal or de facto authorities, but 
from non-State actors (such as relatives or gangs) these can also 
be relevant for refugee and subsidiary protection status. In such 
cases, these human rights violations are to be considered as acts 
of persecution if the authorities are either unwilling, or unable to 
provide protection against such acts (Article 6(c) and 7 Qualification 
Directive).
34 For example, ECtHR 20 March 1991, Cruz Varas v. Sweden, Ser. A vol. 201 on 
Article 3 of the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights; 
Human Rights Committee 13 November 2002, C. v Australia, no. 900/1999 on 
Article 7 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
35 The formulation of this last provision is problematic; see for a first 
judgement of the Court of Justice of the EU CoJ 17 February 2009, Elgafaji v. 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie, C-465/07.
the age of consent) as crimes. The precise sexual acts covered 
by criminalisation are rarely spelled out in law, but are typically 
understood by courts to include any sexual contact deemed 
immoral. Consensual homosexual acts between persons above the 
age of consent are illegal in 76 countries in the world; in 40 of them 
only male-male sex is explicitly outlawed.
1 . 4 . 3  a S y l u m
In this subparagraph, we aim at introducing some central notions 
from international and European refugee law. The aim is not to 
map the debates about these core notions, but to provide minimal 
information about the terms we use in this study. There is ample 
literature providing more in depth information.29
Asylum law provides that persons who, upon return to their country 
of origin, would face particular kinds of risk to life or freedom, are 
protected against return to such a country. The core concept of 
asylum law is that of the refugee. As defined in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention,30 a refugee is a person, who is outside his or her country 
of nationality or habitual residence, with a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group, or political opinion.31 The application of this 
definition in EU Member States is harmonised at a minimum level by 
the Qualification Directive.32 
A person who is a refugee cannot be removed to her or his country 
of origin; this would constitute refoulement, which is forbidden by 
Article 33 (1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Over the past few 
decades, leave to remain has also been granted on other grounds.33 
Most notably, removal to the country of origin is prohibited if the 
person concerned would face a real risk of being subjected to the 
29 General books about refugee law are James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee 
Status, Toronto/Vancouver: Butterworths 1991; James C. Hathaway: The Rights 
of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2005; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam: The Refugee in International Law, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007 (3rd Edition). The leading general book 
on European asylum law is Hemme Battjes, European Asylum and International 
Law, Leiden: Brill 2006.
30 United Nations Treaties Series 189, p. 137.
31 The refugee definition has other elements, which however, are not relevant in 
our context.
32 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for 
the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons 
as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and 
the content of the protection granted, Official Journal L 304, 30 September 
2004, p. 12-23. The most recent version of the recast Qualification Directive 
is the Council’s text, Council of the European Union, Presidency’s Note to 
the Permanent Representatives Committee, Brussels, 6 July 2011, 2009/0164 
(COD), ASILE 56, CODEC 1133.
33 Some people believe that this protection has been granted instead of 
protection as a refugee (i.e. to people who would formerly have been 
recognised as Convention refugees) while others believe that it has been 
granted in addition to the protection of refugees (i.e. to people who formerly 
could not have been recognised as refugees and would have been returned 
to their country of origin). In the present context, this debate can be left aside.
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1 . 5  a i m S  o f  t h E  p r o j E c t ;  t a r G E t  G r o u p S
This project starts from the observation that there is a lack of data 
concerning the way in which the asylum applications of LGBTI 
applicants are dealt with in the European Union. We wish to address 
this data gap by collecting and disseminating the information which 
we have gathered during this project.
The information we have collected warrants two major conclusions:
1. There is considerable incongruity between European Union 
Member States on the adjudication of LGBTI asylum applications 
2. Some practices of European Union Member States are 
problematic from the point of view of international human rights 
law, including international refugee law.
In order to address these two issues, we have sought to identify 
good practices which are already being applied in some Member 
States, and which should be emulated by other Member States. 
Adoption of such good practices by other Member States would 
serve the aim of harmonising Member State practice in the field of 
LGBTI related asylum claims. In order to identify good practices, we 
have relied on international human rights and refugee law.
This implies that one important target group of this report is policy 
makers in the European Union – both at the level of the European 
Union itself and at the Member State level. The term policy maker 
is used here in a very broad sense, including the European Asylum 
Support Office, civil society which is often involved in developing 
policies, and organisations such as UNHCR. However, policy is not 
only to be formulated, but also applied in everyday practice. For 
that reason, we also aim at both informing and sensitising decision 
makers, lawyers, the judiciary and civil society at the national 
level. Specifically, for civil society, we aim at sensitising the LGBTI 
community to asylum issues, and the asylum community to LGBTI 
issues. In addition, we hope that the information presented in 
this report, as well as in the national questionnaires published on 
the accompanying website, can be used as a resource for training 
purposes. It can also be used as a starting point for further analysis 
and research.
1 . 6  t h E  i n v i S i B i l i t y  o f  l B t i ’ S
Publications about LGBTI asylum issues tend to focus on cases of 
gay men. For that reason, in our questionnaire we formulated most 
questions neutrally, so as to include all cases. At the same time, we 
If an asylum seeker has established a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted, that does not necessarily mean he or she qualifies for 
refugee status. The well-founded fear of being persecuted should 
be “for reasons of” (Article 1A-2 1951 Refugee Convention) race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion. In the concept of refugee, discrimination is a 
central element. In our context, two aspects of this requirement of 
a persecution ground are relevant. First: Article 10(1)(d) Qualification 
Directive provides that, depending on the circumstances in the 
country of origin, the concept of particular social group in the 
refugee definition may apply to a group based on a common 
characteristic of sexual orientation. Although this was recognised 
in at least one EU Member State as of 1981,36 this provision means 
that the refugee status of LGB asylum claimants cannot be denied 
on the ground that the requirement of a persecution ground is 
not fulfilled.37 Gender identity has not been incorporated explicitly 
in the Qualification Directive, although it should be considered to 
be covered by the ‘gender-related aspects’ of Article 10(1)(d), and 
will probably be explicitly mentioned in the revised Qualification 
Directive. Second: in Article 10(2) the Qualification Directive codifies 
another widely recognised aspect of persecution grounds, being 
attributed persecution grounds. In our context, this may be relevant 
where someone is the victim of homophobic or transphobic 
violence, because people mistakenly perceive the person to be L, G, 
B, T or I. Another example would be that being an LGBTI person is 
considered to infringe on religious norms or to indicate disloyalty to 
official ideology. In both cases, the person fears acts of persecution 
on account of an attributed persecution ground, and can be 
considered as a refugee.
There are no explicit international law norms for the asylum 
procedure. In the Procedures Directive,38 the European Union has laid 
down minimum standards for the asylum procedure. The practice in 
Member States should be in conformity with these minimum norms.
36 The first country to recognize sexual orientation as a persecution ground 
was the Netherlands, in Afdeling rechtspraak van de Raad van State 
(Judicial Division of the Council of State) 13 August 1981, Rechtspraak 
Vreemdelingenrecht 1981, 5, Gids Vreemdelingenrecht (oud) D12-51.
37 The influence of European law can be gleaned from the example of Israel, 
which is not a Member of the EU and not bound by the Qualification 
Directive; according to the Israeli expert in this research, Israel refuses to 
recognize LGBTIs as a potential social group. Denmark (a member of the EU, 
but not bound by the Qualification Directive) does, however, recognize LGBTIs 
as a potential social group; this predates the Qualification Directive, and 
reflects domestic legal developments rather than European law.
38 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, 
Official Journal L 326, 13 December 2005, p. 13-34. The most recent text of 
the recast Procedures Directive is the Commission’s Amended Proposal, COM 
(2011) 319 final, Brussels, 1 June 2011.
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on the circumstances. The visibility of, and reliable information about 
trans issues, and even more so of intersex issues, is low generally; the 
invisibility of trans and intersex asylum seekers may reflect this. 
The invisibility of LBTI applicants in this report may have different 
explanations from those given above. However, contrary to our 
intention, it may well be that this report reflects the general 
invisibility of LBTI asylum cases. We have sought to counter this by 
focussing specifically on LBTI cases where that was possible, and by 
using more LBTI examples than is representative of the information 
we have. In other words: we consciously over-represent the LBTI 
information we have. We think the invisibility of LBTI asylum cases 
should be the subject of further research.
asked explicit further questions about asylum cases concerning 
lesbian, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants. By means of the 
explicit questions about LBTI cases, we hoped to prevent a focus on 
gay asylum cases. Notwithstanding this explicit effort, information 
about LBTI cases is scarce, and not many cases have been reported.39 
Although the scarcity in information might be taken to reflect a 
lower frequency of LBTI persecution in countries of origin, this is 
hardly a plausible explanation. The assumption that in countries of 
origin anti-gay violence is so much more common than violence 
against lesbian, bisexual, trans and intersex people is simply not 
convincing. 
There are more plausible explanations for why there is a scarcity of 
data on LBTI claims. The first is: LBTIs may be less prone to apply for 
asylum on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 
There may be reasons why they are less outspoken about it, or less 
likely to come forward with LBTI issues towards asylum authorities.40 
The second explanation is: the patterns of persecution of LBTIs are 
less highlighted than those of gay men. When the LGBTI activist 
David Kato was murdered in Uganda on 26 January 2011, media, 
civil society organisations and officials immediately were aware 
of, and condemned, the murder. However, not many take notice 
of the number of trans persons murdered around the world: from 
January 2008 to December 2010 there were 539 reported deaths of 
murdered trans persons.41 
Another approach would be not to look for general explanations of 
the invisibility of LBTI applicants, but to look at the different groups. 
The lower frequency of asylum claims by lesbians may be related 
to the fact that, as a general matter, only one third of all asylum 
seekers in Western countries tend to be women, and a much lower 
percentage are single women. This last data might partly explain the 
low number of lesbian claimants. The information we received from 
our country experts indicates that the proportion of gay to lesbian 
asylum applicants is not two to one, but the percentage of lesbian 
claimants is much lower. The low frequency of bisexual asylum 
claimants may reflect the general invisibility of bisexuals, who are 
incorrectly labelled as either lesbian/gay or heterosexual, depending 
39 In this research twelve intersex cases were reported. Unfortunately, there was 
hardly any additional information about these cases, apart from their mere 
existence. The number of reported trans asylum cases was 67.
40 In Western countries, a large fraction of TI persons are not ‘out’. A study of a 
representative sample of 27.000 Danes revealed that 2 out of 3 transgendered 
persons never spoke to anyone about their gender identity, see Leyla 
Gransell and Henning Hansen, Equal and unequal? The living conditions and 
well being of gay and lesbian people, bisexuals and transgenders in Denmark, 
Copenhagen: Casa 2009, available at www.casa-analyse.dk/default.
asp?Action=Details&Item=387. It is unlikely that among asylum applicants in 
European countries more trans people are out than among Danes.
41 Transgender Europe, Trans Murder Monitoring Project: March 2011 Update, 
available at http://www.transrespect-transphobia.org/en_US/tvt-project/
tmm-results/tmm-march-2011.htm, last accessed 28 June 2011.
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officials from states which abolished criminalisation, the issue 
of criminalisation of sexual orientation or gender identity is of 
particular importance regarding LGBTI applicants from those 
countries. Firstly, in criminalising countries LGBs risk prosecution. 
Secondly, criminalisation reinforces a general climate of homophobia 
(presumably accompanied by transphobia) which enables State 
agents as well as non-State agents to persecute or harm LGB(TI)s 
with impunity. In short, criminalisation makes LGBs into outlaws, at 
risk of persecution or serious harm at any time.
Should criminalisation as such be a ground for granting asylum to 
applicants from those countries, provided the asylum authorities 
believe the applicant to be an LGB person? In the following case 
this question was answered negatively, based on a reported low 
enforcement of criminalisation:
The Irish Tribunal refused the appeal of a Pakistani lesbian woman 
stating: “I accept that homosexuality in Pakistan is a criminal 
offence. However, it appears as if cases involving homosexuality 
are rarely prosecuted. In that regard I would like to refer to the US 
Department of State Human Rights Report on Pakistan, February 
2009, in which it was stated that ‘homosexual intercourse is a 
criminal offence; in practice, however, the government rarely 
prosecuted cases’.”47
2 . 2  i n t E r n a t i o n a l  a n d  E u r o p E a n  S t a n d a r d S
Asylum applications have to be examined on an individual basis but 
all relevant facts have to be taken into account in this examination, 
including laws and regulations in the country of origin and the 
manner in which they are applied (Article 4(3)(a) Qualification 
Directive). It is relevant whether the applicant has already been 
subject to persecution or to direct threats of persecution (Article 
4(4) Qualification Directive) but this is not a necessary condition for 
granting refugee status. 
It is clear that a prison term or corporal punishment on account 
of engaging in same-sex sexual activities constitutes an act of 
persecution, because these acts are sufficiently serious by their 
nature as to constitute severe violations of basic human rights (Article 
9(1)(a) Qualification Directive), namely the right to liberty (Article 
5 ECHR) and the right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment 
47 Refugee Appeals Tribunal 2009.
2  c r i m i n a l i S a t i o n
2 . 1  i n t r o d u c t i o n
In 76 countries of the world, engaging in consensual same-sex sexual 
activities between adults is a criminal act,42 sometimes criminalising 
same-sex sexual contacts for both sexes43 and sometimes – not 
considering lesbians - criminalising only male-male sexual contacts.44 
In seven of these countries homosexual acts are punishable by the 
death penalty (Iran, northern States in Nigeria, Mauritania, Saudi 
Arabia, southern parts of Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen). In some of 
the 76 countries, same-sex sexual activities in themselves are not 
criminalised explicitly, but provisions that criminalise “unnatural” or 
“indecent” behaviour (or similar terms) are applied as to prosecute 
same-sex sexual activities.45 We will refer to such legislation by 
using the term ‘criminalisation’. Since explicit criminalisation is 
mostly targeted at sexual orientation, and not at gender identity, 
this chapter predominantly deals with LGB applications.46 However, 
the fact that sexual orientation is criminalised should be taken as 
an indicator that the position of trans and intersex people may 
be problematic as well. Similarly, in countries where lesbian sex 
is not explicitly criminalised, while gay sex is, this is an indication 
that lesbians are also at risk but tenuously ‘flying under the radar’. 
It should also be noted that in some countries trans identities may 
be targeted through criminalisation of cross-dressing or other 
transgressions of gender specific rules.
While many examples were reported of state persecution by 
42 Eddie Bruce-Jones and Lucas Paoli Itaborahy: State-sponsored Homophobia, A 
world survey of laws prohibiting same-sex activity between consenting adults, The 
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, May 2011, 
www.ilga.org, last accessed 5 July 2011.
43 For example the Gambian Criminal Code 1965, as amended in 2005, Article 
144: “Unnatural offences. (1) Any person who (a) has carnal knowledge of any 
person against the order of nature; or (b) has carnal knowledge of an animal; 
or (c) permits any person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against the 
order of nature; is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for a term of 
14 years. (2) In this section- “carnal knowledge of any person against the order 
of nature” includes- (a) carnal knowledge of the person through the anus or 
the mouth of the person; (b) inserting any object or thing into the vulva or the 
anus of the person for the purpose of simulating sex; and (c) committing any 
other homosexual act with the person.”
44 For example the Uzbekistan 1994 Criminal Code, Article 120: “Besoqolbozlik, 
that is, voluntary sexual intercourse of two male individuals – shall be 
punished with imprisonment up to three years.” Available at http://www.
legislationline.org/documents/id/8931
45 For example the Lebanese Penal Code of 1943, Article 534: “Any sexual 
intercourse against nature is punished with up to one year of imprisonment.” 
46 Apart from ILGA’s list of 76 criminalising countries there are countries where 
trans persons are prosecuted. For instance in Turkey, a country which 
abolished criminalisation of same-sex sexual acts as early as 1858, the Law on 
Misdemeanours is used to impose fines against trans persons, while courts 
have on occasions applied the principle of “unjust provocation” in favour 
of perpetrators of crimes against trans persons. See European Commission, 
Commission Staff Working Document: Turkey 2009 Progress Report, Brussels, 14 
October 2009, SEC (2009)1334, p. 26 and p. 72.
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after having been caught kissing a male friend in an alley, the Court 
found no indication that this had in fact resulted in any criminal 
proceedings being brought against him. The Court observed that 
the materials (information) “do not disclose a situation of active 
prosecution by the authorities of adults involved in consensual and 
private homosexual relationships.”53
UNHCR acknowledges that laws criminalising LGBTs, even when they 
are no longer systematically enforced, could also be enforced in an 
unofficial manner, which does not lead to recorded prosecutions, 
such as through police inflicted violence or extra-legal detention. 
In addition, UNHCR points out that persecution may be found 
even where there is no conclusive country of origin information to 
evidence that laws criminalising homosexual conduct are actually 
enforced.54 
2 . 3  S t a t E  p r a c t i c E
We found that in most Member States, for granting refugee status 
to applicants from countries which criminalise same-sex sexual 
activities, it is required that the criminalisation is enforced. However, 
in Italy enforcement is not required. In some other States even the 
existence of enforced criminalisation seems insufficient for granting 
protection to LGB asylum seekers from those states. Finally for some 
States, our information does not allow for clear conclusions, most 
notably because the situation is inconsistent.
2 . 3 . 1  E x i S t E n c E  o f  E n f o r c E d  c r i m i n a l i S at i o n  S u f f i c i E n t 
In France, actual enforcement of criminalisation is required for 
recognition as a refugee, but will then be sufficient. If criminalisation 
is not always enforced, but is applied with some regularity, this would 
be sufficient for recognition. If criminalisation is never enforced, 
claims are rejected. The same applies in Belgium and Sweden. 
Also in the United Kingdom criminal laws need to be enforced to 
constitute persecution. The Court of Appeal ruled that unenforced 
criminalization did not amount to persecution as defined by Article 
9(2)(c) as a discriminatory legal measure.55 
In Ireland, in one case a Kenyan gay applicant was recognised by the 
Tribunal as a refugee because the criminalisation of homosexuality 
53 ECtHR 20 December 2004, I.I.N. v. the Netherlands, Appl. No. 2035/04. 
54 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims 
Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 21 November 2008, par. 
20-21, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48abd5660.html 
[accessed 5 July 2011].
55 UK: Court of Appeal (England and Wales) 18 November 2009, JM (Uganda) and 
OO (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 1432; 
[2010] All ER (D) 17 (Jun).
(Article 3 ECHR).48 A person facing such punishment has a well-
founded fear of being persecuted on account of membership of a 
particular social group, which is based on the common characteristic 
of sexual orientation (Article 10(1)(d) Qualification Directive). 
Article 9(2)(c) of the Qualification Directive qualifies prosecution or 
punishment which is disproportionate or discriminatory as an act of 
persecution. Because criminalisation is inherently discriminatory,49 
prosecution or punishment on the basis of laws directly or indirectly 
criminalising LGBTIs per se will constitute persecution in the sense of 
the refugee definition.
In the cases of Dudgeon, Norris and Modinos50 the European 
Court of Human Rights held that the penal provisions criminalising 
homosexuality in respectively Northern Ireland, Ireland and Cyprus 
were contrary to the right to privacy in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In Norris v. Ireland the Court 
addressed “the detrimental effects which the very existence of 
legislative provisions in question can have on the life of a person of 
homosexual orientation.” This led to the acknowledgement that “the 
mere criminalisation is sufficient for the conclusion that the right to 
private life in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
of a person to whom these laws might be applicable is violated.”51
However, in its first gay asylum case, F. v. United Kingdom, the 
European Court of Human Rights has taken the position that the 
removal of an LGB person to a country that criminalises same-sex 
sexual acts (i.c. Iran) does not violate Article 8 ECHR. The Court held 
that “On a purely pragmatic basis, it cannot be required that an 
expelling Contracting State only return an alien to a country which 
is in full and effective enforcement of all the rights and freedoms set 
out in the Convention.”52 
In its second gay asylum case, I.I.N. v. the Netherlands, the European 
Court of Human Rights rejected the claim of a gay Iranian, based 
on Article 3 ECHR. While the applicant stated he had been arrested 
48 See on corporal punishment and Article 3 ECHR, ECtHR 25 April 1978, Tyrer v. 
the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 5856/72; and in the asylum context e.g. ECtHR 
22 June 2006, D. v. Turkey, Appl. No. 24245/03. 
49 In a formal sense, the concept of indecency may be used against 
heterosexuals as well. However, the concept tends to be used against LGBTI 
people in particular. Cf. Human Rights Watch, This Alien Legacy, The Origins of 
“Sodomy” Laws in British Colonialism, Human Rights Watch: New York 2008, 
www.hrw.org, last accessed 5 July 2011.
50 ECtHR 22 October 1981, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 7525/76; ECtHR 
26 October 1988, Norris v. Ireland, Appl. No. 10581/83; ECtHR 22 April 1993, 
Modinos v. Cyprus, Appl. No. 15070/89.
51 ECtHR 26 October 1988, Norris v. Ireland, Appl. No. 10581/83.
52 ECtHR 22 June 2004, F. v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 17341/03; comp. 
Committee Against Torture 20 May 2003, CAT, K.S.Y. v. the Netherlands, 190/2001 
(deportation of gay Iranian - no violation of Article 3 Convention against 
Torture); comp. on the application of Article 9 ECHR (Christians from Pakistan) 
ECtHR 28 February 2006, Z and T v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27034/05. 
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from countries where criminalisation is enforced would qualify for 
asylum.62 
In Austria a court granted refugee status to an Iranian gay man ruling 
that the situation for homosexuals in Iran is so serious that every 
homosexual has to fear persecution.63 
G o o d  p r a c t i c E :  i t a ly
In Italy, criminalisation in itself is considered as persecutory. 
Criminalisation is per se considered a limitation to the realisation of 
a human right. This has led to recognition as a refugee of a lesbian 
applicant from Senegal;64 a gay applicant from Egypt;65 and a gay 
applicant from Iran;66 and to the grant of subsidiary protection to a 
gay applicant from Ghana.67 
The enforcement of criminal law is not an issue in Italian practice: 
authorities and courts do not carry out an enquiry about the 
enforcement of criminal law.68
In brief: in eleven Member States,69 the existence of enforced 
criminalisation may be sufficient for recognition as a refugee of LGB 
claimants, although in some cases this is not deemed sufficient for 
refugee status depending on the individual circumstances of the 
62 See for example Rechtbank (Regional Court) Den Haag 11 November 2009, 
09/13455: the US State Department Report proves that section 377 of the 
Indian Penal Code is not a dead letter. On a regular basis this provision is used 
for police raids against homosexuals and for threatening gay people with 
arrest when they come to report acts of violence. Comp. Rechtbank (Regional 
Court) Haarlem 2 March 2010, 10/5782: applicant submitted country of origin 
information that stated several homosexuals have been arrested recently in 
Tanzania, the general climate towards homosexuals has deteriorated, and not 
only with respect to gay activists.
63 Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court), 17 February 2009, E2 255.708-2/2008.
64 Tribunale (Tribunal) Torino, 5 November 2010, 426/10.
65 Commissione territoriale per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale 
di Gorizia (Regional committee for the recognition of international protection 
of Gorizia), January 2011.
66 Commissione territoriale per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale 
di Milano (Regional committee for the recognition of international protection 
of Milan), 2011.
67 Tribunale (Tribunal) Caltanisetta 10 February 2010. 
68 Tribunale (Tribunal) Catania 4 March 2010, 1081/2010 (gay, Ghana); 
Tribunale (Tribunal) Trieste, 17 August 2009, 304/2009 (gay, Benin); Tribunale 
(Tribunal) Caltanisetta, 7 June 2010, (gay, Tunisia); Commissione territoriale 
per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale di Gorizia (Regional 
committee for the recognition of international protection of Gorizia), January 
2011 (gay, Egypt); Commissione territoriale per il riconoscimento della 
protezione internazionale di Milano (Regional committee for the recognition 
of international protection of Milan), 2011 (gay, Iran). In all the above cases 
the applicant was granted refugee status or subsidiary protection and in 
none of the above decisions/cases the enforcement of criminalization was 
assessed. Only Tribunale (Tribunal) Trieste 11 November 2009, 508/09 (gay; 
Senegal), reasoned that although in Senegal a sodomy law exists, there was 
no evidence of any fear of persecution among the citizens: however, the 
main reason to reject the claim seemingly was the lack of credibility of the 
applicant’s sexual orientation.
69 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom.
constituted prima facie evidence of State persecution on grounds 
of sexual orientation in that country. However, in other decisions, 
among which at least one other Kenyan case, refugee status was 
denied because criminalisation was not enforced. This suggests that 
the existence of enforced criminalisation may lead to recognition of 
LGB claimants from the countries of origin concerned.56 
The country expert for Lithuania reports that there have been no 
cases addressing this issue yet, though the government stated that 
criminalisation in the country of origin would be considered as 
persecution. In Poland, the asylum authorities stated that it does 
not make a difference whether criminalisation is enforced or not. 
However, in a Pakistani case refugee status was denied because 
criminalisation in Pakistan was – according to the decision maker – 
almost never enforced.
In Germany, the 1988 Bundesverwaltungsgericht judgement57 
held that criminalisation was insufficient for refugee status, which 
would require excessive punishment (such as the death penalty or 
corporal punishment). However, some recent case law presumes 
that the existence of enforced criminalisation should lead to refugee 
status, also in cases where there are no individualised indications 
that prosecution will occur. This has been ruled in cases concerning 
Iran58 and Cameroon,59 while in a Moroccan case the application 
was denied because the position of the Moroccan authorities 
in prosecuting same-sex relationships was said to be “rather 
pragmatic.”60 
In the Netherlands, the existence of enforced criminalisation in 
Iran was sufficient for a policy rule to the effect that LGBT applicants 
from Iran will in any case be granted asylum on domestic law 
based, humanitarian grounds. Decisions and case law rejecting LGB 
claims because in those countries there is no evidence of enforced 
criminalisation against LGB people61 suggest that LGB claimants 
56 Refugee Appeals Tribunal 2008. Applications were denied on this ground in 
cases originating from Kenya, Uganda and Pakistan. 
57 Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) of 15 March 1988, 
BVerwG 9 C 278.86.
58 Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Potsdam, 11 September 2006 - 9 K 
189/03.A.
59 Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Frankfurt/Oder, 11 November 2010, 
VG 4 K 772/10.A: arrests and convictions of homosexuals are rare but do take 
place.
60 Oberverwaltungsgericht (High Administrative Court) Berlin-Brandenburg 4 
February 2010 - 3 S 120.09.
61 See a Tunisian case, Rechtbank (Regional Court) Groningen 30 November 
2009, 09/41408; Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Judicial 
Division Council of State) 4 February 2010, 200909560/1/V2; a Cameroonian 
case Rechtbank (Regional Court) ‘s-Hertogenbosch 1 October 2009, 08/36980, 
upheld by Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Judicial 
Division Council of State) 25 January 2010, 200908271/1/V1; an Algerian 
case Rechtbank (Regional Court) ‘s-Gravenhage 9 December 2009, 09/23841, 
upheld by Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Judicial 
Division Council of State) 27 January 2010, 201000184/1A/2.
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For Finland, the fact that five Gambian LGB asylum claims were 
denied, while one was granted refugee status, suggests that the 
existence of (enforced) criminalisation is not decisive for recognition 
as a refugee. In fact, most LGB asylum claims in Finland originated 
from criminalising countries of origin, and many of those claims are 
being denied. Such decisions were also reported from Denmark, 
although they are not recent (Iran, 2000;73 Algeria, 1992 and 199874). 
In a leading case, the Norwegian Appeals Court denied asylum to 
an Iranian gay man on the following grounds: “The Appeals Court 
notes that the limitations homosexuals in Iran must endure, with 
regards to practising their sexual orientation because of social and 
religious condemnation in society, obviously cannot be regarded 
as persecution as defined by the UN-convention of 1951 or be 
considered as grounds for triggering a demand for protection. The 
Court moreover finds that denying a homosexual foreigner stay 
in Norway and returning the person to their home country where 
homosexual practices are punishable by law and leads to social 
condemnation, cannot be regarded as violating Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights”(emphasis added).75 
‘ S a f E  c o u n t r i E S ’
A separate finding, closely connected to the issue of criminalising 
countries of origin, is the practice in some Member States to use 
lists of so-called ‘safe countries of origin’. These are countries of origin 
considered to be safe, resulting in asylum seekers from these countries 
having less chance of being granted protection. They might, for instance, 
have their claims fast-tracked and their rights of defence restricted. 
While in some of these countries the lists are not publicly available, 
we have found the following countries on such lists: Albania, 
Armenia, Benin, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Gabon, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Nigeria, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Ukraine. 
In some of these countries same-sex sexual acts are criminalised 
(Botswana, Ghana, India (partly), Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania) while in others the general climate 
seems to be homophobic and/or transphobic. Lists of safe countries 
containing homophobic countries were reported from the Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Malta, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom. 
73 Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Appeals Board) 17 July 2000.
74 Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Appeals Board) 2 April 1992; Flygtningenævnet 
(Refugee Appeals Board) 1 September 1998. See also “Disturbing Knowledge 
– Decisions from asylum cases as documentation of persecution of LGBT-
persons”, LGBT Denmark and Danish Refugee Council (2008), http://www.lgbt.
dk/uploads/media/DisturbingKnowledge.PA.01.pdf
75 LB-2002-1351 - RG-2002-1259 (196-2002).
case. In Italy, the enforcement is not an issue, criminalisation per 
se could lead to refugee status for LGB claimants. In the Member 
States which require enforcement, the country of origin information 
on practical enforcement is crucial, as well as the way in which 
this information is interpreted; this is illustrated by the following 
judgement.
In 1998, the Austrian Federal Asylum Review Board showed a 
sensitive approach to the use of country of origin information in 
a gay Iranian case: “Although UNHCR reportedly does not know of 
any examples in which a person has been prosecuted based on his 
homosexuality, this does not provide for a conclusion considering 
the reasons why no prosecutions have occurred. There might 
not have been any trials based on homosexuality, homosexual 
people might have fled Iran and have been granted asylum in 
another country, or the appropriate evidence might not have been 
submitted. Therefore, from this information it cannot be concluded 
that the provisions criminalising homosexual acts, which do exist in 
Iran, are not being enforced in practice.”70 
2 . 3 . 2   E x i S t E n c E  o f  E n f o r c E d  c r i m i n a l i S at i o n  n o t  
S u f f i c i E n t
In four Member States, including Denmark, as well as in Norway, 
even the existence of enforced criminalisation in the country 
of origin seems to be insufficient for recognition as a refugee.71 
For recognition, it is required that applicants show that there are 
indications that prosecution will take place in their specific case. 
For example: the asylum applicant has previously been detained, or 
has been reported to the police, or has been caught by relatives or 
neighbours, or there are other indications that the authorities are 
aware of their criminalised behaviour and may react by prosecuting 
them. In such cases, the applicant not only has a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted, but actual persecution has already begun. 
From Bulgaria it was reported that, according to the State Agency 
for Refugees’ officials, proof of past persecution would be inevitably 
required for a positive decision.
In Spain in the case of a gay man from Algeria, the Court stated that 
“a gay in Algeria cannot have problems, the reality is not so serious as 
to consider that someone can be persecuted because of his sexual 
orientation.”72 From Spain it was also reported that refugee status 
concerning LGBTI applicants were (with one or two exceptions) only 
granted to LGBTI activists.
70 Unabhängiger Bundesasylsenat (Independent Federal Asylum Review Board) 
28 September 1998, 203.430/0-IX/26/98.
71 Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain.
72 Audiencia Nacional (National Court) 7 November 2008, rec. nº 1563/2007.
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man from Iran claimed he was caught in the act (of having sex 
with a male person) by the police. The Court ruled that it should 
be examined whether this would lead to a real risk of the death 
penalty. Furthermore, according to the Court, it should be examined, 
whether the Iranian law criminalising same-sex sexual acts is applied 
to anyone, or only to homosexuals. The Court considered this to 
be relevant in order to see whether an exclusion clause, based on 
committing a serious non-political crime, should be applied. 
2 . 4  c o n c l u S i o n
On an empirical level, in eleven Member States the existence of 
enforced criminalisation in the country of origin may be sufficient 
for recognition as a refugee for LGB asylum applicants from those 
countries. In four Member States (and Norway), the existence of 
enforced criminalisation is not sufficient for recognition as a refugee. 
Indications are further required that criminalisation will be enforced 
in the individual case with respect to this specific applicant. 
However, most countries where the existence of enforced 
criminalisation is insufficient for recognition of LGB applicants do 
not deny that an applicant who has a well-founded fear of being 
prosecuted for same-sex sexual activities between consenting 
adults also has a well-founded fear of being persecuted on account 
of membership of a particular social group.80 Consequently, it 
would appear that the difference in practices of European States is 
essentially about the ‘well-founded fear’ requirement. 
If one could be sure that the criminal law provision at stake is never 
enforced (for example: there is official policy to that effect, which 
is upheld in practice; but for political, cultural or religious reasons, 
revocation of the criminal law provision is not deemed prudent by 
the authorities) then the applicant does not have a well-founded fear 
of being persecuted on the grounds of this law. If one could be sure 
that the criminal law provision is always enforced, then clearly the 
applicant does have a well-founded fear of prosecution.
Reality tends to be more complicated than these two extremes and 
the enforcement of criminal provisions will vary in time and place. 
In criminalising countries, however, there is always the possibility 
of enforcement. It should also be taken into account that the 
existence of criminal sanctions reinforces the stigmatisation of LGBTIs 
in the countries concerned. Even in the absence of enforcement, 
80 Although Norway and Bulgaria seem to deny this – Norway because a prison 
sentence for same-sex sexual contacts is not deemed to be persecution, 
and Bulgaria because it has not transposed the Article 10(1)(d) Qualification 
Directive definition of sexual orientation as a persecution ground into the 
national Law on Asylum and Refugees.
2 . 3 . 3  c o u n t r i E S  i n  W h i c h  p r a c t i c E  i S  n o t  c l E a r
In the Czech Republic, in a case dating from before the entry into 
force of the Qualification Directive, the court held that the fact that 
homosexuality is a criminal act in the country of origin (Morocco) did 
not automatically satisfy the threshold of persecution, because of the 
low enforcement of this penal sanction.76 In a later ruling, the court 
referred to this judgement but stressed that the wording of the term 
persecution in Czech domestic law had changed so as to incorporate 
the Qualification Directive.77 However, the court did not address the 
purportedly low enforcement rate of Moroccan criminalisation in its 
judgement, which leaves it unclear whether enforced criminalisation 
would suffice for recognition as a refugee of LGB claimants.
In a Romanian case of an asylum seeker from Cameroon, the 
judge from the First Court used the following reasons for rejecting 
the case: “the applicant alleges that he is a victim of persecution 
because he is homosexual. But the only persecution he was victim 
to, was represented by his arrest for the recognised reason that he 
hugged and kissed another man in his car. Because in Cameroon 
homosexuality is considered a crime and the applicant committed 
this crime in a car, on a public road, the reaction of the authorities 
against him is perfectly normal. Besides, until 2001, the applicant’s 
act would have been considered a crime in Romania, also, and 
punished even more drastic than in Cameroon.” However, the judge 
from the Second Court acknowledged the enforced Penal Code from 
Cameroon and granted refugee status. 
In Portugal, one decision recognizing a Senegalese man as a 
refugee was based on criminalisation per se,78 but a negative decision 
concerning another Senegalese man and a Senegalese woman did 
not even mention criminalization in Senegal.79
The national expert from Slovakia reports that there is no 
established practice regarding LGBTI asylum cases on this point, 
although, in 2005, refugee status was granted to a bisexual applicant 
from a criminalising country, while the decision touched upon the 
criminal provisions in that country. The same applies for Cyprus, 
Greece and Malta. According to our national expert, practice in 
Hungary is inconsistent. 
From Slovenia a remarkable case was reported, though it should 
be noted that this judgement dates from 2005, before the 
implementation of the Qualification Directive. In this case a gay 
76 Supreme Administrative Court (Czech Republic) 23 November 2007, No. 5 Azs 
50/2007.
77 Supreme Administrative Court (Czech Republic) 28 May 2009, No. 6 Azs 
26/2009.
78 Asylum Procedure No. 148B/08.
79 Asylum Procedure No. 97C/08; Asylum Procedure No. 30C/10.
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orientation or gender identity are criminalised, or where general 
provisions of criminal law are used in order to prosecute people 
on account of their sexual orientation or gender identity.
•	 Countries of origin which criminalise sexual orientation or 
gender identity cannot be considered as ‘safe countries of origin’ 
for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants.
criminalisation amounts to State sponsored homophobia. In 
addition, because there is always the possibility of prosecution, LGB 
people are, as a general matter, defenceless against homophobic 
violence or extortion. Moreover, in countries where same-sex 
sexual activities are criminalised, State protection against anti-LGBTI 
violence must be deemed not to be forthcoming (see Chapter 3). 
It should also be noted that, although we found many examples in 
which applicants were rejected because of non-enforcement or low 
enforcement of the criminal laws, this finding does not necessarily 
mean that, a contrario, they would have been recognised if they 
originated from countries were criminalisation was enforced. Taking 
into account the current scarcity of country of origin information 
on LGBTIs (see Chapter 8), including information on enforcement 
of criminalisation, it cannot be ruled out that the issue of (non-)
enforcement of criminal provisions against LGBs is merely used as a 
means applied by asylum authorities to reject LGB applications. 
How could it be assessed whether, and to what extent, the provisions 
against sexual orientation are enforced? Data on the prosecution 
rate in criminalising countries of origin will be seldom provided 
by the prosecuting governments. Also, prosecution might take 
place in Sharia courts or local tribunals or other places for which 
information is difficult to find. Therefore, it is essential that country 
of origin information is used appropriately. In the present context, it 
is important that scarcity of information about enforcement is not 
taken as an indication that enforcement does not take place. Lack 
of information should be taken for what it is: that the organisation 
collecting information does not know. 
If one accepts that LGB people should not be required to hide 
their sexual orientation (see Chapter 4), then the fact that sexual 
activities between consenting adults of the same sex are criminalised 
in the country of origin should lead to the conclusion that LGB 
applicants from that country are refugees. They are likely to engage 
in criminalised conduct (or perceived to do so), hence they are 
likely to fall within the scope of criminal law. There is a reasonable 
likelihood that an LGB person from the criminalising country of origin 
in question will face persecution upon return, be it in the form of 
prosecution or in the form of extortion or other forms of violence 
against LGB people with no State protection to be found. 
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n S
•	 Article 4(3)(a) Qualification Directive should be applied in such a 
way that it leads to refugee status for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans 
and intersex applicants originating from countries where sexual 
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to Article 7(2) that this protection must be effective and of a non-
temporary nature.82
UNHCR has noted that criminal sanctions for homosexual activity 
impede the access of LGBT persons to State protection. 
“For example, a LGBT person who has been exposed to violence may 
hesitate to approach the police for protection because he or she may be 
regarded as an offender instead of a victim. An applicant could therefore 
also establish a valid claim where the State condones or tolerates 
discriminatory practices or harm perpetrated against him or her, or 
where the State is unable to protect him or her effectively against such 
harm.”83 
“A refugee claim can, thus, be established where the State is unwilling or 
unable to protect against violations committed by State or non-State 
actors. Instances where a State’s inaction may be persecutory include 
failure of the police to respond to requests for assistance, and refusal by 
the authorities to investigate, prosecute or punish individuals inflicting 
harm on LGBT persons.”84
3 . 2   S E E k i n G  p r o t E c t i o n  f r o m  S t a t E S  t h a t 
c r i m i n a l i S E  l G B t i ' S 
In some Member States, LGBTI applications are rejected on the ground 
that the applicant should have sought protection from national 
authorities against homophobic and transphobic violence by non-
State actors, while these national authorities criminalise LGBTIs. 
3 . 2 . 1  S t at E  p r a c t i c E
For instance in Austria, seeking national protection was required 
from a gay man from Zimbabwe:
He has known that he was homosexual since his time at school. 
People in Zimbabwe are against homosexuality, he was beaten 
by strangers several times and he has been discriminated against. 
Sometimes persons paid him or gave him presents when he had 
sex with them. After the community found out, they battered him 
even more. The negative decision of the Federal Asylum Office was 
cancelled once and there is still no final decision.85
82 Council of the European Union, Presidency’s Note to the Permanent 
Representatives Committee, Brussels, 6 July 2011, 2009/0164 (COD), ASILE 56, 
CODEC 1133.
83 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims 
Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 21 November 2008, p. 22.
84 Ibid. p. 27.
85 Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court) 12 August 2010, A2 414.747-1/2010. In another 
3    S t a t E  p r o t E c t i o n  a G a i n S t  n o n - S t a t E 
p E r S E c u t i o n
Many LGBTI asylum seekers do not flee persecution emanating 
only from the State, but they flee persecution or ill-treatment by 
non-State actors (family, neighbours, fellow-citizens or ‘mobs’), 
or situations involving both State and non-State actors. In such 
situations, international protection will only be granted if applicants 
are unable to get protection from their national authorities. 
Therefore, in these cases the reaction of the national authorities to 
persecution by non-State actors is crucial. Do they offer effective 
protection? 
This problem is illustrated by an Austrian case:
A Ukrainian gay asylum seeker said that he was beaten up by a 
group called “Ukrainian Patriots” (who often harass homosexuals) 
when he met other homosexuals and lost three teeth. He was 
also openly threatened by graffiti concerning him personally. 
When he left his home town and lived in a hotel he asked the 
waiter for the gay scene in this town. Two days later four persons 
came to his hotel room. He was raped by one of them, they 
threatened him and warned him not to call the police. This case is 
still pending, but the Constitutional Court cancelled the Asylum 
Court’s negative decision, even though he did not go to the 
Ukrainian police to complain about the violation of his rights.81
3 . 1  i n t E r n a t i o n a l  a n d  E u r o p E a n  S t a n d a r d S
Persecution by non-State actors has been recognised as relevant 
for asylum in Article 6 of the Qualification Directive. Actors of 
persecution or serious harm include non-State actors, if it can 
be demonstrated that the State or de facto authorities, including 
international organisations, are unable or unwilling to provide 
protection against persecution or serious harm. 
The primacy of national protection over international is reflected in 
the Qualification Directive: 
Article 7(2): Protection is generally provided when the actors 
mentioned in paragraph 1 take ‘reasonable steps’ to prevent the 
persecution or suffering of serious harm, inter alia, by operating an 
effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment 
of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, and the applicant 
has access to such protection. In the most recent version of the 
recast proposal of the Qualification Directive it is proposed to add 
81 Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court) 30 October 2009, D12 230.429-2/2009/8E.
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In addition, this policy is incorporated in some policy guidelines 
concerning specific countries. “Homosexuals in [country name] 
are not expected to turn to the police for protection”. On this 
basis, homosexuals from the following countries are not required 
to seek national protection in case of problems related to their 
sexual orientation: Afghanistan, Democratic Republic Congo, Guinea, 
Iraq, Ivory Coast, Nepal (referring to homosexuals, transvestites and 
transgenders), Nigeria,90 Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Syria. It should 
be noted that in some of these countries, homosexual acts are 
not criminalised, for instance in Nepal and Ivory Coast. In case of 
criminalising countries that do not appear in these country specific 
guidelines, LGBs can invoke the exemption from the requirement to 
seek national protection on the basis of the general policy rule, the 
application of which is not restricted to particular countries. It applies 
to all countries where same-sex sexual acts are criminalised.
In one Irish decision to grant the refugee appeal of a Kenyan gay 
man, the Tribunal referred to country of origin information that 
homosexuality is illegal in Kenya and that “in addition to repressive 
legislation gay people face stigmatisation and discrimination” and 
stated “in the opinion of the Tribunal this objective fact would 
absolve the applicant of the obligation to resort to state protection 
where available”. Accordingly, it was accepted that the applicant 
would be at risk of persecution if returned to Kenya and that 
he could not be expected to seek protection from the police or 
other state authorities.91 However, Irish practice is reported to be 
inconsistent, because in other cases it was expected to seek police 
protection in criminalising countries. 
From France, Germany and Italy is reported that seeking state 
protection against non-state actors is not required from LGBTIs 
originating from countries which criminalise homosexuality. 
In the United Kingdom, the same approach seems to be taken, 
insofar as LGB applicants from Jamaica are not expected to 
turn to their authorities for protection because of the prevailing 
homophobic climate.92 
3 . 2 . 3  c o n c l u S i o n
Our conclusion is that there is divergent state practice in the 
European Union on this point. On the basis of the information we 
90 For Nigeria, the policy guidelines mention that sexual activities between 
persons of the same sex are criminal acts, and refer to the general policy 
rule providing, inter alia, that applicants are not required to seek national 
protection if homosexuality is criminalised.
91 Refugee Appeals Tribunal 2008.
92 Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, DW (Jamaica) v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, CG [2005] UKAIT 00168 and UK Upper Tribunal, 24 June 
2011, SW (Jamaica) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG [2011] 
UKUT 00251. See also UK Home Office, Operational Guidance Note: Jamaica, 3 
May 2011, v 9.0, paragraph 3.7.7.
In Finland, applicants from Iran and Nigeria were required to seek 
protection from the state.86 In Norway protection was withheld to 
an Ethiopian man on this ground.87 In Portugal this happened in 
respect to applicants from Senegal and Angola,88 in Sweden for 
Iraq, and in Romania for Afghanistan. Also in Spain, seeking state 
protection was expected in countries that criminalise homosexuality. 
Although the Maltese authorities stated they do not to require this, 
an example to the contrary was found.
The next case illustrates the impossibility of seeking State protection 
in criminalising countries:
In Denmark, there was an Algerian bisexual man who had been 
threatened with a gun because of his sexual orientation by Islamic 
fundamentalists. He paid them off with some jewellery. He did 
not dare to report the incident to the police out of fear for being 
sentenced to prison. In the following weeks he received death 
threats by telephone. His friend was killed by having his throat slit. 
The application was rejected by the Danish Refugee Board, for there 
was no indication that his sexual orientation was known to the 
authorities. Furthermore the maximum penalty in Algeria was not 
considered “disproportionate compared to Danish law.”89 
No examples either way were reported from Bulgaria, Greece, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and the Czech 
Republic. 
3 . 2 . 2  G o o d  p r a c t i c E
A good practice is provided by the Netherlands, where since July 
2009 the policy guidelines explicitly state: “Whenever homosexual 
acts are criminalised in the country of origin, the applicant is not 
required to have invoked the protection of the authorities there” 
(Aliens Circular C2/2.10.2). 
gay case seeking protection from the Nigerian authorities was required.
86 Maahanmuuttovirasto (Finnish Migration Service) 25 November 2009 and 
Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Administrative Court of Helsinki) 26 October 2010, 
10/1422/1.
87 Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court) 1 March 2011, DUF: 2007 059077 09.
88 Asylum Procedure No. 97C/08, Asylum Procedure No. 30C/10, Asylum 
Procedure No. 124T/09.
89 Decision of the Refugee Appeals Board, 1998; Art. 338 of the Algerian Penal 
Code: Any person guilty of a homosexual act shall be punished with a term 
of imprisonment of between two months and two years and a fine of 500 to 
2000 Algerian dinars. See also “Disturbing Knowledge – Decisions from asylum 
cases as documentation of persecution of LGBT-persons”, LGBT Denmark and 
Danish Refugee Council (2008). 
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Many Finnish cases concern Russian LGBs. Decision makers claim that 
the applicant should seek protection from the police; however, when 
the police do not help them, they should bring their case to a court. 
In all of these cases applicants have suffered from incorrect or even 
hostile reactions from the police.93
From Finland we also received a positive asylum decision, concerning 
Iraq, where same-sex relationships are not clearly criminalised in the 
law (according to ILGA): “In general the authorities cannot guarantee 
the protection needed, because homosexuality is regarded illegal 
according to the religion and traditional mores. In most of the cases 
where homosexual persons have suffered from violence, honour 
killings, forced prostitution and kidnappings, nobody has been 
punished for those acts. There are many cases, where policemen 
have mistreated, sexually abused and blackmailed homosexuals.”94
For Denmark, examples where police protection was requested 
concerned Russia (1994, 2003), Albania (2002), Lithuania (1997), 
and Turkey (2000).95 When former Soviet Union countries 
decriminalised homosexuality, claims were rejected immediately, 
before any evidence concerning the availability of protection by the 
authorities could be obtained (e.g. Russia 1994). In a case of a gay 
man from Romania (1995) the decision was based on the expected 
decriminalisation in near future.96 
In Lithuania there were two cases of gay Kazakh asylum seekers, 
who claimed they had sought protection from the militia, although 
the militia usually did not take any action and even expressed views 
like: “homosexuals have to be exterminated.” Country of origin 
information showed that protection generally would not be available 
to gay people in Kazakhstan. However, the Lithuanian Migration 
Department required evidence that they had actively applied to the 
Kazakh state authorities and that those were unable or unwilling to 
protect.
Several Czech judgments dating from before the entry into force 
of the Qualification Directive held that applicants failed to seek 
protection from the state authorities in the country of origin, 
even though the police had a reputation of being homophobic.97 
93 Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Administrative Court of Helsinki) 26 October 2007, 
07/1355/1; Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Administrative Court of Helsinki) 30 
September 2008, 08/1444/3; Maahanmuuttovirasto (Finnish Migration Service) 
7 September 2009.
94 Maahanmuuttovirasto (Finnish Migration Service) 12 February 2010.
95 Russia: Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Appeals Board) 12 January 1994; 
Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Appeals Board) 25 February 2003; Albania: 
Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Appeals Board) 16 May 2002; Lithuania: 
Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Appeals Board) 28 July 1997; Turkey: 
Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Appeals Board) 16 February 2000.
96 Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Appeals Board), 11 May 1995.
97 Claims were rejected because the applicants did not seek State protection 
against persecution by non-State agents, even though the effectiveness 
have, seeking State protection even if LGBTIs are criminalised in 
the country of origin is required in Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Romania, Malta and Spain. 
In other Member States, seeking State protection is not required if 
LGBTIs are criminalised in the country of origin; this is the case in the 
Netherlands, France, Germany and Italy. 
It is clear that in countries where homosexual acts (or other ‘deviant’ 
sexualities) are criminalised, acts of non-State persecution (including 
discrimination) cannot be remedied by turning to the authorities for 
protection, because this may lead to criminal sanctions on account 
of sexual orientation. Even in countries where criminal sanctions are 
not actively enforced in order to prosecute LGBTIs, the authorities 
cannot reasonably be expected to provide effective protection. 
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n S 
•	 Article 7 of the Qualification Directive should be applied in such 
a way that lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants 
are only required to turn to the authorities for protection, if it has 
been established that effective protection of a non-temporary 
nature would generally be available for lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
trans and intersex people in that country.
•	 Article 7 of the Qualification Directive should be applied in such a 
way that, when sexual orientation or gender identity is criminalised 
in the country of origin, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or intersex 
applicants are not required to invoke the protection of the authorities. 
3 . 3   S t a t E  p r o t E c t i o n  a n d  h o m o p h o B i c / 
t r a n S p h o B i c  a u t h o r i t i E S 
It may be that in the country of origin of the applicant, criminal 
law has never been used against LGBTIs, or that Penal law has been 
amended so as to decriminalise homosexuality. Even then, it may be 
unreasonable to expect LGBTI asylum seekers to turn to the national 
authorities for protection, since such an attempt may be either 
useless because the authorities would not do anything to protect 
them, or it might be positively risky for their future safety from the 
authorities and/or non-state actors.
3 . 3 . 1  S t at E  p r a c t i c E
Because of the diversity of Member State practices, we purposely 
provide many examples of the notion of State protection in countries of 
origin where the police or other authorities are homo- or transphobic.
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policy guidelines explicitly state that “homosexuals, transvestites 
and transgenders can obtain national protection, unless it has been 
established in the individual case that this is not so,” although this 
information is contrary to the information in the Dutch country 
report on Turkey.101
The decisions identified in Portugal indicate that seeking protection 
from police is always a requirement. Information on whether that 
protection would be available to LGBTI individuals does not seem to 
be sought by the Portuguese authorities nor does this play any role 
in decision-making.
In Sweden, it is common to require LGBTI applicants from ex-Soviet 
Union countries (like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) and Mongolia to 
seek State protection. 
In Germany, it is usually not required that LGBTI applicants seek 
protection from authorities which are known to be homophobic, 
with one exception in a rejected case of a trans woman from 
Venezuela: The Federal Office considered that she should have 
reported the threats from a criminal gang to the police. In spite 
of her claim that she had been frequently subjected to degrading 
treatment by state authorities and that she could not get protection 
from the police, as they were corrupt and cooperating with the 
criminal gang, the court agreed with the Federal Office. It must be 
noted though, that the main reasons for the rejection of the claim 
were significant doubts concerning her credibility.102 
In Spain, a Georgian gay who suffered physical attacks because of 
his sexual orientation, was rejected by the National Court because 
“the attitude of the police was not totally passive towards the 
problems the asylum seeker submitted as a basis for his asylum 
claim”. The Court reached this conclusion “because on the day the 
asylum seeker was hit, there was police intervention. Although 
they did not take measures as effectively as would have been 
necessary.”103 
The case law of the Polish Office for Aliens as well as the court’s 
case law is consistent in requiring that the applicants show the 
impossibility or ineffectiveness of state protection. However, 
the applicants may be asked to put forward evidence why such 
of State, 8 June 2007, 200700569/1 (appeal dismissed), Rechtbank (Regional 
Court) Zutphen, 17 March 2006, nr. 06/9846 (appeal dismissed).
101 See Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country Report Turkey, 1 September 
2010, par. 3.4.6, available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/bz/
documenten-en-publicaties/ambtsberichten/2010/09/14/turkije-2010-09-14.
html. 
102 Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Dresden, 15 May 2009, A1 K 
30157/07.
103 Audiencia Nacional (National Court) 23 May 2007, rec. nº 412/2004.
Since the transposition of the Qualification Directive, the Supreme 
Administrative Court interprets this requirement in light of Art. 7(2) 
of the Qualification Directive. Since the Department of Asylum and 
Migration Policies of the Ministry of the Interior (DAMP) can no 
longer reject an asylum claim merely on the ground that persecution 
emanates from ‘non-state agents’, the failure to seek protection from 
state authorities has become the most common reason for rejecting 
refugee claims. However, there have not been LGBTI cases yet 
discussing these issues in a comprehensive manner. 
The case law of the Dutch Judicial Division of the Council of State 
holds that it has to be established firstly whether the authorities 
in the country concerned provide protection in general. Only 
after this is established, is the question addressed whether the 
applicant has established that seeking protection would have been 
clearly dangerous or pointless. If not, the applicant is required to 
have sought State protection. The authorities are only deemed to 
have been unable or unwilling to grant protection if the applicant 
has invoked protection in vain.98 Only after this has proven to be 
dangerous or pointless, will the claim be examined on its merits.
The Dutch country report on Armenia99 states that “in general 
homosexuals do not turn to the police for help, because there is 
no guarantee that they will get protection from the police. Upon 
contacting the police, homosexuals run the risk of being blackmailed 
by the police.” However, according to the Court in the case of a gay 
Armenian, this does not mean that asking protection from the higher 
authorities would be dangerous or pointless.100 For Turkey, the Dutch 
of protection and/or availability of protection was questionable or not 
addressed at all by the Department of Asylum and Migration Policies of the 
Ministry of the Interior (DAMP). See e.g. Supreme Administrative Court (Czech 
Republic), 5 October 2006, No. 2 Azs 66/2006; and Supreme Administrative 
Court (Czech Republic), 27 February 2008, No. 6 Azs 4/2008. See also cases in 
which applicants were required to seek State protection (at higher echelons 
of the police hierarchy) even though the applicant was subject to ridicule, 
intimidation or sexual harassment by the police when he or she turned to 
the local police officers: e.g. Supreme Administrative Court (Czech Republic), 
20 April 2005, No. 3 Azs 245/2004; Supreme Administrative Court (Czech 
Republic), 30 October 2006, No. 4 Azs 13/2006; and Supreme Administrative 
Court (Czech Republic), 30 June 2006, No. 8 Azs 101/2005.
98 e.g. Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Judicial Division of 
the Council of State) 12 December 2010, LJN: BL4567.
99 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country Report Armenia, 19 December 
2006.
100 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Zutphen, 10 October 2007, nr. 07/17458 (appeal 
dismissed). Confirmed by the Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van 
State (Judicial Division of the Council of State) 18 February 2008, 200707743/1. 
Comp. Rechtbank (Regional Court) Groningen, 3 November 2008, nr. 
08/12467, appeal by applicant dismissed without reasons by Judicial Division 
of the Council of State, 7 April 2009, 200808661/1/V1 (China); Rechtbank 
(Regional Court) ‘s-Hertogenbosch, 16 February 2010, nr. 09/16343, applicant’s 
appeal dismissed without reasons by Judicial Division of the Council of State, 
11 June 2010, 201002793/1A/2. See also Rechtbank (Regional Court) Almelo, 
28 May 2010, nr. 10/16955, Judicial Division of the Council of State, 31 August 
2010, 201005517/1/V2 (appeal dismissed); Rechtbank (Regional Court) 
Arnhem, 21 December 2006, nr. 06/21595, Judicial Division of the Council 
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protection would be ineffective or impossible to obtain, and thus 
rebut the assumption. In the case of a trans person from Ingushetia, 
the Office took notice of the fact that the local authorities were 
unwilling to offer protection.
3 . 3 . 2  G o o d  p r a c t i c E
In France, homophobia in official circles is taken into account when 
it comes to the requirement of invoking State protection:
The French National Asylum Law Court held that a Kosovar applicant 
had not asked police protection: ‘Although homosexuality is not 
criminalised in Kosovo, homosexuals can be the victim of grave 
discrimination and violence; complaints lodged with the authorities 
are not always followed upon, when they concern persons 
belonging to the gay community, and may even give rise to reprisals; 
individuals who have been the victim of such facts most often refrain 
from filing a complaint; the attitude of the Kosovo authorities can be 
perceived as encouraging homophobic acts.’104
In Germany, generally it is not expected that LGBTI applicants seek 
State protection in countries where the authorities are homophobic 
(but, for an exception, see above). 
3 . 3 . 3  c o n c l u S i o n
There is divergent State practice on this point. It is clear that 
in countries where national or local authorities are homo- or 
transphobic, acts of non-State persecution (including discrimination) 
cannot be remedied by turning to the authorities for protection 
because this may lead to the person being subjected to further 
homo- or transphobia, this time from the police. Even when the 
authorities are not likely to engage in anti-LGBTI violence themselves, 
homo- and transphobic authorities are not likely to provide effective 
and non-temporary protection against anti-LGBTI violence or other 
forms of discrimination. 
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n
•	 Article 7 of the Qualification Directive should be applied in such 
a way that when potential actors of protection are likely to be 
homophobic/transphobic, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or intersex 
applicants are not required to have invoked the protection of the 
authorities. 
104 Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile (National Court for Asylum Law), 23 December 
2009, ref 09012138; for comparable rulings on Morocco see Cour Nationale du 
Droit d’Asile (National Court for Asylum Law), 29 January 2008, ref 602367; and 
on Albania Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile (National Court for Asylum Law), 10 
December 2009, ref 08018574.
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of the five persecution grounds. One of the persecution grounds 
is membership of a particular social group. Article 10(1)(d) of the 
Qualification Directive holds that a group shall be considered to form 
a particular social group where, in particular, the members of that 
group share a characteristic that is so fundamental to identity that 
a person should not be forced to renounce it. What the discretion 
requirement in fact does is to require LGBTI applicants to renounce 
the expression of their sexual orientation or gender identity; they are 
expected not to act on it, or at least to hide this crucial element of 
their personality, so as to escape being persecuted. This requirement 
goes against the Qualification Directive provision. 
Also UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity makes it clear that the discretion requirement should be 
abandoned, by stating: 
“A person cannot be expected or required by the State to change 
or conceal his or her identity in order to avoid persecution. As 
affirmed by numerous jurisdictions, persecution does not cease 
to be persecution because those persecuted can eliminate 
the harm by taking avoiding action. Just as a claim based 
on political opinion or nationality would not be dismissed on 
grounds that the applicant could avoid the anticipated harm by 
changing or concealing his or her beliefs or identity, applications 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity should not be 
rejected merely on such grounds. 
The question to be considered is whether the applicant has a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted, rather than whether he or 
she could live in the country of origin without attracting adverse 
consequences. This requires an objective examination of how 
the applicant may be treated if he or she were returned to that 
country. (…) There is no duty to be “discreet” or to take certain 
steps to avoid persecution, such as living a life of isolation, or 
refraining from having intimate relationships. A requirement 
for discretion would furthermore imply that a person’s sexual 
orientation is confined to a mere sexual act, thereby overlooking 
a range of behaviours and everyday activities otherwise affected 
by that person’s sexual orientation and gender identity. It would, 
in fact, amount to requiring the ‘same submissive and compliant 
behaviour, the same denial of a fundamental right, which the 
agent of persecution seeks to achieve by persecutory conduct.”106 
106 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims 
Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 21 November 2008, par. 25-
26.
4  t h E  d i S c r E t i o n  r E q u i r E m E n t
In large parts of the world people still hide their sexual orientation 
or gender identity. They stay ‘in the closet’ (i.e. conceal their sexual 
orientation or gender identity) because they fear harm from others: 
their family-members, friends, neighbours, society in general or state 
authorities. The reactions to disclosure (‘coming out’) can take the 
form of abuse, discrimination, forced marriage, torture, rape, murder, 
etc. 
LGBTI people who leave their country in order to seek refuge and 
apply for international protection elsewhere, are often rejected with 
the reasoning that they have nothing to fear in their country of origin 
as long as they remain ‘discreet’. The explicit or implicit requirement 
that a person acts discreetly in order to prevent being persecuted on 
grounds of his or her sexual orientation or gender identity occurs in 
many countries and legal systems. Often discretion is required in the 
context of an internal protection alternative (see also Chapter 5).
In the case of an Algerian applicant the Hungarian Office of 
Immigration and Nationality stated that “even if criminal sanctions 
against homosexuals or homosexual behaviour are in force, the 
sexual orientation can be practised in a hidden, discreet way, in 
order to prevent possible attacks.”
In the last decade this type of reasoning has met severe criticism 
from lawyers and activists, which has led to substantive changes in 
asylum practice in some countries outside Europe.105 
4 . 1  i n t E r n a t i o n a l  a n d  E u r o p E a n  S t a n d a r d S
Article 1A-2 of the Refugee Convention (and, consequently, Article 
2(c) of the Qualification Directive) defines a refugee as someone 
who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of one 
105 In 2003, the High Court of Australia held: “It would undermine the object of 
the Convention if the signatory countries required them to modify their beliefs 
or opinions or to hide their race, nationality or membership of particular 
social groups before those countries would give them protection under the 
Convention”, High Court of Australia 9 December 2003, Appellant S396/2002 
v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2003] HCA 71, S395/2002 
and S396/2002. In 2004, the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority 
ruled: “By requiring the refugee applicant to abandon a core right the refugee 
decision-maker is requiring of the refugee claimant the same submissive 
and compliant behaviour, the same denial of a fundamental human right, 
which the agent of persecution in the country of origin seeks to achieve by 
persecutory conduct. The potential complicity of the refugee decision-maker 
in the refugee claimant’s predicament of ‘being persecuted’ in the country of 
origin must be confronted”, Refugee Appeal no. 74665/03, 7 July 2004; cf. for 
similar rulings: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 7 March 
2005, Karouni v. Gonzales, Attorney General, No. 02-72651, 399 F.3d 1163 
(2005), and: Federal Court of Canada 8 October 2008, Atta Fosu v. the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration, 2008 FC 1135.
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centres, known as homosexual meeting places.”109 The appeal was 
dismissed.110 
The Norwegian Directory of Immigration held: “Regarding an 
evaluation of the risks that the complainant will meet if he returns 
to Iran, we must consider the socio-cultural framework which exists 
in Iranian society. The Appeals Board supposes that the applicant 
will not act in a way which is in conflict with what is socially 
acceptable.”111
Recently, in Switzerland the asylum application of a gay man from 
Iran was rejected by the Federal Administrative Court, stating that in 
practice homosexuality is tolerated by the Iranian authorities, “when 
it is not publicly exposed in a way which could be offensive.”112 
Comparable examples were reported from Finland113 and 
Germany.114
From Austria it was reported that the discretion argument is 
mostly used in cases of bisexuals. Bisexuals can be expected to 
practice discretion in a particular way. For instance, in a case of a 
bisexual Iranian the court believed he had homosexual experiences, 
but decided that “these were not so deeply engraved in his 
sexual orientation, that it would be impossible for him to live in a 
heterosexual relationship.”115 
Other discretion examples were found in Hungary: In a West-African 
lesbian’s case the Hungarian authority stated: “Even if the applicant 
was a lesbian, if she would not make her lesbianism public, she 
would not have to fear the consequences of her behaviour.” The 
Bulgarian expert reported an apparent common opinion shared by 
the State Agency for Refugees’ officials, that it is better if a gay man 
returns to his country of origin and tries to live a more discreet life or 
even to make an attempt to ‘change’ his sexual orientation. 
109 This was based on a Norwegian source of 27 April 2009.
110 Raad voor de Vreemdelingenbetwistingen (Council for Aliens Cases) 31 March 
2010, 41 185, v Lex 200952695.
111 Decision dating from autumn 2010.
112 Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court ) 18 January 
2011, T. v. Bundesamt für Migration, C-2107/2010; see also: Seraina Nufer and 
Maximillian Lipp, Zulässigkeit der Wegweisung eines homosexuellen Iraners, 
Jusletter, 30 May 2011. www.jusletter.ch.
113 Maahanmuuttovirasto (Finnish Migration Service) 6 October 2010, Dnro 
3498/0512/2010. Comp. in an Afghan case: “Homosexuality is common in 
Afghanistan, but it cannot be expressed publicly. If you keep quiet about 
it, you will not get into unreasonable difficulties, according to the country 
of origin information” Maahanmuuttovirasto (Finnish Migration Service) 1 
November 2010, Dnro 3744/0512/2010.
114 In Iran there was deemed to be no serious risk of persecution for gay men “as 
long as they practice same-sex sexual life covertly and as long as they have 
not been drawn to the attention of the Iranian authorities”. Verwaltungsgericht 
Düsseldorf (Administrative Court) 11 March 2009 - 5 K 1875/08.A, 
Informationsverbund Asyl & Migration M18011.
115 Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court) 14 July 2009, E2 405.216-1/2009.
The discretion requirement was one of the subjects of a preliminary 
reference to the Court of Justice of the EU which, however, was later 
withdrawn because the asylum applicant had been granted refugee 
status.107
4 . 2  S t a t E  p r a c t i c E 
In the majority of EU Member States discretion reasoning still occurs. 
Examples were found in: Austria (mostly for bisexuals), Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands (despite the policy guidelines, see 
below), Poland, Romania, and Spain. Norway and Switzerland 
also use the discretion argument. 
The experts from the Czech Republic, Greece, Lithuania, Portugal, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia did not find evidence from the cases 
analysed that such reasoning was used, although some of these 
countries had a very a small number of LGBTI asylum cases. 
The Netherlands formally abolished the discretion requirement in its 
policy guidelines in 2007 but it is still applied in individual cases, with the 
approval of the judiciary (see below). The United Kingdom following the 
Supreme Court case of HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) only apply discretion 
where it is voluntary and only because of reasons of family or societal 
pressure.108 Sweden adopted the British approach in January 2011.
4 . 2  1  d i S c r E t i o n  r E q u i r E d
In a considerable number of cases, the asylum applications of gay 
Iranians were rejected on the ground that they could live in Iran as 
gay men, as long as they remained discreet. 
A Belgian judgment states: “In Iranian society there is a great 
difference between public space and private sphere. In practice, 
homosexuality among men is widespread and accepted in many 
Islamic societies, as long as the relationship is kept private and not 
talked about. The general “de facto-tolerance” means that, as long 
as homosexuals live their sexuality in private, it is not very likely that 
the Iranian authorities will show interest in the person involved. 
Society knows sex segregation and, as long as they play it by the 
rules, homosexual men can interact socially, live together, travel, and 
share a hotel room, without attracting attention. In general there 
are no problems to find fellow-homosexuals in parks and sports 
107 Official Journal of the European Union, 5 February 2011, C38/7, 2011/C 
38/09, Case C-563/10: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the 
Oberverwaltungsgericht (High Administrative Court) Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1 
December 2010, Khavand v Federal Republic of Germany, C-563/10.
108 UK Supreme Court 7 July 2010, HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, [2010] UKSC 31; [2011] 1 A.C. 596.569, para. 82.
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and its agencies and bodies including this Tribunal, is bound by the 
European Convention on Human Rights, I would require persuasive 
authority before imposing such an obligation on any applicant for 
refugee status, where that application is based on their sexuality.”119
In Germany, as early as 1983, an Administrative Court compared 
the discretion argument to the requirement that someone changes 
his or her skin colour in order to evade persecution.120 Yet, to date 
German case law is divided on the subject, while the discretion 
argument seems to be common, particularly with regard to North 
African countries like Egypt, Algeria121 and Morocco.122
Other German courts disagree on the grounds that, as a matter of 
principle, it is unacceptable to ask a claimant to keep his/her sexual 
orientation secret. A fierce rejection of the discretion argument has 
been brought forward in a case of a Nigerian homosexual man: 
“ (...) the claimant (...) can invoke the human right to free 
development of his personality which according to European 
and German legal opinion is universal and definitely must not 
be restricted in view of the legal systems of other countries. If one 
tolerates a situation in which the protection of human rights in 
Germany is dependent on the practice of other countries, one 
is inevitably bound to end up in Guantanamo as an especially 
blatant example of the violation of basic human rights by 
a country which considers itself a democratic and civilised 
nation.”123
In response to a parliamentary query from 18 May 2010,124 the 
German government stated that a prognosis on the future conduct 
of the applicant is decisive, i.e. whether the applicant is to be 
expected to engage in homosexual activities after his/her return: 
“The outcome of the asylum procedure depends on whether the 
asylum-seeker will behave in a manner which will lead to persecution 
after his/her return (...). It is irrelevant whether he/she may reasonably 
119 Refugee Appeals Tribunal, 2008.
120 Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden (Administrative Court) 26 April 1983, IV/I E 
06244/81.
121 Verwaltungsgericht Trier (Administrative Court) 9 September 2010, 1 L 928/10.
TR, Informationsverbund Asyl & Migration M17537.
122 Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf (Administrative Court) 14 January 2010, 11 K 
6778/09.A, Informationsverbund Asyl & Migration M16859.
123 Verwaltungsgericht München (Administrative Court) 30 January 2007, M 21 K 
04.51404; The arguments of the Verwaltungsgericht München (Administrative 
Court) have been rejected in turn by the Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf 
(Administrative Court) 21 February 2008, 11 K 2432/07.A, Informationsverbund 
Asyl & Migration M13330. A comment on this dispute: K. Dienelt, 




124 Bundestags-Drucksache 17/1505, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/
btd/17/015/1701505.pdf.
4 . 2 . 2  d i v E r G E n t  p r a c t i c E
Since 1 May 2007, the Netherlands incorporated the abandonment 
of the ‘discretion requirement’ in its Aliens Circular, for ‘homosexuals’ 
(presumably lesbians and gays): “People with a homosexual 
preference are not required to hide this preference upon return in 
the country of origin.”116 However, despite this good practice in terms 
of formal policy guidelines, in some cases the discretion requirement 
is still used. 
A woman from Sierra Leone had a hidden lesbian relationship in 
her country of origin. She came out in the Netherlands and did not 
want to conceal her sexual orientation again. The Council of State 
accepted the argument that “the fact that in the Netherlands the 
applicant used the possibilities and rights of Dutch society does not 
imply that she will be unable to accommodate upon return, even 
if that would require a certain restraint towards society”, adding: 
“although sexual orientation is a crucial element of one’s personality, 
this does not imply that it cannot be expected that she lives her 
private life in Sierra Leone in the same way as before she left for the 
Netherlands, just because she cannot live her sexual orientation 
in Sierra Leone publicly. It is also not contrary to Article 8 ECHR to 
expect this from her, for the mere reason that she has not adduced 
facts or circumstances indicating that in Sierra Leone she has not 
been able or will not be able to give a meaningful interpretation to 
her homosexual orientation.”117 
In Ireland, practice also seems inconsistent. In a refugee appeal by 
a Pakistani gay man, a Tribunal decision referred to country of origin 
information, which was regarded as indicating that gay men in 
Pakistan rarely revealed their sexual orientation. The Tribunal Member 
considered that the applicant had previously concealed his sexual 
orientation in Pakistan and he could do so again on his return, and 
found that internal relocation was an option.118 
In granting the appeal of an Iranian gay man, the Tribunal stated 
to the contrary: “One of the issues which has been raised is that 
while it was accepted that it is illegal to be homosexual in Iran, if 
people were very private or discreet, there was no problem. There 
can be difficulties with this when this argument is taken to its 
logical conclusion. I have some doubts whether there could be any 
obligation on a person to be so deceptive in hiding one’s sexuality 
or act in a clandestine manner in order to protect themselves that 
it amounts to a suppression of their sexual orientation. As this State, 
116 Vreemdelingencirculaire (Aliens Circular) 2000 C2/2.10.2.
117 Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State) 11 May 2011, 201011782/1/
V1, MigratieWeb ve11001135, Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 2011/307, 
annulling Rechtbank (Regional Court) Dordrecht, 9 November 2010, 09/4135.
118 Refugee Appeals Tribunal, 2009.
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The French ‘indiscretion requirement’ reasoning may deny asylum to 
applicants who have been unable to give expression to their sexual 
orientation or gender identity due to the persecution they had good 
grounds to fear if they had expressed their sexual orientation or 
gender identity. As a consequence, LGB people who have not been 
out and were still in the closet in their country of origin out of fear of 
persecution, are not protected by the French authorities.
4 . 2 . 4  G o o d  p r a c t i c E
Since July 2006, the United Kingdom has applied a test as to 
whether discretion was ‘reasonably tolerable’.128 This is comparable to 
the test in many other European countries which enquired whether 
the applicant could be reasonably expected to hide his/her sexual 
orientation or gender identity. But in July 2010 the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom, in what has become a famous judgment of 
HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon), abandoned this restrictive view.129 The 
judgement is phrased as applying to lesbians, gays and bisexuals, but 
as trans and intersex asylum applicants rely on the same protected 
grounds, the reasoning could be applied in T and I cases as well. 
The effect of discretion and why this undermined the rationale of the 
Refugee Convention were explained in paragraphs 55, 77 and 78 of 
the judgment by Lord Rodger:
55. “ At the risk of repetition, the importance of this analysis for 
present purposes is that it proceeds on the basis that, so 
far from permitting or encouraging its agents to persecute 
the applicant for one of the protected grounds, the home 
state should have protected him from any persecution on 
that ground. The underlying rationale of the Convention is 
therefore that people should be able to live freely, without 
fearing that they may suffer harm of the requisite intensity 
or duration because they are, say, black, or the descendants 
of some former dictator, or gay. In the absence of any 
indication to the contrary, the implication is that they must 
be free to live openly in this way without fear of persecution. 
By allowing them to live openly and free from that fear, the 
receiving state affords them protection which is a surrogate 
for the protection which their home state should have 
afforded them.
128 Court of Appeal (England and Wales) 26 July 2006, J v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, [2006] EWCA Civ 1238, [2007] Imm AR 73. The Court has 
to enquire whether the individual will by ‘choice’ adopt discretion. English 
jurisprudence followed from considering the Australian High Court decision 
in Appellant S395 in Z v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA 
Civ 1578; [2005] Imm A R 75, 2 December 2004, which then led to successive 
Court of Appeal judgments up to and including J, which then led to the 
appeal to the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) in July 2010. 
129 Supreme Court 7 July 2010, HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, [2010] UKSC 31; [2011] 1 AC 596.
be expected to behave in an alternative manner.” Also, it has to be 
assessed whether there is “a relevant degree of probability” that the 
homosexual activities will become known to the authorities in the 
country of origin. 
4 . 2 . 3  t h E  d i S c r E t i o n  r E q u i r E m E n t  i n  r E v E r S E
The French National Asylum Court often requires LGB applicants 
to have fully disclosed their sexual orientation in the country of 
origin. They should have ‘exposed their sexual orientation publicly or 
manifested it by exterior behaviour.’125 This is another way of saying: 
“If you are discreet, then there are no grounds to grant you asylum. 
You will only be granted asylum if you come out of the closet.” 
This ‘indiscretion requirement’ is not about well-founded fear, as the 
discretion requirement is, but rather concerns the question whether 
or not an LGBTI person who has not yet ‘come out’ as such, can be a 
member of a particular social group defined by sexual orientation. 
It is derived from the interpretation of the concept of a ‘particular 
social group’ by the Council of State jurisprudence in France. Article 
10(1)(d), second provision of the Qualification Directive requires 
that a particular social group has a distinct identity in the country 
of origin, because that group is perceived as being different by the 
surrounding society. This is exactly how the French Council of State 
formulated the test in its 1997 judgement: the social group is defined 
by “common characteristics which define them as a group in the eyes 
of authorities and society.”126 
The National Asylum Court (CNDA, first level jurisdiction) often 
mistakenly applies this social group requirement as a ‘discretion 
requirement in reverse’: as long as a person hides her or his sexual 
orientation or gender identity from others no one can perceive it. 
Then this person cannot be a member of the social group of LGBs, 
since she or he is not perceived as such. 
This CNDA jurisprudence is based on a misapplication of the social 
perception requirement of Article 10(1)(d) of the Directive. This 
requirement is about whether the social group is perceived to be 
different by the surroundings, instead of whether the (‘closeted’ or 
‘out’) individual is perceived to be different.127
125 In French: ‘revendiquer son homosexualité ou manifester son homosexualité 
dans son comportement extérieur’.
126 Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) 23 June 1997, 171858; see also Conseil d’Etat 
(Council of State) 23 August 2006, 272680.
127 Comp. T. Alexander Aleinikofff’s article, which was the first to formulate the 
social perception approach as an alternative to the protected characteristics 
approach: T. Alexander Aleinikoff: Protected characteristics and social 
perceptions: an analysis of the meaning of ‘membership of a particular social 
group’, in E. Feller, V. Türk and F. Nicholson: Refugee Protection in International 
Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, p. 263-311, at 296-301. See 
on the Qualification Directive on this point H. Battjes: European Asylum Law 
and International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2006, par. 327-329.
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applicant’s country of nationality. If so, the tribunal must go on 
to consider what the individual applicant would do if he were 
returned to that country. If the applicant would in fact live openly 
and thereby be exposed to a real risk of persecution, then he 
has a well-founded fear of persecution - even if he could avoid 
the risk by living ‘discreetly’. If, on the other hand, the tribunal 
concludes that the applicant would in fact live discreetly and so 
avoid persecution, it must go on to ask itself why he would do 
so. If the tribunal concludes that the applicant would choose to 
live discreetly simply because that was how he himself would 
wish to live, or because of social pressures, e.g., not wanting to 
distress his parents or embarrass his friends, then his application 
should be rejected. Social pressures of that kind do not amount 
to persecution and the Convention does not offer protection 
against them. Such a person has no well-founded fear of 
persecution because, for reasons that have nothing to do with 
any fear of persecution, he himself chooses to adopt a way of 
life which means that he is not in fact liable to be persecuted 
because he is gay. If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes 
that a material reason for the applicant living discreetly on his 
return would be a fear of the persecution which would follow 
if he were to live openly as a gay man, then, other things being 
equal, his application should be accepted. Such a person has a 
well-founded fear of persecution. To reject his application on the 
ground that he could avoid the persecution by living discreetly 
would be to defeat the very right which the Convention exists 
to protect – his right to live freely and openly as a gay man 
without fear of persecution. By admitting him to asylum and 
allowing him to live freely and openly as a gay man without 
fear of persecution, the receiving state gives effect to that right 
by affording the applicant a surrogate for the protection from 
persecution which his country of nationality should have 
afforded him.”130
In SW the United Kingdom Upper Tribunal has developed the 
reasoning of the UK Supreme Court’s approach in HJ-HT, to show 
that it is not mere silence which may be necessary for evading 
persecution, but not being able to present a ‘heterosexual 
narrative’ (i.e. by having children or being married), which will 
lead to identification, and then risk. The Upper Tribunal provided 
the following Country Guidance with respect to risk to (actual or 
perceived) lesbians from Jamaica, stating inter alia:
“Not all lesbians are at risk. Those who are naturally discreet, 
have children and/or are willing to present a heterosexual 
130 This new approach has also been incorporated in a new Asylum instruction: 
UK Border Agency, Asylum Instruction, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
in the Asylum Claim, 6 October 2010, http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/
sitecontent.
77.  At the most basic level, if a male applicant were to live 
discreetly, he would in practice have to avoid any open 
expression of affection for another man which went 
beyond what would be acceptable behaviour on the part 
of a straight man. He would have to be cautious about the 
friendships he formed, the circle of friends in which he moved, 
the places where he socialised. He would have constantly to 
restrain himself in an area of life where powerful emotions 
and physical attraction are involved and a straight man 
could be spontaneous, impulsive even. Not only would he not 
be able to indulge openly in the mild flirtations which are an 
enjoyable part of heterosexual life, but he would have to think 
twice before revealing that he was attracted to another man. 
Similarly, the small tokens and gestures of affection which 
are taken for granted between men and women could well 
be dangerous. In short, his potential for finding happiness in 
some sexual relationship would be profoundly affected. It is 
objectionable to assume that any gay man can be supposed 
to find even these restrictions on his life and happiness 
reasonably tolerable. 
78.  It would be wrong, however, to limit the areas of behaviour 
that must be protected to the kinds of matters which I 
have just described – essentially, those which will enable 
the applicant to attract sexual partners and establish and 
maintain relationships with them in the same way as 
happens between persons who are straight. As Gummow 
and Hayne JJ pointed out in Appellant S395/2002 v Minister 
for Immigration (2003) 216 CLR 473, 500-501, para 81: ‘Sexual 
identity is not to be understood in this context as confined 
to engaging in particular sexual acts or, indeed, to any 
particular forms of physical conduct. It may, and often will, 
extend to many aspects of human relationships and activity. 
That two individuals engage in sexual acts in private (and 
in that sense ‘discreetly’) may say nothing about how those 
individuals would choose to live other aspects of their lives 
that are related to, or informed by, their sexuality’.”
We also cite paragraph 82, in which Lord Rodger explains how LGB 
asylum claims should be dealt with:
“When an applicant applies for asylum on the ground of a well-
founded fear of persecution because he is gay, the tribunal must 
first ask itself whether it is satisfied on the evidence that he is 
gay, or that he would be treated as gay by potential persecutors 
in his country of nationality. If so, the tribunal must then ask 
itself whether it is satisfied on the available evidence that gay 
people who lived openly would be liable to persecution in the 
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and it is even applied in countries such as the Netherlands, where 
the discretion argument has been formally abolished. 
Although the UK Supreme Court judgment is a very important 
step in the right direction, especially compared to practices we 
found in the other Member States, the distinction concerning 
the reasons why someone plans to live discreetly is problematic. 
Firstly, it ignores that by the mere fact of submitting an LGBTI based 
asylum application, applicants express their desire to live openly 
as LGBTIs without fear of persecution. If the applicant wants to 
live openly as an LGBTI person, this is the legitimate exercise of a 
basic human right which an applicant cannot be required to give 
up. Secondly, this reasoning does not take into account the fact 
that, although the applicant might ‘simply’ want to live in a discreet 
way, persecution may still be imminent as soon as the applicant is 
discovered being LGBTI or is outed against her or his will by others, 
due to their ‘difference’.136 The test of well-founded fear should be 
the risk ‘open’ LGBTI claimants run upon return to their country of 
origin, instead of focussing on her/his reasons for living a double-
life.137 
The French requirement that a person must have disclosed her/his 
sexual orientation or gender identity in the country of origin is based 
on a misapplication of the social perception test. This test, which 
concerns the existence of a particular social group (Article 10(1)(d) 
Qualification Directive) requires that the social group to which the 
applicant purportedly belongs must be perceived as being different 
by the surrounding society. This can be the case, whether or not the 
applicant is in fact a member of that group.
We also found cultural relativistic arguments being used to reason 
that discretion could be expected, for instance by considerations on 
the socio-cultural framework in the country of origin. This kind of 
arguments is unacceptable; the discretion argument goes against 
the core of international and European refugee and human rights 
law. Human rights are universal. Requiring people not to express 
their political opinions, not to live according to their religious beliefs, 
or not to be open about their sexual orientation or gender identity 
in order not to be exposed to a risk of persecution, is unacceptable. 
A person with a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
136 J. Millbank and C. Dauvergne have noted that “even an individual who 
wishes to hide, who desperately wishes – and takes all possible steps – to 
remain closeted does, in fact become increasingly ‘visible’ with the passage 
of time”, see C. Dauvergne and J. Millbank, ‘Before the High Court: Applicants 
S396/2002 and S395/2002, a gay refugee couple from Bangladesh’ (2003) 
Sydney Law Review 97, Vol 25, 122. See also S. Chelvan, ‘Put Your Hands Up (If 
You Feel Love)’, Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law, Vol 25, No 1, 2011, S. 
65, where the author remarked “that even where (voluntary) discretion is not 
due to a fear of well-founded persecution, the fact that an individual is not 
living a straight life, will identify them as ‘different’ leading to LGB identification.’ 
137 Cf. para 83 Handbook UNHCR on concealing a political opinion.
narrative for family or societal reasons may live as discreet 
lesbians without persecutory risk, provided that they are not 
doing so out of fear. (…) Single women with no male partner or 
children risk being perceived as lesbian, whether or not that is the 
case, unless they present a heterosexual narrative and behave 
with discretion.”131 
The approach developed in HJ-HT has been adopted by the United 
Kingdom’s lower Courts and Tribunals in not only determining claims 
based on sexual identity, but also asylum claims based on political 
opinion132 and religious grounds.133 This illustrates a good practice in 
the cross-application of developing precedent in LGB claims to other 
Refugee Convention reason claims. 
In Sweden, asylum applications were rejected based on discretion 
arguments. However, as of 13 January 2011, Sweden followed the 
reasoning of the UK Supreme Court and adopted a policy document 
not to require an applicant to live discreetly: 
“In case the applicant states s/he will choose a discreet way of 
life upon return, it is crucial to question the reason for this choice. 
If the reason is that s/he wishes to live that way, or if it is due to 
social pressure, the claim should be rejected. If on the other hand 
the reason of the discretion is a fear of persecution, the claim 
should be accepted.”134 
In Italy, one case was reported in which an asylum seeker declared 
that he had always lived his sexual orientation very discreetly, but 
he did not experience this as a privation. Therefore the first instance 
adjudicator decided he had no fear of persecution.135 Except for this 
case, our Italian experts did not find any evidence that the discretion 
requirement has been used in decisions or case law.
4 . 3  c o n c l u S i o n 
Requiring discretion concerning sexual orientation, or making a 
finding of “voluntary” discretion, is widespread in EU Member States 
131 Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) 24th June 2011, SW 
(lesbians – HJ and HT applied) Jamaica CG [2011] UKUT 00251, par. 107.
132 Court of Appeal (England & Wales) 18 November 2010, RT (Zimbabwe) and 
others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC 1285 (non-
Zanu-PF claimants from Zimbabwe).
133 Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) 13 July 2011, MT (Ahmadi 
– HJ (Iran) Pakistan CG [2011] UKUT 00277 (Ahmadis from Pakistan).
134 Rättschefens rättsliga ställningstagande angående metod för utredning och 
prövning av den framåtsyftande risken för personer som åberopar skyddsskäl på 
grund av sexuell läggning (RCI 03/2011) available at: www.migrationsverket.se/
lifos.
135 Case reported by Commissione territoriale per il riconoscimento della 
protezione internazionale di Bari (Regional committee for the recognition of 
international protection of Bari). Date unreported. 
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related to a persecution ground cannot reasonably be expected to 
renounce the characteristic constituting the basis of this persecution 
ground, even if, for the sake of the argument, it is accepted that that 
would theoretically be possible. 
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n S
•	 The well-founded fear element of the refugee definition should 
be applied in such a way that lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and 
intersex applicants are not required or presumed to hide their 
sexual orientation or gender identity upon return to the country 
of origin in order to avoid persecution.
•	 The persecution ground element of the refugee definition 
should be applied in such a way that, for a sexual orientation or 
gender identity based particular social group to exist, the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, trans or intersex applicant is not required to have 
already disclosed her/his sexual orientation or gender identity in 
the country of origin.
40
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to the general circumstances in that part of the country and to 
the personal circumstances of the applicant.141 The most recent 
version of the Recast proposal added to Article 8 that “to this end, 
Member states shall ensure that precise and up-to-date information 
is obtained from relevant sources, such as the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the European Asylum 
Support Office.”142
The UNHCR Guidance Note states: 
33.  As homophobia, whether expressed through laws or people’s 
attitudes and behaviour, often tends to exist nationwide 
rather than merely being localized, internal flight alternatives 
cannot normally be considered as applicable in claims 
related to sexual orientation and gender identity. Any 
suggested place of relocation would have to be carefully 
assessed and must be both “relevant” and “reasonable”. 
Internal flight is normally not considered relevant where the 
State is the agent of persecution, unless the State’s authority 
is limited to certain parts of the country. A law of general 
application, such as a penal code criminalizing homosexual 
conduct, which is enforceable in the place of persecution, 
would normally also be enforceable in a proposed place of 
relocation. 
34.  Where a non-State actor is the persecutor, it can often be 
assumed that if the State is not willing or able to protect 
in one part of the country, it will not be willing or able to 
do so in any other part. Applicants cannot be expected to 
suppress their sexual orientation or gender identity in the 
internal flight area, or required to depend on anonymity to 
avoid the reach of the agent of persecution. While a major 
or capital city in some cases may offer a more tolerant and 
anonymous environment, the place of relocation must be 
more than a “safe haven”. The applicant must also be able to 
access a minimum level of political, civil and socio-economic 
rights. Thus, he or she must be able to access State protection 
in a genuine and meaningful way. The existence of LGBT 
141 Article 8(3) Qualification Directive provides that the internal protection 
alternative may be held against the applicant notwithstanding technical 
obstacles to return to the country of origin. This provision is at odds with the 
position of the European Court of Human Rights, which requires that “the 
person to be expelled must be able to travel to the area concerned”, ECtHR 
11 January 2007, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, Appl. No. 1948/04, par.138; 
ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 8319/07 
and 11449/07, par. 266. We therefore agree with the most recent recast 
proposal to delete Article 8(3) QD. 
142 Council of the European Union, Presidency’s Note to the Permanent 
Representatives Committee, Brussels, 6 July 2011, 2009/0164 (COD), ASILE 56, 
CODEC 1133.
5  i n t E r n a l  p r o t E c t i o n
If the asylum authorities have established, or presume, that an 
asylum seeker has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in her 
or his country, they might still deny asylum, because the applicant 
could live safely in another part of the country of origin and is 
therefore in no need of international protection. This is called the 
internal protection alternative (often also referred to as ‘internal 
relocation alternative’ or ‘internal flight alternative’). To determine 
whether a location proposed by the authorities is a meaningful 
internal protection alternative, certain criteria should be met. There 
should be no risk of persecution or serious harm in the proposed 
location and state protection should be available there.138
In the case of a gay Afghan, the Romanian Immigration Office 
stated: “From the investigation of Country of Origin Information 
and from the applicant’s statements, it follows that there is a 
possible relocation alternative for people like the applicant (i.e. 
homosexuals). Therefore a relocation alternative in Afghanistan is 
a reasonable and relevant choice for him, especially because he 
has no problems with the Afghan authorities.”139
5 . 1  i n t E r n a t i o n a l  a n d  E u r o p E a n  S t a n d a r d S
Article 8(1) of the Qualification Directive provides that an applicant 
may not be in need of international protection if, in another part 
of the country, the applicant has no well-founded fear of being 
persecuted nor a real risk of serious harm; and if the applicant can 
reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country. The 
most recent version of the Recast proposal amends Article 8(1) in 
such a way that internal protection can consist either of a part of 
the country where the applicant has no well-founded fear of being 
persecuted, or is not at real risk of suffering serious harm, “or has 
access to protection against persecution or serious harm.”140 
The current Article 8(2) states that the assessment of whether an 
internal protection alternative exists, should be done having regard 
138 See generally on the internal protection alternative James C. Hathaway and 
Michelle Foster, ‘Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight Alternative as an Aspect 
of Refugee Status Determination’, in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances 
Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global 
Consultations on International Protection, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2003; see also First Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee 
Law, Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative, April 9-11, 1999.
139 The COI used in this decision (by the Oficiul Roman pentru Imigrari) was: 
Department of State, 2009 Country reports on Human Rights Practices - 
Afghanistan, 11 March 2010; Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to 
paragraph 40 of resolution 1917 (16 June 2010) UN Doc S/2010/318.
140 Council of the European Union, Presidency’s Note to the Permanent 
Representatives Committee, Brussels, 6 July 2011, 2009/0164 (COD), ASILE 56, 
CODEC 1133.
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of persecution emanates from a non-State actor. Even when 
relevant, its applicability will depend on a full consideration 
of all the circumstances of the case and the reasonableness 
of relocation to another area in the country of origin.144 
This means that in cases where the feared persecution emanates 
from or is condoned or tolerated by State actors, internal protection 
is not available, because under such circumstances the person is 
threatened with persecution countrywide. Also, when the feared 
persecution comes from local or regional State actors, internal 
protection will in most cases not be relevant. It should also be taken 
into account whether the basic human rights of the individual are 
respected and protected in the proposed location. 
As we have concluded in the Chapter on State protection (Chapter 
3), in countries that criminalise LGBTIs, State protection is not 
available. Therefore, an internal protection will also not be an 
option for LGBTIs in those countries. In other (i.e. non-criminalising) 
countries, an internal protection alternative can only be taken into 
consideration, after it has been established that the State authorities 
in that part of the country are not homophobic or transphobic, 
but are instead willing and able to offer protection to LGBTIs, when 
needed. 
5 . 2  S t a t E  p r a c t i c E :  p r o t E c t i o n
We found examples in which LGBTI applicants were rejected, based 
on an internal protection alternative in sixteen European countries.145
A lesbian from Mongolia applied for asylum in Austria in 2002, after 
she was harassed and physically maltreated by her former husband 
and her colleagues because of her sexual orientation. The Asylum 
Court stated that: “Since 2002, homosexual acts are no longer 
criminalised in Mongolia, homosexuals are not more in danger than 
other minorities.” In 2009, her asylum application was rejected, based 
on an internal protection alternative.146
In a judgment in 2003, in the case of a Russian trans woman the 
Danish Refugee Board relied on country of origin information in its 
finding that there was no reason to expect systematic persecution 
of trans persons in Russia, neither by private persons nor by the 
144 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 
4: “Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative” within the Context of Article 1A(2) of 
the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 23 
July 2003.
145 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, United 
Kingdom (before HJ/HT).
146 Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court), 19 August 2009, C9 248.748-0/2008.
related NGOs does not in itself provide protection from 
persecution.143
UNHCR’s Guidelines on Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative state:
14.  Where the risk of being persecuted emanates from local or 
regional bodies, organs or administrations within a State, 
it will rarely be necessary to consider potential relocation, 
as it can generally be presumed that such local or regional 
bodies derive their authority from the State. The possibility 
of relocating internally may be relevant only if there is clear 
evidence that the persecuting authority has no reach outside 
its own region and that there are particular circumstances to 
explain the national government’s failure to counteract the 
localised harm. The need for an analysis of internal relocation 
only arises where the fear of being persecuted is limited to a 
specific part of the country, outside of which the feared harm 
cannot materialise. 
15.  (…) It can be presumed that if the State is unable or unwilling 
to protect the individual in one part of the country, it may 
also not be able or willing to extend protection in other 
areas. This may apply in particular to cases of gender-related 
persecution.
28.  Where respect for basic human rights standards, including 
in particular non-derogable rights, is clearly problematic, 
the proposed area cannot be considered a reasonable 
alternative. This does not mean that the deprivation of 
any civil, political or socio-economic human right in the 
proposed area will disqualify it from being an internal flight 
or relocation alternative. Rather, it requires, from a practical 
perspective, an assessment of whether the rights that will not 
be respected or protected are fundamental to the individual, 
such that the deprivation of those rights would be sufficiently 
harmful to render the area an unreasonable alternative.
34.  (…) the decision-maker bears the burden of proof of 
establishing that an analysis of relocation is relevant to the 
particular case. If considered relevant, it is up to the party 
asserting this to identify the proposed area of relocation 
and provide evidence establishing that it is a reasonable 
alternative for the individual concerned.
38.  (…) It (an alternative flight or relocation alternative) is 
relevant only in certain cases, particularly when thesource 
143 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims 
Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 21 November 2008.
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The Lithuanian Migration Department rejected the application of an 
asylum seeker from Kazakhstan. “Country of origin information stated 
that freedom of movement is respected in Kazakhstan and gays 
feel comparatively safe in Astana, Almata, Karaganda, Aktau, Atyrau, 
Ust-Kamenogorosk, Pavlodar. Bars, clubs and other entertainment 
are available for gays in those cities. Furthermore, psychological and 
material support is available for gays who live in the street or who are 
sexually abused.” Therefore these places were considered a suitable 
protection alternative.
In an Ethiopian case the Norwegian Appeal Board stated: “She is 
a mature and resourceful woman who could be expected to live 
in a place other than her hometown, for example in Addis Ababa. 
Lesbians generally have no reason to fear persecution.”152
In Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Greece, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain no cases of rejection based on an 
internal protection alternative were found.
5 . 3   S t a t E  p r a c t i c E :  d i S c r E t i o n  i n  t h E 
p r o t E c t i o n  a l t E r n a t i v E
In nine European countries examples were found in which the 
applicant was explicitly or implicitly expected to move to another 
part of the country, and hide his or her sexual orientation or gender 
identity there.153 (See on discretion also Chapter 4) Again, many cases 
were reported concerning criminalising countries, as is illustrated by 
the following examples.
For instance in the case of a Cameroonian gay man, the Romanian 
First Court (Judecatorie) stated: “Nothing prevents the applicant to 
settle in his country of origin in a place where he is not known and to 
practice his sexuality, but he should be more discreet, in order not to 
call for the reaction of the authorities and the general public opinion.”
In the Netherlands we found divergence between policy and 
practice: In 2006, the Dutch Minister Verdonk stated that: “an internal 
flight alternative can only be raised if this does not imply that the 
asylum seeker should hide his or her sexual preference in the other 
part of the country.”154 However, in 2007 a Dutch Court considered 
152 Decision no. N101901611.
153 These countries were: Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Romania, 
Denmark, Malta, Norway and Poland. Cf. a report of the UKLGIG in which 68% 
of the 50 researched decisions cited an internal protection alternative as a 
reason for denial; in 38% of the cases discretion was expected in the internal 
relocation alternative. UK Lesbian & Gay Immigration Group, Failing the Grade. 
Home Office initial decisions on lesbian and gay claims for asylum, April 2010, p. 
5.
154 Answers to parliamentary questions, 28 November 2006, Aanhangsel 
Handelingen II 2006/07, nr. 394.
authorities. The Board therefore proposed that she should move to 
a larger city, where she could be expected to find a community of 
persons with her sexual orientation (sic), and where it would be less 
likely for her to become victim of abuse by the police. 
In many cases it was assumed that LGBTIs could find internal 
protection in other parts of a criminalising country. 
In an Irish decision refusing the refugee appeal of a Nigerian gay 
man, the Tribunal stated: “While it is accepted that state protection 
may not be available to homosexuals in Nigeria, internal relocation 
to avoid any possible threat would be an option.”147 The decision did 
not address the implications of this lack of state protection.
In the case of a gay Iranian, the Finnish Migration Service reasoned: 
“internal relocation would be a feasible and effective way for him to 
avoid possible problems with his relatives and the authorities. It is 
not regarded as probable that the authorities would try to catch him, 
at least not outside his home area.”148 
In the case of a gay Senegalese, an Italian court held that the 
claimant could have avoided the (eventual) threat of his father by 
moving to another town in Senegal.149
We also found that many decisions and judgements were relying 
on the presumption that the mere existence of gay bars, gay 
meeting places or LGBT NGOs in larger cities in the country would 
be sufficient to provide a safe place for LGBTIs, instead of carefully 
assessing whether in these cities the State offered protection against 
anti-gay or trans violence, when needed. 
A Dutch Court held that the tourist coastal area of Gambia was a 
good protection alternative. “Because of the loose sexual morals 
found in that area, a gay man could live there in some anonymity.”150
The Finnish Directorate of Immigration stated: “The applicants 
could move to an area, where the attitude towards homosexuals is 
more tolerant. In bigger cities it is less probable that homosexuals 
would stand out among the people, and e.g. in Moscow and in St. 
Petersburg there are a few NGOs for sexual minorities and publicly 
known clubs.”151 
147 Refugee Appeals Tribunal, 2009.
148 Maahanmuuttovirasto (Finnish Migration Service) 6 October 2010, Dnro 
3498/0512/2010. Cf. also “If the applicant has problems because of his 
bisexuality in his hometown, he can move to another part of Ethiopia.” 
Maahanmuuttovirasto (Finnish Migration Service) 27 October 2008, Dnro 
403/0611/2008.
149 Tribunale (Tribunal) Trieste 11 November 2009, nr. 508/09.
150 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Amsterdam 6 October 2005, nr. 05/42699.
151 Ulkomaalaisvirasto (Directorate of Immigration) 3 November 2004, Dnro 1719-
1720/0611/2004.
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A good practice is found in the British Supreme Court Judgment 
HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) which makes it clear that internal 
relocation is not acceptable for LGB applicants originating from 
criminalising countries, if it depends on concealing their sexual 
orientation in the proposed new location: 
“The objection to it is that it assumes that the applicant will be 
prepared to lie about and conceal his sexual orientation when he 
moves to the place of relocation. (…) There is no place, in countries 
such as Iran and Cameroon, to which a gay applicant could safely 
relocate without making fundamental changes to his behaviour 
which he cannot make simply because he is gay.”160 
In a Country Guidance case on lesbians in Jamaica the United 
Kingdom’s Upper Tribunal accepted that this objection against 
proposing internal protection for criminalising countries could also 
apply to perceived lesbians, i.e. to people who cannot present a 
“heterosexual narrative”: 
“Because the risks arise from perceived as well as actual lesbian 
sexual orientation, internal relocation does not enhance safety.  
Newcomers in rural communities will be the subject of speculative 
conclusions, derived both by asking them questions and by 
observing their lifestyle and unless they can show a heterosexual 
narrative, they risk being identified as lesbians. Perceived lesbians 
also risk social exclusion (loss of employment or being driven from 
their homes).”161
5 . 5  c o n c l u S i o n
In many European countries internal protection alternatives were 
applied to applicants who fled from countries that criminalise sexual 
orientation. It should be borne in mind that the internal protection 
alternative should only enter into play when it has been established, 
or when at least it is presumed, that an applicant has a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted in one part of the country. If that has not 
been established or is not presumed, the whole notion of internal 
protection is not applicable because in that case the applicant has 
no need of protection. 
As we concluded before (in Chapter 4 on the discretion 
requirement), requiring people not to be open about their sexual 
orientation or gender identity in order not to be exposed to a risk of 
persecution, is unacceptable. Similarly, requiring people to hide their 
160 UK Supreme Court, 7 July 2010, HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, [2010] UKSC 31; [2011] 1 A.C. 596.569.
161 UK Upper Tribunal, 24 June 2011, SW (Jamaica) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, CG [2011] UKUT 00251, para. 107(5).
larger cities in Nigeria a good protection alternative, based on a 
British Home Office Report (October 2005) stating that “homosexuals 
do not have fear of persecution there, as long as they do not openly 
express their sexual orientation.”155 
In several Austrian cases an internal relocation to a Christian part of 
Nigeria was proposed. For instance in the case of a Nigerian lesbian 
whose father threatened to kill her, because she refused to marry 
one of his friends, the Austrian Asylum Court stated that she had an 
internal protection alternative, for - according to COI - lesbians are 
not as discriminated as gay men.156
Similarly, in the refugee appeal of a Nigerian lesbian the Irish 
Tribunal concluded that country of origin information “indicates that 
there are parts of Nigeria, including Lagos, where lesbians can live 
freely as long as they do not impinge on the rights of others.”157
In another Irish decision refusing the refugee appeal of a Ugandan 
lesbian, the Tribunal noted that although the applicant had a lesbian 
partner, “she has not been discriminated in her country of origin 
in any way, save, that she kept her sexuality secret. There are gay 
people throughout the world who keep their sexuality secret, and do 
not choose to declare their sexuality and/or to have their sexuality 
identify them.” The Tribunal concluded: “it is considered reasonable, 
practical, safe and not of undue hardship, to relocate in Uganda if she 
so wishes. This is a matter of choice for the applicant.”158 
5 . 4  G o o d  p r a c t i c E
Concerning the implicit or explicit requirement of hiding one’s sexual 
orientation or gender identity, The Netherlands’ official policy on 
criminalisation and the internal protection holds that “an internal 
flight alternative can only be raised if this does not imply that the 
asylum seeker should hide his or her sexual preference in the other 
part of the country.”159 This is a good practice, but we found cases in 
which this policy is not applied in practice. 
155 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Den Bosch, 31 May 2007, nr. 06/51632. Similarly 
in 2009, based on the Dutch Country Report on Algeria of 2005, another 
Dutch Court considered larger cities in Algeria, where homosexuality is 
being tolerated, as long as it is not explicitly propagated, a good protection 
alternative. Rechtbank (Regional Court) Assen, 17 April 2009, nr. 09/11179, 
confirmed without reasons by Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van 
State (Judicial Division of the Council of State) 25 May 2009, nr. 200902993/1/
V2. In both Algeria and Nigeria, sexual orientation is criminalised.
156 Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court) 1 July 2009, A13 407.007-1/2009.
157 Refugee Appeals Tribunal, 2009.
158 Refugee Appeals Tribunal, 2009.
159 Answers to parliamentary questions, 28 November 2006, Aanhangsel 
Handelingen II 2006/07, nr. 394.
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•	 In all other cases, the decision-making authorities should make a 
careful assessment of the situation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans 
and intersex people in the proposed internal protection area, 
including whether it is possible to live openly as lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, trans or intersex persons there and whether effective 
state protection is available for them. 
•	 Applicants should not be required or presumed to hide their 
sexual orientation or gender identity in the internal protection 
area in order to be protected against persecution.
sexual orientation or gender identity in another part of the country is 
equally unacceptable.162 
Where the risk of persecution emanates from State actors 
(including local and regional bodies) internal protection will rarely 
be a possibility. Consequently, in cases of LGBTI applicants fleeing 
countries which criminalise sexual orientation or gender identity, 
while having a well-founded fear of being persecuted by State actors, 
“internal protection” is really not an option. When LGBTI applicants 
fear non-State actors from countries criminalising sexual orientation 
or gender identity, then the internal protection is also not an option, 
for the criminalising State will not be able or willing to provide 
them effective protection. (see also Chapter 3, State protection) In 
conclusion: in a country that criminalises LGBTI persons, internal 
protection is unavailable. LGBTI asylum applications of applicants 
from criminalising countries of origin should never be rejected on 
the ground of internal protection. 
In all other cases, the decision making authorities should make a 
careful assessment of the situation of LGBTI people in the part of the 
country proposed as the internal protection alternative, including 
whether it is possible to live openly as LGBTI persons there and 
whether effective state protection is available for them. It must be 
prevented that the applicant ends up in a part of the country where 
he or she may be subjected to persecution, ill-treatment or other 
situations that breach Article 3 ECHR.
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n S 
•	 Article 8 of the Qualification Directive should be applied in such 
a way that internal protection is deemed unavailable in cases 
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants from 
countries which criminalise sexual orientation or gender identity.
162 Millbank has noted: “Discretion reasoning clouded the consideration of 
internal relocation by implicitly or explicitly assuming that the purpose of 
relocation was to achieve (re)concealment rather than to move to a place 
of actual safety and sufficiency of state protection.” Jenni Millbank, ‘From 
discretion to disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on the Basis 
of Sexual Orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom,’ International 
Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 13, No. 2/3, 2009, p.3. See also: UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Seeking Protection on 
Account of their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. Summary Conclusions 
of the Expert roundtable organized by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(Geneva, 30 September - 1 October 2010): “Just as the so-called ‘discretion’ 
argument has been held not to be a valid reason to deny refugee protection 
in other types of refugee claims, it likewise has no validity in sexual orientation 
or gender identity cases. Similarly, the concept of Internal Flight Alternative 
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emancipated European LGBTIs as a standard representation of what 
LGBTI people look like. 
On the other hand, dismissing credibility as a legitimate issue 
altogether will not do either. When an asylum seeker claims to have 
a well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of being a 
communist, there is a good reason to turn the application down if it has 
been established that the applicant does not in fact hold such political 
views, nor is she or he perceived to be a communist. Similarly, an LGBTI 
asylum claim may be legitimately turned down if the applicant is not 
an L, G, B, T or I and thus not a member of a particular social group 
constituted of LGBTI people, and not perceived to be by anyone. 
In some countries, when asylum policy is made LGBTI sensitive in 
one way (abolition of the discretion requirement, see Chapter 4; 
or a policy of granting protection to a particular group of LGBTI 
applicants) this is offset by a counter tendency: a growing number 
of LGB claims being rejected because the sexual orientation of 
the applicants is disbelieved. In countries where obstacles to the 
recognition of LGBTI applicants as refugees were abandoned, a shift 
towards credibility-problems occurs (the Czech Republic,165 the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom after the abandonment 
of the discretion requirement).166 The same has happened recently 
in the Netherlands, after favourable policies were adopted for 
specific groups of homosexuals.167 Thus, an expansion of the scope 
of protection for LGBTI claimants may be accompanied by an even 
greater emphasis on credibility issues.
For some countries the national experts reported that there are no 
problems on the point of credibility: some of them only found a few 
LGB cases that were rejected because the fear was not believed to 
be well founded or the risk of ill-treatment was not considered real. 
For some of those countries, it seems that credibility is not a topic in 
LGB cases (Greece, Portugal) while others mention examples but 
also state that LGB applications are usually rejected on other grounds 
(ill-treatment does not meet the threshold of persecution; failure to 
seek State protection: Spain). 
165 Until the transposition of the Qualification Directive, LGB applications were 
usually rejected on substantive grounds. However, after the transposition of 
the Qualification Directive the restrictive positions towards persecution by 
non-State actors, the threshold of persecution and the failure to seek State 
protection had to be abandoned and thus the credibility assessment has 
become a key issue in the LGB claims. In other words, an expansion of the 
scope of protection for LGBTI claimants was accompanied by an even greater 
emphasis on credibility issues.
166 Comp. on Australia Jenni Millbank, From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends 
in Refugee Determinations on the Basis of Sexual Orientation in Australia and 
the United Kingdom, International Journal of Human Rights 2009-13 (2/3). On 
the Netherlands, see the Dutch national questionnaire.
167 Cf. Middelkoop 2010, supra. 
6  c r E d i B i l i t y  a S S E S S m E n t 
6 . 1  i n t r o d u c t i o n
Credibility has become a major issue in many refugee status 
determinations. In most asylum cases, statements of the applicant 
(laid down in a written report of the interview, or in a written 
statement) are the main source of evidence. Based on this, decision-
makers have to decide whether the claim is truthful, i.e. credible. 
Did the stated events really happen? What will happen in the future 
if the person is returned to the country of origin? The importance 
of a thorough way of investigating the facts in the initial interview 
is growing, as fast track procedures become more common, while 
at the same time there is a trend for judicial review on the facts to 
become less substantive. 
Apart from the general credibility of the account, when the asylum 
application is based on the sexual orientation or gender identity of 
the applicant, a specific credibility aspect is at stake: is it credible that 
the person is, or is perceived to be,163 a member of a social group 
constituted in terms of sexual orientation or gender identity? 
Only one case was found in the present research in which the gender 
identity of an applicant was doubted (see in more detail below, par. 
6.4.4). However, the question regarding gender identity is similar 
to that of sexual orientation: Does the surrounding society know 
about the applicant’s gender identity? Was the applicant persecuted 
because of actual or perceived gender identity? 
The focus on the question whether or not the applicant is an L, G, 
B, T or I person is problematic, because it is based on assumptions 
about how a “true” LGBTI person behaves. There is no uniform way 
in which LGBTIs recognise and act on their sexual orientation or 
gender identity.164 For example, there is diversity among born and 
bred LGBTI people of Amsterdam – never mind when one takes into 
account the sexual identities of people from other parts of the world. 
This makes it very hard to decide whether asylum seekers really are 
credible when they testify regarding their sexual orientation - in 
particular where the interviewer take the stereotype of relatively 
163 Middelkoop has argued that, except in sur place cases, the focus should be 
exclusively on whether an applicant has a well-founded fear on grounds 
of perceived homosexuality. In this way, he aims at sidestepping debates 
triggered by cases where an applicant denies being gay, despite having a 
same-sex relationship; and, for example, a case in which a male applicant has a 
relationship with a male-to-female transgender, and was considered to have a 
heterosexual relationship, L.P. Middelkoop, ‘Geloofwaardigheidskwesties rond 
homoseksuelen in de Nederlandse asielprocedure’, Asiel- en Migrantenrecht 
2010-1, p. 508-515.
164 N. LaViolette, ‘Coming Out to Canada: The Immigration of Same-Sex Couples 
under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act’, McGill Law Journal 2004, 
p. 996.
48
c r E d i B i l i t y  a S S E S S m E n t
More specifically, on LGBTI claims, the UNHCR Guidance Note states: 
35.  Self-identification as LGBT should be taken as an indication 
of the individual’s sexual orientation. While some applicants 
will be able to provide proof of their LGBT status, for 
instance through witness statements, photographs or other 
documentary evidence, they do not need to document 
activities in the country of origin indicating their different 
sexual orientation or gender identity. Where the applicant is 
unable to provide evidence as to his or her sexual orientation, 
and/or there is a lack of sufficiently specific country of origin 
information, the decision-maker will have to rely on that 
person’s testimony alone. If the applicant’s account appears 
credible, he or she should, unless there are good reasons to 
the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt. 
36.  In the assessment of LGBT claims, stereotypical images of 
LGBT persons must be avoided, such as expecting a particular 
“flamboyant” or feminine demeanour in gay men, or “butch” 
or masculine appearance in lesbian women. Similarly, a 
person should not automatically be considered heterosexual 
merely because he or she is, or has been, married, has 
children, or dresses in conformity with prevailing social codes. 
Enquiries as to the applicant’s realization and experience of 
sexual identity rather than a detailed questioning of sexual 
acts may more accurately assist in assessing the applicant’s 
credibility. 
37.  It is important that LGBT applicants are interviewed by 
trained officials who are well informed about the specific 
problems LGBT persons face. The same applies for interpreters 
present at the interview. Relevant ways to increase officials’ 
awareness, include short targeted trainings, mainstreaming 
of issues relating to sexual orientation and gender identity 
into the induction of new staff and training of existing staff, 
accessing websites with expertise on LGBT issues, as well 
as the development of guidance relating to appropriate 
enquiries and interview techniques to use during the different 
stages of the asylum procedure.170 
170 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims 
Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 21 November 2008. 
There is wide divergence in the way in which credibility issues 
are dealt with in the various EU countries. Apparently, there is no 
consistent practice in the Member States on this point. The following 
issues will be identified in this chapter:
 – Medical examinations;
 – Witness statements;
 – Questioning methods; 
 – Assumed knowledge and behaviour (including non-familiarity 
with gay scenes; heterosexual marriage and parenthood; poor 
knowledge of criminal sanctions; conduct too risky to be true).
6 . 2   i n t E r n a t i o n a l  a n d  E u r o p E a n  S t a n d a r d S  o n 
c r E d i B i l i t y  –  G E n E r a l  c o n S i d E r a t i o n S
The general provision of Article 4 Qualification Directive, as well as 
the standards of paragraphs 195-205 of the UNHCR Handbook must 
serve as the starting point. Applied to credibility assessment these 
standards indicate that applications should be examined with a 
keen eye for the problems asylum seekers may have in submitting 
evidence (Article 4(5) Qualification Directive; par. 196 UNHCR 
Handbook168) whereby the authorities and the applicant should 
cooperate in order to assess the relevance of the elements of the 
application (Article 4(1) Qualification Directive).
Article 13(3)(a) of the Procedures Directive provides that Member 
States shall ensure that interviewers are competent to take 
account of the personal or general circumstances surrounding the 
application, including the applicant’s culture or vulnerability, insofar 
as this is possible.169 The UNHCR Handbook points to the possibility 
that applicants may feel apprehensive towards any authority (par. 
198), and emphasizes that it is necessary for the examiner to gain the 
confidence of applicants in order to assist them in putting forward 
their case and in fully explaining their opinions and feelings (par. 
200).
168 See about the difficulties for asylum seekers in supplying evidence ECtHR 19 
February 1998, Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, Appl. No. 25894/94, RJ&D ECHR 
1998-I, par. 45.
169 The most recent version of the recast proposal of the Procedures Directive 
explicitly mentions sexual orientation and gender identity in this respect in 
Article 15(3), see the Commission’s Amended Proposal, COM(2011) 319 final, 
Brussels, 1 June 2011.
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professionals. Such classifications may become an obstacle to the 
full enjoyment of human rights by transgender people, especially 
when they are applied in a way to restrict the legal capacity or 
choice for medical treatment.”172 Like sexual orientation, gender 
identity is part of an individual’s self awareness, even though in a 
number of instances, trans people do opt for a medical intervention 
that is necessary for their wellbeing. More than 230 organisations 
worldwide have joined the STP-2012 initiative (Stop Trans-
Pathologization) calling for removal of gender identities from the 
diagnosis manuals (ICD and DSM, the “Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Diseases” of the American Psychiatric Association). 
We share this view, and take the position that gender identity is an 
identity on which medical or psychiatric experts have no relevant 
expertise. 
Obviously, medical or psychiatric experts (as well as psychologists) 
do have expertise as to the problems LGBTI people may have as a 
consequence of the way in which society deals with non-standard 
sexual orientations and gender identities, but the establishment of 
a person’s sexual orientation and gender identity is a matter of self-
identification, not a medical issue. 
6 . 3 . 1 . 2  I n h u m a n  t r e a t m e n t ;  p r I v a c y
Whether or not sexual orientation and gender identity are 
considered to be medical issues is important, because medical, 
psychiatric and psychological examinations are intrusive, and may 
constitute a violation of a person’s privacy when they serve no 
legitimate aim. A compulsory medical intervention, even if of minor 
importance, must be considered as an interference with the right 
to privacy laid down in Article 8 ECHR.173 A medical examination 
equally falls into the scope of the concept of privacy. If such an 
examination is required in order to realise an entitlement, it must 
be in accordance with the law, serve a legitimate aim, and be 
necessary in a democratic society (i.e. proportionate).174 This has also 
been formulated in Article 18 of the Yogyakarta Principles, which 
states: ‘No person may be forced to undergo any form of medical 
or psychological treatment, procedure, testing, or be confined to 
a medical facility, based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Notwithstanding any classifications to the contrary, a person’s 
sexual orientation and gender identity are not, in and of themselves, 
medical conditions and are not to be treated, cured or suppressed.’175
172 Council of Europe’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, Issue Paper (2009)2 




173 Appl. 8278/78, X v Austria, D&R 18 (1980), p, a55, at 156.
174 ECtHR 5 July 1999, Matter v Slovakia, appl. no. 31534/96 concerning a 
psychological examination; ECtHR 27 November 2003, Worwa v Poland, appl. 
no. 26624/95 concerning a psychiatric report.
175 International Panel of Experts in International Human Rights Law and on 
6 . 3  m E d i c a l  E x a m i n a t i o n S
In various European countries, medical examinations (psychiatric 
examinations, physical response to pornographic images, i.e. the so-
called ‘phallometric testing’) are used in order to establish whether 
or not the applicant is an LGBTI person. Examples of examinations 
performed by psychologists, psychiatrists and sexologists to assess 
someone’s sexual orientation were reported in 8 countries: Austria, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland,171 
Romania and Slovakia.
In a Hungarian case of a 16-year-old Iranian applicant, three 
medical examinations were made. A forensic “expert” established 
that he was heterosexual, while the psychiatrist of the Cordelia 
Foundation (a Hungarian NGO) confirmed his homosexuality. 
The decision-maker not knowing what to decide asked for a third 
expert’s opinion. This psychologist stated that it was impossible to 
determine the sexual orientation of an adolescent at this young 
age when personality can still change a lot with time. This took 
about half a year, cost a lot of money for the asylum authority, 
with the applicant being finally recognised as a refugee.
6 . 3 . 1  i n t E r n at i o n a l  a n d  E u r o p E a n  S t a n d a r d S
6 . 3 . 1 . 1  D e p s y c h I a t r I s a t I o n
Variations in sexual orientation and gender identity are common 
and are to be considered an integral part of human life. Thus, sexual 
orientation or gender identity cannot be considered as medical 
conditions or psychological deviations.
Homosexuality has ceased to be considered as a medical 
or psychiatric condition since 1990, when the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) dropped it as a medical category. Hence, 
medical or psychiatric experts have no relevant expertise as to 
whether or not applicants are LGB. 
Although the current WHO’s ICD-10 (International Classification of 
Diseases) includes “Transsexualism”, “dual-role transvestism”, “gender 
identity disorder of childhood” in the category of “gender identity 
disorders” in the list of “Mental and behavioural disorders”, LGBTI 
NGOs are calling for the depsychiatrisation of all gender identities. 
Similarly, according to the Council of Europe’s High Commissioner 
for Human Rights “these classifications are in turn problematic 
and increasingly questioned by civil society actors and health care 
171 We include Poland in this list, because the Polish Office for Aliens reportedly 
recommends the applicant to provide additional evidence, e.g. results of 
psychological tests, medical opinions from sexologists. We do not have 
concrete evidence that these examinations were really performed in Poland. 
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professional interest in or training on sexual orientation or gender 
identity). The ‘examination’ is usually limited to a simple discussion 
between the ‘expert’ and the applicant. In some cases the medical 
expert used Rorschach and Szondi psychological tests. These 
examinations are applied even in clear-cut cases, when no doubts 
arise regarding the applicant’s credibility (e.g. when the applicant 
has been living together with his same-sex partner for several 
months in Hungary and this fact could have easily been checked and 
considered sufficient factual evidence). The OIN seems to only refrain 
from this practice in case of trans persons or gay men who look or 
behave in a very effeminate manner. 
Similar practices are reported for Bulgaria.
6 . 3 . 3   S t at E  p r a c t i c E :  m E d i c a l  E x a m i n at i o n S  at  t h E  
i n i t i at i v E  o f  t h E  a p p l i c a n t
In response to negative credibility findings, applicants may feel 
compelled to turn to sexologists, psychologists or similar experts in 
order to get an expert confirmation of their sexual orientation. 
In Germany, statements by psychologists, psychiatrists or other 
medical experts are sometimes provided by asylum-seekers at 
their own initiative. In some cases this seems to be the only way to 
convince the courts, especially in cases when the asylum-seeker 
did not talk about his/her sexual orientation in the initial asylum 
procedure and claims to be L, G or B at a later stage (compare on that 
issue Chapter 7). 
The matter of expert opinion is further complicated in Germany by 
the notion of “irreversibility” as defined in the landmark decision of 
the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) of 15 
March 1988. In this leading case, the Court held that it is decisive 
whether the applicant has an irreversible homosexual orientation 
(irreversibele Homosexualität). A mere inclination (blosse Neigung) 
is not decisive to same-sex activities upon which the person 
concerned can choose to act or refrain from acting as s/he pleases. 
Only the inescapable fateful fixation on homosexual behaviour 
or urge fulfilment - “unentrinnbare schicksalhafte Festlegung auf 
homosexuelles Verhalten bzw. Triebbefriedigung”- making it impossible 
not to engage in same-sex behaviour may be a ground for granting 
asylum. This leading case, cast in terms which are unmistakably 
those of classical sexology, results in the asylum authorities or courts 
requiring applicants to submit a psychiatric expert opinion about the 
extent to which they are homosexual.179
179 A Professor of sexual sciences and founding member of the former Frankfurt 
Institute for Sexual Sciences is quoted as having “regularly” written expert 
opinions on the perceived homosexuality of asylum-seekers. The case at hand 
is one of a Nigerian homosexual man who is portrayed in this article; the 
medical statement was actually paid for by Amnesty International. According 
The so-called “phallometry” (see below, par. 6.4.5) arguably violates 
Artt. 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.176 In 
the context of a criminal convict, the European Court of Human 
Rights, while accepting that phallometry is humiliating, held it not 
to be a violation of Article 3 in that particular case, mainly because 
measures considered to be a therapeutic necessity cannot be 
considered as degrading.177 The therapeutic aim being absent in 
the asylum context, it must be considered as a violation of Article 
3. In the context of Article 8, the intense invasion of a person’s 
privacy brought about by phallometric testing might in theory be 
justified if it were necessary in a democratic society. But the aim of 
this testing (establishing credibility) can be reached by other means; 
and it is disputed whether the test can lead to relevant outcomes 
for establishing a person’s sexual orientation. This makes clear that, 
on a balance of interests, the infringement of an individual’s privacy 
brought about by phallometric testing cannot be justified, and 
constitutes a violation of Article 8 ECHR. 
6 . 3 . 1 . 3  c o n s e n t
Furthermore, there is a consent problem. Even if the medical, 
psychiatric or psychological expert opinion is drafted at the request 
of the asylum applicant,178 it can hardly be maintained that someone 
has freely consented if the motivation for granting consent to the 
examination is the painful knowledge that failure to agree necessarily 
implies a refusal of the asylum application and possible exposure to 
persecution in the country of origin. This context effectively exerts 
serious pressure on asylum seekers to undergo such examination. 
As sexual orientation and gender identity are not valid medical, 
psychiatric or psychological categories, this makes the ‘consent’ of 
asylum seekers to such examinations highly questionable.
6 . 3 . 2    S t at E  p r a c t i c E :  m E d i c a l  E x p E r t i S E  r E q u E S t E d  B y 
t h E  a u t h o r i t i E S
In order to examine the credibility of sexual orientation, the 
Hungarian Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) sometimes 
requests an “expert opinion” of a forensic expert (without any specific 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Principles on the Application of 
International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity (2007), www.yogyakartaprinciples.org.
176 Comp. Judgment of the German Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) 
Schleswig-Holstein, 7 September 2009, 6 B 32/09; European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA), Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on 
Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity – 2010 Update, 10 December 
2010, pp. 59-60; ORAM, Testing Sexual Orientation: A Scientific and Legal Analysis 
of Plethysmography in Asylum & Refugee Status Proceedings, 2011; UNHCR, 
Comments on the Practice of Phallometry in the Czech Republic to Determine the 
Credibility of Asylum Claims based on Persecution due to Sexual Orientation, April 
2011, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4daeb07b2.html. 
177 ECtHR 14 September 1999, appl. no. 37231/97 (Toomey v. United Kingdom). 
178 In this respect, it is important to note that the so-called phallometry was 
introduced at the instigation of the lawyer of an asylum seeker; see for more 
details the Czech questionnaire.
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In most other countries, like for instance in France, medical expert 
opinions may be relied on by applicants in order to establish the 
physical or psychological problems they may have encountered in 
relation to their sexuality, but they cannot serve as proof of sexual 
orientation. The statements of applicants about their experiences are 
decisive.
6 . 3 . 4  S t at E  p r a c t i c E :  t r a n S  a n d  i n t E r S E x  c a S E S
Trans and intersex asylum applicants may already be in contact with 
doctors. However, people who identify themselves as a T or I person 
but who do not seek medical intervention may not be, and may 
not want to be, in contact with medical experts. Only one example 
of disbelief concerning a trans person was reported by a national 
expert. In the United Kingdom, an applicant from Pakistan originally 
applied on the basis of being a lesbian and then later made a fresh 
claim as a trans man, which was denied by the UK Home Office with 
respect to disbelief regarding the trans identity. It took over a year for 
the UK Home Office to refer to the applicant as ‘him´ instead of ‘her’. 
In February 2011, the Home Office accepted that trans men from 
Pakistan are an ‘at risk’ group, and afforded him refugee status.184 
The reason for the scarcity of credibility issues in trans and intersex 
cases could be that in practice trans and intersex applicants do 
submit medical reports. For instance, in a Finnish case of an intersex 
applicant there were statements by a doctor and by a pediatric 
endocrinologist.
In Ireland, two intersex cases were identified by practitioners. In 
both cases, the decision-maker accepted medical evidence from the 
applicants’ treating consultant confirming the applicants’ condition, 
such reports being accepted by the decision-makers as conclusive 
proof that the applicants were intersex persons. These medical 
reports arose in the context of ongoing medical treatment for the 
applicants - the reports were not required by the decision-maker, 
but once submitted in support of the asylum application, the reports 
were accepted.
In Austria, a 2004 decision ruled: “As Mr. X is a transsexual, who 
has undergone a sex change operation in Georgia, the necessary 
minimum standard for medical/therapeutic treatment of 
transsexuals is certainly not guaranteed in the country of origin, 
and the legal guarantees will be completely absent. The diagnosis 
was transsexualism as well as a clear fear mixed with a depressed 
disturbance.”185
184 AB (Pakistan) (unreported, 2009) Administrative Court.
185 UBAS (Federal Asylum Review Board) 10 May 2004, 240.479/0-VIII/22/03.
An example of the role that expert opinions can play in the 
procedure, is the case of an Iranian applicant in which an expert 
opinion was used as evidence to support his credibility which the 
authorities had doubted: “The claimant explained in his interview 
at the Federal Office that he first had homosexual contacts during 
his military service. […] The court does not doubt these statements, 
particularly as the claimant made identical statements when 
questioned by the clinical centre of the University of […] and 
the sexological-psychological expert opinion concludes that the 
claimant has an irreversible homosexual disposition. [...]”180 
On the other hand, some German courts are beginning to doubt 
the value of sexologist expert opinions. In one court decision 
the value of expert opinions is denied: “The expert opinion 
obtained in another procedure [...] only relies on the statements 
of the ‘test person’ (proband) to reach the conclusion that the 
‘formulation of an irreversible homosexual personality cannot be 
answered in a concrete and concluding manner from a psychiatric 
perspective’. It does not need an expert opinion to come to such 
an assessment, this assessment can and has to be undertaken by 
the court in the context of the credibility test of the claimant.”181 
Sexologists themselves also seem hesitant. An expert opinion 
(sexualmedizinisches Gutachten) submitted in another court case 
may serve as an example. In this case, the expert was a specialist in 
psychotherapeutic medicine and professor at the Charité University 
Hospital of Berlin. An excerpt of this expert opinion was passed on 
to a German NGO in an anonymised version and consisted of a 22-
page “digression” on the methodological difficulties in determining 
sexual orientation and on the interdependency of biological (pre-)
disposition with psychological and socio-cultural criteria which 
according to the author are equally relevant for the formation of 
someone’s sexual “structure”.182 This excerpt shows that the expert 
went to lengths to emphasise that a number of factors have to 
be considered in order to make a statement on someone’s sexual 
orientation and that such statements could hardly be taken as 
definitive. 
According to our information, similar practices occur in Austria183 
and Romania. In Poland, the asylum authorities recommend the 
applicant to provide additional evidence, e.g. results of psychological 
tests, opinions from sexologists or other medical doctors.
to this article his statements were based on “one or two [interview] sessions”. 
Source: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/weltweit-verfolgt-homosexuelle-
toedliche-kuesse-1.488972, Süddeutsche Zeitung 16 January 2009.
180 Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) Wiesbaden, 24. September 2008 - 6 
K 478/08.WI.A(2).
181 Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) München, 20 January 2004, M 9 K 
03.51197.
182 Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Frankfurt/Oder in 2003.
183 Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court) 20 July 2009, C5 257.855-0/2008; UBAS 
(Federal Asylum Review Board) 5 August 2005, 238.353/5-VIII/22/0.
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Phallometric testing was used at least once in Slovakia in 2005.
6 . 3 . 6   G o o d  p r a c t i c E :  S E l f - i d E n t i f i c at i o n ;  m E d i c a l 
r E p o r t S  o n  t r a u m a
In the decisions made available by the Portuguese asylum authority 
SEF regarding LGBTI asylum seekers, sexual orientation was always 
determined by self-identification of the asylum seeker and not 
questioned (at least not expressly) in the decision.
The Asylum Instruction on Sexual Orientation in the United 
Kingdom states: “Generally speaking, self-identification as lesbian, 
gay, bisexual or trans will be the normal starting point as an 
indication of a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity.189 
In Italy, the sexual orientation or gender identity that is considered 
relevant in the asylum context is the applicant’s current sexual 
orientation or gender identity. Sexual orientation or gender identity 
is generally established through an evaluation of the declaration of 
the asylum seeker and of supporting evidence (if available). Court 
decisions have been reported that considered credible the sexual 
orientation based on the declaration of the claimant, without any 
other evidence.190
Medical reports made because of the psychological or physical trauma 
suffered by the applicant sometimes mention the sexual orientation 
of the person concerned. In case of doubt regarding the sexual 
orientation of the applicant these reports may be used as supporting 
proof of the ill-treatment suffered on the basis of sexual orientation 
or gender identity, but not of actual sexual or gender identity. These 
medical reports could also support a narrative of someone who 
came out in a later procedure because of shame, fear, or internalised 
homo- or transphobia or whose credibility was in doubt anyway (e.g. 
in Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands, Italy). These types of reports 
are not objectionable, because they are not about establishing 
a sexual orientation or gender identity per se. This use of medical 
reports in such contexts can even be considered a good practice. It 
is to be strongly preferred that such reports are written by experts 
who are already treating and/or counselling the applicants as this 
will spare them the suffering which may be involved in undergoing a 
separate expert examination.
189 UK Home Office, Asylum Instruction: Sexual Orientation issues in the Asylum 
Claim (6 October 2010, revised on 13 June 2011) http://www.ukba.homeoffice.
gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicyinstructions/
apis/sexual-orientation-gender-ident?view=Binary <<last accessed 16th July 
2011>>.
190 Tribunale (Tribunal) Caltanisetta 7 June 2010 (gay, Tunisia), Tribunale (Tribunal) 
Catania 4 March 2010, n. 1081/10; Tribunale (Tribunal) Caltanisetta 10 
February.2010 (gay, Ghana). 
In the Netherlands, an applicant’s gender identity was supported by 
the letter of the VU University Medical Centre, from which it appears 
that the applicant has a “serious gender identity disorder”. This evidence 
was crucial in the court decision to quash a negative asylum decision.186
6 . 3 . 5  S t at E  p r a c t i c E :  ‘ p h a l l o m E t r i c ’ t E S t i n G
A rather controversial method is that of phallometric testing, which 
was applied in the Czech Republic, introduced for the first time 
by a legal representative of an asylum seeker, and not by the Czech 
authorities. When applicants were not generally credible or when 
their statements related to LGBTI identity were contradictory or 
unconvincing, the asylum authorities required additional proof. This 
additional proof meant a complex “sexodiagnostic examination”, 
and included an interview with a sexologist and the so-called 
“phallometric testing”. Although this phallometric testing was only 
one part of the examination, it carried a decisive weight in the 
asylum authorities’ conclusions on the credibility of the applicant’s 
assertion of his or her sexual identity.
The examination was performed by a professional sexologist 
and only with the person’s written consent, after being informed 
about the technique of the examination.187 This “sexodiagnostic 
examination” was similar to tests applied to sex offenders.
Put simply, phallometric testing focussed on the applicants’ 
physical reaction to pornographic material. This pornographic 
material included heterosexual, gay, lesbian, adolescent and child 
pornography. According to reactions of the applicant to these types 
of pornographic materials, the sexologist arrived at a conclusion. In 
medical terminology, phallometric testing of men is called penile 
plethysmography (also known as “PPG”) and its counterpart for 
women is called vaginal photoplethysmography (also known as 
“VPG”).188 The Czech asylum authorities claim that this procedure was 
conducted in 2008 and 2009 in less than 10 cases in total. Both PPG 
and VPG were used in the Czech Republic.
The criticism of the Fundamental Rights Agency, the European 
Commission, NGO’s and UNHCR led to suspending this practice. 
According to all available sources phallometric testing was stopped 
in 2009 and since then it has not been used. 
186 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Den Bosch, 30 December 2009, nr. 09/7231.
187 But note that the Czech NGO Organization for Aid to Refugees (Organizace 
pro pomoc uprchlikům), questioned whether asylum seekers were informed 
about the procedure itself in a way that is understandable for them; see FRA 
Report of 2010, p. 60. According to UNHCR, the form that applicants had 
to sign before “sexodiagnostic examination” contained information that if 
they refused to do so, the examination of their application for international 
protection could be discontinued. Hence, the applicants were in fact coerced 
to undergo this “sexodiagnostic examination”, Replies of UNHCR from 4 March 
2011 (on file with the Czech expert).
188 For a more detailed description of these two methods, see ORAM, supra. 
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6 . 4  W i t n E S S  S t a t E m E n t S 
In an Austrian case an Iranian was not believed to be gay, 
because he brought inaccurate evidence from an Iranian court 
and he was married. His social worker confirmed that he is gay 
and for that reason he had problems with other asylum seekers 
in his accommodation, but the first instance asylum authority 
also did not find the applicant credible. After he brought in more 
witnesses (among them a male sex-partner) the court, in appeal, 
finally believed that he was gay. He received refugee status.192 
6 . 4 . 1  i n t E r n at i o n a l  a n d  E u r o p E a n  S t a n d a r d S
Because there are no specific norms about the role of witness 
statements, the general provision of Article 4 of the Qualification 
Directive, as well as the standards of para. 195-205 of the UNHCR 
Handbook must serve as the starting point. Applied to the relevance 
of witness statements, these standards indicate that applications 
should be examined with a keen eye for the problems asylum 
seekers may have in submitting evidence (Article 4(5) Qualification 
Directive; par. 196 UNHCR Handbook).193 Consequently, the 
authorities and the applicant should cooperate in order to assess 
the relevance of the elements of the application (Article 4(1) 
Qualification Directive).
6 . 4 . 2  S t at E  p r a c t i c E
Apart from the applicant’s own testimony, witness statements are 
submitted and declarations or ‘attestations’ from LGBTI organisations 
were reported in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom to 
solve credibility problems. The following examples can serve as an 
illustration.
In Cyprus, declarations of LGBTI organisations and membership 
of LGBTI social networking sites are taken into account. However, 
although this evidence will be accepted and examined, it may often 
be dismissed in the final decision as either incredible, depending on 
the country and/or organisation issuing it, or it may be dismissed as 
general supportive evidence that does not prove the statement of 
the applicant.
In the United Kingdom, evidence of witnesses and declarations 
of LGBTI organisations, who have worked closely with the asylum 
seeker, such as the UK Lesbian and Gay Immigratrion Group, are 
192 Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court) 17 February 2009, E2 255.708-2/2008.
193 See about the difficulties for asylum seekers in supplying evidence ECtHR 
19 February 1998, Appl. No. 25894/94, Reports 1998-I, (Bahaddar v the 
Netherlands) par. 45.
6 . 3 . 7  c o n c l u S i o n 
Medical, psychological or psychiatric examinations can be 
emotionally painful and humiliating for those who have suffered 
persecution because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 
If such examinations are to be used in order to establish whether 
the applicant is LGBTI, it is clear that these examinations serve 
no legitimate purpose. Since LGBTI identities do not constitute 
legitimate medical, psychological or psychiatric categories, 
medical or psychiatric experts have no expertise on this point. 
All examinations by psychologists, psychiatrists and sexologists 
performed to assess someone’s sexual orientation or gender identity 
(found in 8 countries: Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Hungary, Poland,191 Romania, Slovakia) are to be 
considered a violation of the right to privacy under Article 8 ECHR. 
This provision has been elaborated within the context of sexual 
orientation and gender identity in Article 18 of the Yogyakarta 
Principles. 
The ‘phallometry’ test used in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia 
to assess the sexual orientation of gay and lesbian asylum seekers 
constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 3 ECHR) 
as well as an invasion of applicants’ privacy (Article 8 ECHR) and 
it is right that this practice has now been abandoned. It is to be 
recommended that domestic law in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
is amended in such a way that it is clear that ‘phallometric testing’ 
cannot be applied in asylum cases.
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n S
•	 As a general principle, establishing sexual orientation or gender 
identity should be based on self-identification of the applicant. 
•	 Medical and psychiatric expert opinions are an inadequate and 
inappropriate method for establishing an applicant’s sexual 
orientation or gender identity.
191 We include Poland in this list, because the Polish Office for Aliens reportedly 
recommends the applicant to provide additional evidence, e.g. results of 
psychological tests, medical opinions from sexologists. We do not have 
concrete evidence that these examinations were really performed in Poland. 
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and intersex may be terms which are completely alien to an asylum 
seeker who can only associate her or his identity with negative terms 
to describe sexual or gender identity. For example, in Jamaica a gay 
man is referred to by others as a ‘batty man’ and a lesbian is referred 
to as a ‘sodomite’. Therefore, evidence, including witness statements, 
should focus on whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted on account of an actual or perceived membership 
of a particular social group. Witness statements of an applicant’s 
participation in activities of LGBTI organisations (be it in the country 
of origin or the country of refuge) or statements of people who 
had sexual contacts with applicants, therefore may be relevant for 
the credibility of applicants, provided that they are evaluated in the 
wider context of the case.
6 . 5  q u E S t i o n i n G  m E t h o d S
Credibility may crucially depend on the approach to questioning 
and types of questions asked (such as open or closed questions). 
Putting questions in ways which applicants find offensive or 
otherwise disturbing may lead to answers which are suspicious to 
asylum authorities. People may relate to themselves in ways which 
are unfamiliar to the interviewer, or they may have difficulties in 
putting into words how they see themselves. They may be hesitant 
to disclose their sexual orientation or gender identity, or may be 
in the process of figuring out how they see themselves. If asylum 
interviewers give applicants a sufficient ‘safe space’ to tell their 
story, this is most likely to lead to statements which are useful in 
the context of refugee status determination. Of course, statements 
are not necessarily to be found credible (or to lead to recognition 
as a refugee). However, the way in which the interview may be 
conducted can interfere with status determination by introducing 
the possibility that the applicant’s statements have been unduly 
influenced by the method of conducting the interview. 
6 . 5 . 1  i n t E r n at i o n a l  a n d  E u r o p E a n  S t a n d a r d S
Article 13(3)(a) of the Procedures Directive provides that Member 
States shall ensure that interviewers are competent to take account of 
the personal or general circumstances surrounding the application, 
including the applicant’s culture or vulnerability, insofar as it is possible 
to do so.195 The UNHCR Handbook points to the possibility that 
applicants may feel apprehensive vis-à-vis any authority (par. 198), and 
emphasizes that it is necessary for the examiner to gain the confidence 
of applicants in order to assist them in putting forward their case and 
in fully explaining their opinions and feelings (par. 200). 
195 The recast proposal of the Procedures Directive explicitly mentions sexual 
orientation and gender identity in this respect in Article 15(3), see the 
Commission’s Amended Proposal, COM(2011) 319 final, Brussels, 1 June 2011.
taken into consideration. Membership of LGBTI organisations can 
also be submitted, as well as proof of appointments at clinics which 
treat sexually transmitted diseases, and cater specifically for gay or 
bisexual men.
An example of how witness statements can be useful in the wider 
context of a case is an Irish case. Some decision-makers proved 
adept at distinguishing between what might be termed ‘peripheral’ 
credibility findings, e.g. disbelief as to mode of travel, absence of 
identity documentation, failure to seek asylum in safe first country, 
and ‘core’ credibility issues, namely the sexual orientation or gender 
identity of the claimant and their fear of persecution. In one case 
involving an Iranian gay man, various ‘peripheral’ credibility findings 
were made against the applicant, including his lack of identity 
documents and certain discrepancies in respect of the evidence 
which had been given by the applicant at interview and his evidence 
on appeal. Nonetheless, the decision maker in deciding the case 
weighed these negative findings against the evidence given in 
support of the applicant, including oral evidence heard from a 
member of the applicant’s own ethnic community. The decision-
maker concluded:
 “The Applicant, in the manner in which he gave his evidence 
throughout the whole hearing whether on direct examination or 
examination by the Presenting Officer, or questions at various stages 
during the hearing, was persuasive in relation to key matters which 
he stated. This was added to by the evidence of his witness who was 
very compelling and essentially the applicant’s case turns on this. He 
confirmed the two most important elements of the applicant’s case 
that he is an Iranian and that he is gay. When one considers what is 
important, all other matters become peripheral. This witness gave 
the impression, and I formed the opinion, that what he was saying 
was truthful. When pressed he was able to give very specific details. 
Their combined evidence was coherent and plausible. On balance I 
am prepared to accept that the Applicant is both credible and that 
he gave truthful evidence in the main thrust of his evidence. I accept 
that the Applicant is a homosexual from Iran.”194
6 . 4 . 3  c o n c l u S i o n
Witness statements may be relevant in any asylum context, including 
LGBTI cases. However, what it means to ‘be’ L, G, B, T or I is contested, 
and ‘being’ L, G, B, T or I has different meanings to different people: 
it may be about identification, or about feelings of attraction, or 
about acts, or about any combination of these. In addition, in some 
countries other identities, such as MSM – men having sex with 
men– are used precisely in an effort to deal with/evade homophobia 
by not using a gay identity. The terms lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans 
194 Refugee Appeals Tribunal, 2009.
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cases as implying that the decision-maker had expectations of 
promiscuous behaviour by gay men.
In Bulgaria questions were reported like: How many partners did 
you have? Are you passive or active in your sexual contacts?
In the United Kingdom, anecdotal evidence includes questioning 
bordering on the pornographic with respect to a lesbian woman, and 
asking a gay man when he first committed “buggery” with his boyfriend.199 
Also in Austria, explicit and degrading questions about sexual 
positions and the number of partners were reported in interrogations 
at the Federal Asylum Office (Bundesasylamt) as well as at the Asylum 
Court. A young man from Somalia was asked in his interrogation at 
the Bundesasylamt Graz when he had a homosexual encounter for 
the first time in a very inappropriate wording (“Bubensex” – boy sex, a 
term with predominantly pornographic connotations).
In Cyprus, a gay applicant was asked if he was a member of any gay 
social network site. When he answered positively, he was requested 
to give his personal password in order to check this statement. 
This overly intrusive question gives the impression that the asylum 
authorities want to know not just whether he was a member of a gay 
network site, but what sexual activities he engaged in on that site.
6 . 5 . 3  r E f l E c t i n G  h o m o -  a n d  t r a n S p h o B i a
Interviewers of the Romanian Office for Immigration asked: ”What do 
you think about homosexuality? Is it a normal relationship or a physical 
or psychological problem? Did you consult a doctor?” and: “Did you 
receive money for it?” These questions may well be experienced by 
applicants as reflecting forms of homophobia (homosexuality as an 
illness or as prostitution) similar to the ones they fled. This is extremely 
damaging to the trust required during asylum interviews. 
On the other hand, one can imagine that such questions could be 
appropriate, depending on the context. One can imagine a claimant 
testifying about realising that s/he was LGBTI, and the adjudicator 
asking how the claimant perceived this realization. This might illicit a 
useful narrative about claimants’ personal views of themselves, and 
the views their society held of homosexuality. A claimant may indeed 
have consulted a doctor, because many societies still consider a 
homosexual orientation an illness. 
199 Unreported case before the First-Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber), 2010. This case has been heared by the Upper Tribunal 
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) on the 12th of July 2011 with the Senior 
Immigration Judges finding that the approach of the Immigration Judge to 
his negative fidnings on the appellant’s sexual identity were perverse and 
allowed the asylum appeal of the gay man from Uzbekistan (having applied 
the HJ/HT guidelines). The UK country expert is awaiting further information 
on whether the case will be reported.
The UNHCR Gender Guidelines contain passages which are 
appropriate in the context of LGBTI asylum claims as well.
“Both ‘open-ended’ and specific questions which may help 
to reveal gender issues relevant to a refugee claim should be 
incorporated into all asylum interviews.”196
“Where it is envisaged that a particular case may give rise to a 
gender-related claim, adequate preparation is needed, which 
will also allow a relationship of confidence and trust with the 
claimant to be developed, as well as allowing the interviewer to 
ask the right questions and deal with any problems that may 
arise during an interview.”197
6 . 5 . 2  S E x u a l ly  E x p l i c i t  q u E S t i o n S
A prevalent practice consists of asking sexually explicit questions; 
often, the responses to such questions are labelled as ‘evasive’, hence 
not credible by decision makers.
In a Dutch case, during the asylum interview, an Iranian applicant 
had already been made to declare that he and his friend had 
been caught while they were naked in the bed of his friend; that 
they were sitting; that they touched each other on erotic body 
parts; and that they were having sex. The account was found not 
credible by the asylum authorities because the answer to the 
question in which position exactly he was caught with his friend 
was evasive. The Regional Court quashed this decision, ruling that 
it cannot be required of the applicant to give further details in 
order to be found credible on the point of his homosexuality.198
In Belgium, questions may be asked such as: When did you first 
touch private parts, when did you engage in tongue kissing, fellatio, 
coitus? There is also a reported tendency among Belgian decision-
makers to consider a relationship only as relevant for an LGB claim, if 
it includes (anal or oral) sexual activity or to consider the date of the 
first sexual intercourse as the starting date of the relationship, even 
if the applicant has indicated an earlier date as the beginning of a 
relationship.
Some Irish practitioners reported that homosexual applicants were 
questioned about the number of sexual partners and frequency 
of sexual relationships; this was perceived by practitioners in some 
196 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution 
within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees, 7 May 2002, 36, vii.
197 Supra, 36, ix.
198 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Haarlem 8 December 2009, 08/40650; the IND 
appealed at the Council of State, still pending.
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contacts with persons of the same sexual orientation in the country 
of origin; did he publicly manifest his orientation; etc.
The United Kingdom in their June 2011 Asylum Instruction on 
Gender Identity issues in the asylum claim, the UK Border Agency 
accepts:
“The credibility of an individual’s claim and the degree of risk on 
return should primarily be tested by a sensitive enquiry into the 
applicant’s realisation and experience of gender identity. Altering 
one’s birth sex is not a one-step process, but a complex process 
that occurs over a period of time. Transition may include some, 
or all of the following personal, legal and medical adjustments: 
telling family, friends and colleagues, changing one’s name 
and/or sex on legal documents; dressing, behaving and/or 
living as a different sex; hormone therapy; and possible surgery. 
Interviewing officers should ask open questions that allow 
applicants to describe the development of their identity and how 
this has affected their identity and how this has affected their 
experiences both in their own country and in the UK.”200 
6 . 5 . 5  c o n c l u S i o n
In some Member States, sexually explicit questions are asked, and 
evasive responses are considered to damage applicants’ credibility. 
This is highly problematic because the purported evasiveness of 
the responses may be related as much to the shock of being asked 
questions about sexual details as to a lack of veracity. In addition, 
such intrusive questioning constitues an invasion of applicants’ 
privacy in the absence of an overriding necessity to do so.
A second issue is that questions – whether sexually explicit or not – 
may rely on stereotypes. Examples are the notion that homosexuality 
is an illness, has much to do with prostitution, is about intercourse, 
or is by itself promiscuous. Such stereotypical presumptions may 
be offensive to applicants and, as a consequence, interfere with 
the asylum interview. They may also lead to conclusions which are 
as incorrect as the presumptions, such as: if an applicant has had 
relations with only one other person and wants things to stay that 
way, this simply does not imply that the person is not L, G, B, T or I. 
Asylum interviewers should seek to establish the perspective of the 
applicant, which may be influenced by stereotypes interviewers 
do not share. Applicants may experience their sexual orientation 
as an illness (but believe they should not be punished for it); or 
200 UK Border Agency Asylum Instruction on Gender Identity issues in the 
asylum claim, 13 June 2011, http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/
sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicyinstructions/apis/
genderissueintheasylum.pdf?view=Binary, last accessed 16 July 2011. See for a 
similar instruction on sexual orientation: UK Border Agency, Sexual Orientation 
issues in the asylum claim (6 October 2010, revised on 13 June 2011).
The most important part of a claim is the claimant’s narrative, and 
sometimes questions are useful to move the narrative along and 
solicit additional information. Such narrative may be detailed and 
in many cases starts form childhood, prior to any realisation of 
sexual feelings. Because the social context may be different than the 
European context, asking questions that would be offensive to many 
western LGBTI people might in fact be very relevant to LGBTIs from 
other countries. It is impossible to work with standard instructions 
on this point. It is crucial that interviewers are understanding, and 
are aware that what they consider as LGBTI awareness may be 
experienced as reflecting homo- or transphobia by the applicant, 
and vice versa: what the interviewer considers as unacceptable may 
be experienced as supportive and understanding by the applicant. 
This is precisely the point: the asylum interview should focus on the 
applicant’s perspective.
6 . 5 . 4  G o o d  p r a c t i c E
Examples of good practices can be given as well on this point. In 
some Member States, interview officers will ask applicants to tell 
their story about their sexual orientation: when they realized they 
were LGBTI, whether, and if so when, they had their first relationship, 
responses of their friends and family; what kind of problems the 
applicant and his/her partners may have had on account of their 
sexual orientation. These questions assist applicants in telling their 
story, and do not steer them in any particular direction. A few 
examples:
From Hungary, it was reported to be prevalent that the authority 
asks about the “history” of the sexual orientation, and characteristics 
of the relationships, e.g. when the applicant realised his/her gay 
orientation, when he/she had the first gay relationship, how the 
partners got to know each other, how long the relationship lasted, 
did the partners live together, how many partners the applicant had. 
The deputy Head of the Procedural Department of Slovakia 
stated during the interview for the purposes of this research that 
firstly the LGBTI asylum seeker is asked to speak freely about his 
problems and sexual orientation; then the decision-maker asks 
concrete additional questions, which can include explicit questions 
about sexual activities. Usually, the questions will be more general 
and will not include direct questions, such as the description of 
sexual intercourse. The asylum interviews of the cases researched 
included such questions as: when and how the applicant found out 
he was homosexual; if the family and community knew about his 
sexual orientation; if any of applicant’s partners or friends had been 
persecuted because of sexual orientation and how; how police 
became aware of his homosexuality; what was the attitude of his 
family towards his sexual orientation; did he maintain personal 
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authorities state that these types of questions are only asked as a 
means of extra proof, people are frequently refused asylum when 
they do not know the correct answers. This is problematic, because 
gay scenes in the country of origin may not exist, or applicants 
may not want to be part of that environment. The same goes for 
gay scenes in the country of refuge: whether or not an applicant is 
interested in LGBTI neighbourhoods or venues is hardly relevant for 
establishing sexual orientation, especially where they do not have 
the economic or social means to access the meeting spaces these 
areas consist of.
In the case of a gay Ugandan male, an Irish decision maker stated 
“it was put to the applicant that his knowledge of homosexual 
meeting points, websites, clubs or rallies against homosexuality 
was very limited, to which he replied that he did not want to 
campaign for the rights of homosexuals, he was happy with [his 
partner] and did not need to include other people or find out 
how they lived. The applicant is a well educated person and it is 
not credible that as an alleged homosexual man he would show 
such little interest or knowledge in matters that affect him. This 
casts doubt upon the credibility of the applicant.”201
6 . 6 . 1 . 1  s t a t e  p r a c t I c e
Questions asked in Belgium on gay life in the country of origin 
include: Do you know popular stars with the reputation of being 
LGBT in your country of origin? How can you recognise another gay 
person on his conduct? Where do LGBTs meet in the city? Are there 
cruising places? Where did you go to negotiate same-sex sexual 
desires? 
In the United Kingdom, the First-Tier Tribunal could not accept that 
a Ugandan lesbian woman was not more familiar with lesbian books 
and magazines.202 Comparable examples are reported from France 
and the Netherlands.
Other countries report a more nuanced situation, where it will 
depend on the statements of the applicant whether s/he is expected 
to know gay scenes. In Finland, the representative of the Finnish 
Migration Service says, that “these kind of questions can be asked 
in some cases, if there is a reason to believe, that the applicant 
would know about them. However, this kind of knowledge is not a 
prerequisite for a positive decision.”
201 Refugee Applications Commissioner, 2009.
202 Immigration and Asylum Chamber 30 January 2011, BN (Uganda), reported on 
LGBT Asylum News website.
they may refuse to label themselves as gay because they find this 
implies promiscuity. The other way around, well intended questions, 
such as whether applicants sought assistance when they came out 
to themselves, may hurt applicants who were forced to undergo 
‘assistance’ in changing their sexual orientation.
Sensitive interviewing requires permanent reflection by interviewers 
on the interview. If, for example, an interviewer finds the applicant 
evasive, the interviewer should reflect on what could be the cause 
for this. Is the applicant making something up (and if so, why); is the 
applicant reluctant to share painful facts; has the applicant been 
offended by something the interviewer (or the interpreter) said? In 
order to enable interviewers to be reflective in this way, training is 
needed both at the beginning of an interviewer’s career, as well as 
in the form of professional development and training updates. LGBTI 
issues should preferably be both the subject of specific trainings 
and part of general trainings on interviewing methods, since they 
both warrant specific attention and need to be mainstreamed. In 
addition, LGBTI specific aspects of interviewing techniques have a 
lot in common with issues concerning gender, victims of systemic 
discrimination, and victims of torture. These LGTBI aspects need to be 
incorporated into the Europan Asylum Curriculum (training modules 
for civil servants) as well as into the training for the judiciary. 
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n 
•	 Interviewers, decision makers, the judiciary and legal aid 
providers need to be competent and capable of taking into 
account the sexual orientation and gender identity aspects of 
asylum applications, including the process of ‘coming-out’ and 
the special needs of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex 
applicants. To this end, they should be professionally trained, 
both in a specific basic training module and during general 
permanent education modules.
6 . 6  a S S u m E d  k n o W l E d G E  a n d  B E h a v i o u r
In many cases, credibility findings were closely related to 
assumptions on the part of the interviewer or the decision maker as 
to how a ‘true’ lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or intersex person behaves, 
or about what LGBTI people know. In this paragraph, a few common 
assumptions are dealt with.
6 . 6 . 1  f a m i l i a r i t y  W i t h  G a y  S c E n E S
Questions are often asked with respect to familiarity with gay scenes 
in the country of origin and in the country of refuge. Although some 
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purported fear of being persecuted on account of sexual 
orientation or gender identity is not credible. 
6 . 6 . 2  h E t E r o S E x u a l  m a r r i a G E  a n d  pa r E n t h o o d 
In many Member States, the fact that an applicant claiming to be L, 
G, B, T or I has been married - or does so in the country of refuge – is 
considered grounds for finding it not credible that the applicant is an 
LGBTI person. This ignores the common feature of LGBTIs identities, 
which still exist even in Europe, of the ‘double lives’ LGBTIs lead. 
6 . 6 . 2 . 1  I n t e r n a t I o n a l  s t a n D a r D s
The UNHCR Guidance note states that “a person should not 
automatically be considered heterosexual merely because he or she 
is, or has been, married, [or] has children.”204
6 . 6 . 2 . 2  s t a t e  p r a c t I c e
In the case of a lesbian applicant in Cyprus the fact that she had two 
previous marriages was considered reason not to believe her sexual 
orientation, even though she had claimed that both marriages were 
forced and that the first was not consummated, which led to it being 
annulled, and the second was forcefully consummated and also 
ended in divorce. In Spain a lesbian was refused because she had a 
baby in Algeria. In the Netherlands a decision stated: “It is strange 
that a man who previously had a homosexual relationship for four 
years, marries a woman without objections.”205
Marriage outside the country of origin is also considered to damage 
the credibility of the sexual orientation of applicants. In Malta there 
was the case of a Libyan national who was in a steady relationship 
with a Maltese man. Once his family in Libya discovered his 
homosexuality he was threatened and ordered to leave Libya. He 
left for Malta and entered a marriage of convenience with a Maltese 
woman, viewed as the only legal way of remaining in Malta, since he 
was unaware that homosexuality could be a ground for international 
protection. His Maltese wife eventually filed a police report admitting 
to the marriage of convenience, on the basis of which the police 
initiated deportation proceedings. At this point, the applicant 
applied for refugee status, but - due to the expiry of the required 
deadline - his case was deemed to be invalid. In a last attempt to 
challenge his deportation, the applicant initiated court proceedings 
challenging his pending deportation under Articles 3 and 8 of the 
204 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims 
Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 21 November 2008, par. 
36. Comp. In the Danish study mentioned above, only 19% of LBT women 
and 29% of the GBT men stated they were not interested in having children. 
Thus, the vast majority of LGBT-persons actually had or would like to have 
children, Leyla Gransell and Henning Hansen, Equal and unequal? The living 
conditions and well being of gay and lesbian people, bisexuals and transgenders in 
Denmark, Copenhagen: Casa 2009, available at www.casa-analyse.dk/default.
asp?Action=Details&Item=387.
205 Decision IND 28 January 2011, Burundi, nr. 0607-27-04150. 
Obviously, sometimes knowledge of gay scenes actually supports an 
asylum claim; this, however, does not imply that lack of knowledge 
of gay scenes is a solid ground for rejecting a claim. In the case of an 
Albanian applicant in Hungary, the declaration of his gay orientation 
was believed by the authority, his statements were supported by 
the existence of the web pages containing gay-friendly information, 
which had been set up and operated by the applicant. The 
application was strengthened as well by the fact that the Albanian 
claimant was a member of a gay association which was supported 
by COC Netherlands.
One Irish practitioner reported a gay asylum applicant being asked 
if he was familiar with a well known gay bar in Dublin. A negative 
credibility finding was made on the grounds that he was not familiar 
with this bar; the decision-maker could not accept that a gay man 
living in Dublin would not have been to this bar. Similar questioning 
is reported from France and Romania.
6 . 6 . 1 . 2  G o o D  p r a c t I c e
The Swedish LGBT Guidelines contain a good practice: “The fact 
that the homosexual has not been in contact with organizations 
for homosexuals, whether in Sweden or in the country of origin, 
is seldom a factor that would gainsay his or hers fears regarding 
a return to the country of origin, and thereby negatively affect 
the assessment. In addition, in many countries there are no such 
organizations to consult.”203
6 . 6 . 1 . 3  c o n c l u s I o n
When part of an applicant’s statements is that she or he participated 
in LGBTI organisations or has visited LGBTI venues, this may influence 
the credibility of these statements. However, the simple fact that an 
applicant claiming to be L, G, B, T or I has no knowledge of particular 
LGBTI organisations or meeting places does not allow for direct 
conclusions as to their credibility. They may not be aware of these, 
they may be unwilling to be part of them, they may not be ‘out’ 
enough to do so, have financial means to access such venues – there 
are many other reasons besides a lack of credibility. In addition, 
asking questions such as these may contribute to an examination-
like atmosphere during the interview, which is detrimental to the 
quality of the interview. 
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n
•	 The fact that an applicant lacks familiarity with lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, trans and intersex organisations or venues cannot 
in itself be considered as an indication that the applicant’s 
203 Migrationsverket, Sexual Orientation Guidelines, 2002.
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and children are believed to be one of the main indicators for the 
assessment of the sexual orientation of a person. There was a case of 
a bisexual man from Lebanon being rejected because he had a wife 
and children.
An applicant in Finland changed his claim from homosexual to 
bisexual, immediately after he married a woman. Although in the 
interview he repeatedly pointed out that he is not homosexual, but 
bisexual, and he held the difference between these two orientations 
very significant, he did not know the right term for bisexuality, at the 
time of writing his application. This was not found to be credible and 
his claim was rejected in 2010. 
An Algerian applicant in Hungary was refused protection, because 
he could not sufficiently substantiate the probability of his 
persecution in Algeria. It was not stated explicitly that the reason for 
the rejection was his bisexuality; however, he had a wife and children. 
6 . 6 . 2 . 3  G o o D  p r a c t I c e
In a number of Member States it is recognised that marriage does 
not necessarily imply that the applicant is not an LGBTI person. 
This is to be considered as a good practice, in line with the UNHCR 
Guidance Note.
In Italy, a gay Moroccan was married in Morocco and had a child 
within the marriage. He said that he got married at the age of 28 (he 
was 40 at the time of claim) because he was forced to do so by his 
family. He declared he was not sure he was the father of the child, 
but he felt obliged to help his wife and child economically. He said 
his wife did not accept a divorce out of fear of social repercussions. 
He was granted refugee status.209
In Slovakia, the only applicant who was granted asylum because of 
his (bi)sexual orientation was previously married in the country of 
origin and had four children.
In Denmark, it is well understood that an applicant being L, G, B, T 
or I and being married is not incompatible. In one case the applicant 
was granted refugee status because of homosexual conduct in his 
home country, while living with a woman in Denmark. In France, the 
asylum authorities as well as the Court do not consider marriage and 
family as a key element which could be the ground for a refusal, but 
in case of doubt this element can be considered among others. 
209 Commissione territoriale per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale 
di Milano (Regional committee for the recognition of international protection 
of Milan), decision, 2010.
ECHR, which proceedings were never finalised since the applicant was 
deported prior to any court hearing. Since no court hearing was held, 
no court decision is available. Of interest, however, are the submissions 
presented by the Attorney General in support of the applicant’s 
deportation. The submissions wholly dismissed the applicant’s claims 
regarding his homosexuality on the basis that the applicant’s credibility 
was irreparably damaged by the marriage of convenience.206
A Nigerian applicant married a lesbian woman (in the U.S.A.), because 
he wanted to have children. He stated he was more interested in 
men than in women, and he could only have sex with a woman after 
consuming lots of alcohol. According to the Dutch authorities, these 
statements added to the lack of credibility of his statements on his 
homosexuality. The decision was upheld by the Regional Court.207 
In case of marriage or children in Finland it is not necessarily 
expressed directly that the sexual orientation would not be believed. 
More often it is stated that it is not probable that there would 
be a serious danger of persecution based on the claimed sexual 
orientation. Because of the heterosexual relationship and children 
the applicant would not be perceived to be homosexual, and hence 
s/he has no fear of persecution.
In Germany, the concept of sexual orientation based on classical 
sexology also appears in a decision in 2008. The fact that one 
claimant was married in the Netherlands and had a child as a result 
of this marriage established, according to the Administrative Court, 
that the claimant was not to a sufficient degree “determined by 
his homosexuality” in order to fulfil the criteria of belonging to a 
particular social group within the definition of Art. 10 (1) d of the 
Qualification Directive.208
Also in Hungary marriage and children seem to significantly reduce 
the probability that the applicant is deemed credible. A lesbian 
applicant was married and had a child, born after she had recognized 
her lesbian orientation. The Office of Immigration and Nationality 
declared that she would not have lived together and married a man, 
had she been a lesbian. 
In several countries, even declared bisexual applicants were rejected 
because the applicant was married and/or has children.
In Bulgaria, according to the country expert, anyone falling out 
of the stereotypes for LGBs is considered as not credible. Marriage 
206 W. El-H vs Principal Immigration Officer (First Hall, Civil Court), initiated on 29 
July 2008.
207 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Haarlem, 12 January 2010, nr. 09/48023.
208 Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Ansbach, 21 August 2008, AN 18 K 
08.30201.
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social surroundings) can be of much more importance than formal 
sanctions. Therefore, applicants being unaware of the (exact) criminal 
sanctions against sexual orientation in their country of origin should 
not in itself be a ground for finding the applicant not credible.
6 . 6 . 4  S t at E d  c o n d u c t  t o o  r i S k y  t o  B E  t r u E
In several cases, asylum applications are rejected because applicants 
have engaged in activities which were dangerous for themselves; 
this is deemed to be implausible.
A German court summarized a negative decision as follows: 
“The applicant’s claim to have engaged in homosexual activities 
in Cameroon is not credible as this would have meant to expose 
himself to danger. His description of his life as a homosexual in 
Cameroon is not precise enough.” The reviewing Administrative 
court disagreed on both points and quashed the decision.212
Comparably, a German court quoted from a Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees decision as follows: “The applicant’s (a Sunni 
Arab from Mosul/Iraq) statement is implausible: if his homosexual 
activities had indeed become known and he would have been 
persecuted he would also have been convicted under Section 400 
of the Iraqi Penal Code.” The Administrative Court disagreed and 
quashed the decision.213
In Slovenia an applicant was found not credible because he stated 
that he had sexual relations with a friend whose wife got to know 
about it, after which they did not hide their relations for the wife. The 
Slovenian authorities also found it strange that the wife reported 
them to the police only after knowing about this for two years.
In the Netherlands the asylum authorities did not find it plausible 
that a Pakistani boy had sex with his boy-friend in his room while 
other (Muslim) family-members were present in the same home, 
nor that they did not lock the door properly, knowing the risks 
involved.214
If this kind of reasoning is taken to its logical conclusion, the claim of 
virtually every asylum seeker who has had, or attempted, a same-sex 
relationship in their country of origin, or who has expressed a trans 
identity, is implausible because of the inherent risk it entailed.215 
212 Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Frankfurt (Oder), 11 November 
2010, VG 4 K 772/10.A.
213 Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Sigmaringen, 26 April 2010, A 1 K 
1911/0.
214 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Haarlem, 29 September 2009, nr. 09/32801.
215 Jenni Millbank, ‘The Ring of Truth’: A Case Study of Credibility Assessment 
in Particular Social Group Refugee Determinations, International Journal of 
Refugee Law, 2009-1, p. 22.
Sweden has an explicit policy rule, holding: ‘The fact that the 
homosexual is married, and perhaps has children with a person of 
the opposite sex should not in any way rule out the fact that he or 
she has a homosexual orientation.’210
The recent United Kingdom Asylum Instruction holds in this 
respect: ‘ “Neither should (heterosexual) relationships or parenthood 
(both of which may need to be explored at interview) be 
automatically taken as evidence of lack of credibility.”211 
Also Austria, Belgium, and the Czech Republic report no problems 
on this point.
6 . 6 . 2 . 4  c o n c l u s I o n
It can be concluded that in many Member States, marriage and 
children and being an L, G, B, T or I person are deemed incompatible. 
While this is a totally untenable position when it comes to bisexuals, 
it also does not make sense for LGTI applicants. The social pressures 
applicants face may be enormous, forcing LGTI people to marry 
against their will. The notion that being married or having children 
can be of any relevance for the credibility of an applicant’s sexual 
orientation, seems to be one of the remnants of the medical view 
of sexual orientation and gender identity, which considers LGTI 
identities in terms of lack or incapacity. The implicit notion is that a 
person will only be LGTI if s/he has no other option and cannot help 
being LGTI. Only when LGBTI identities are seen as resulting from 
necessity (not choice) does it make sense to think that, if a person 
was married or had a child, s/he cannot really be LGTI.
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n 
•	 The fact that an applicant is or has been married or cohabiting 
in a heterosexual relationship, possibly with children of that 
relationship, should not in any way rule out the fact that he or 
she may be lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or intersex.
6 . 6 . 3   k n o W l E d G E  o f  c r i m i n a l  S a n c t i o n S
Belgium, France, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland reported 
that not knowing the exact criminal sanctions or the exact wording 
of the criminal provisions against sexual orientation in their country 
of origin, may affect the applicant’s credibility.
This denies the reality of the lives of many LGBTI people, where 
social sanctions (pressure or – threats of – violence from relatives of 
210 Migrationsverket, Sexual Orientation Guidelines 2002.
211 UK Home Office, Asylum Instruction: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in 
the Asylum Claim, 6 October 2010, revised on 13 June 2011.
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6 . 6 . 5  o t h E r  S t E r E o t y p E d  c r i t E r i a
There are scores of other stereotypical notions which have been (ab)
used to conclude that an applicant is not an LGBTI person. A non-
exhaustive list of examples:
Obviously, when an applicant does meet stereotype expectations, 
this can be to the applicant’s advantage: in Hungary in the case of 
a Tunisian applicant, the decision mentioned that he dressed in a 
feminine way and wore make-up. 
In the United Kingdom, a Yemeni gay man wore tight T-shirts 
and tight jeans and had long hair, which he associated with 
the expression of his sexual identity. He refused to accept any 
modification to his dress, or cut his hair on return, to fit with the 
clothes and hair-styles of straight Muslim men on return. The Tribunal 
in 2009 allowed his appeal and he was granted refugee status.224
224 Unreported case before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal.
More generally, the fact that behaviour put an applicant at risk 
is more likely to be a reason to grant asylum than to deny it. This 
reasoning should be abandoned. 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223
216 Audiencia Nacional (National Court) 19 December 2008, rec. nº 1399/2007.
217 Refugee Appeals Tribunal, 2010.
218 Raad voor de Vreemdelingenbetwistingen  (Council for Aliens Cases) 21 
October 2008, 17.431; Raad voor de Vreemdelingenbetwistingen (Council for 
Aliens Cases) 22 October 2008, 17.471;19.383; 19.842; 19.837; 21.996.
219 Audiencia Nacional (National Court), 21 July 2008, rec. nº 679/2006.
220 Reported in Nathanael Miles, No Going Back, Lesbian and Gay People and the 
Asylum System, Stonewall, May 2010, www.stonewall.org.uk.
221 Court of Appeal (England and Wales), August 2009, NR (Jamaica) v SSHD 
[2010] INLR 169.
222 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Haarlem, 18 December 2007, nr. 07/26891, 
Council of State, 18 April 2008, 200800353/1.
223 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Groningen, 3 September 2010, nr. 10/6506.
Topic Member State Example
Military service Cyprus A gay applicant was questioned regarding his service in the army. The fact that he did not try to avoid the army, which 
is mandatory in his country, was found to be contradictory with stereotypical gay conduct.
Cultural taste France Questions may concern a person’s dressing habits, leisure time, cultural tastes (music, film, television), knowledge of 
and/or participation in culture considered gay.
Language Hungary In the case of a Nigerian woman the asylum authorities deemed it improbable that the applicant would use “Latin 
terminology” (such as “homosexual”) given her educational background. The authority supposed that the applicant heard 
or invented the story of her homosexuality to attain a refugee status. The medical examination resulted in the assessment 
of “strong feminine sexuality”. It has to be noted that other elements also questioned the credibility of the applicant.
Language Spain A Mauritanian gay man who called himself “maricon”. The Court was of the opinion that this word is rarely used by a 
gay person.216
Demeanour Ireland Some decision-makers reached negative decisions based on their own judgments of an applicant’s demeanour (i.e. 
whether, in the view of the decision-maker, the applicant presented as a homosexual person). For example, in refusing a 
refugee appeal by an Algerian gay man, a Tribunal Member stated “from his demeanour (at the appeal) I have no doubt 
that the applicant advanced the claim that he is a homosexual to enhance his application to be declared to be a refugee”. 
The basis of the Tribunal Member’s expertise to determine sexual orientation based on demeanour is not addressed.217
Demeanour Bulgaria A common opinion is that a gay man should necessarily“look feminine” and “display” his sexual orientation, the same 
applies to homosexual women.
Sex work Belgium Homosexual sex workers have been rejected, because of “engagement in illegal homosexual acts motivated by 
economic and opportunistic reasons.”218
Sex work Spain A trans woman from Costa Rica suffered all kind of discrimination; the Court held that her problems and discrimination 
occurred because she worked in prostitution, not because of her gender identity.219
Cultural tastes UK stereotypes and ignorance, including expecting a gay man to know about the works of Oscar Wilde.220
No other choice UK A woman’s sexual conduct in prison was considered a continuation of teenage sexual experimentation; in prison, she 
had “no choice, bar celibacy” and therefore it was not found credible that she was a lesbian. The finding was reversed by 
the Court of Appeal.221
Genetics Netherlands A Jamaican's bisexuality was not found credible, because he stated that his homosexual orientation was "not in his genes."222
Monogamy Netherlands An Iraqi applicant stated that, although he had a sexual relationship with a man for five years, he was not sure whether 
he was in fact homosexual, because he never had feelings towards other men. The IND believed the relationship, but 
was of the opinion that the policy for homosexuals from Iraq did not apply to him, because he was not a homosexual. 
“In Arabic countries young men often turn to men for sexual satisfaction, because they cannot satisfy their sexual 
needs with a woman”, according to the IND. The Regional Court of Groningen saw no reason why this speculation was 
applicable here. Appeal allowed.223
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The above way of looking at sexual orientation is to be seen at work 
in all credibility issues. The medical expert opinions are based on 
categories which have officially been rejected (gender dysphoria, 
inversion, etc) and essentially seek to establish the stability of a 
person’s sexual orientation. Germany is merely explicit in requiring 
a stable sexual identity (Schicksalhaften Festlegung – fateful fixation). 
In other Member States as well, decision makers and courts try to 
distinguish between frivolous behaviour (merely same-sex sexual 
activities, which should not lead to asylum, even if it has led to 
inhuman treatment in the country of origin) and applicants who 
feel compelled to engage in same-sex sexual activities, or who are 
really trans or intersex. One gets the impression that applicants are 
required to be earnest about their sexuality. Apparently, it is not 
usual to be gay without enquiring about criminal law specifics; to 
be lesbian but not read lesbian media; to have a relationship with 
another man but not know about gay meeting places in Teheran 
parks. All these examples testify that credibility findings are based 
on very specific expectations, which treat sexual orientation 
as something akin to political or religious convictions, with the 
expected participation in party meetings, focussing on the formal 
public sphere of public media and legislation. Obviously, sexuality is 
political in many ways, but sexual politics, while it may take place in 
classical venues such as media and parliaments, is more often (and 
maybe predominantly) played out in settings which are labelled as 
private, such as the family, the neighbourhood or the workplace. 
It cannot be claimed that every asylum applicant claiming to have a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of being L, G, B, T 
or I speaks the truth and qualifies for asylum. That said, the examples 
of asylum interview practice provide evidence of untenable methods 
of establishing credibility, riddled with questionable assumptions 
about how ‘true’ LGBTI applicants behave. The main conclusion 
to be drawn from this state of affairs is that credibility can only be 
established on the basis of an interview which allows the applicant 
to freely tell her or his own story. This means that it should be 
geared towards enabling applicants to tell the story of the sexual 
orientation as they have experienced it, in a detailed manner and 
in a safe space. As LaViolette has established, this will lead to three 
main lines of enquiry during asylum interviews: (i) Personal and 
Family (ii) Lesbian and Gay Contacts in both sending and receiving 
countries and (iii) Experience/Knowledge of Discrimination and 
Persecution.225 The Swedish and UK guidelines, as well as the 
UNHCR Guidance Note contain a description of a useful approach. 
Of course, requests for clarifications or for more details may be asked. 
But anything that smacks of an exam, asking for ‘the right answer’ 
225 Nicole LaViolette, ‘Sexual Orientation and the Refugee Determination Process: 
Questioning a Claimant about their Membership in the Particular Social 
Group’, prepared for the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, 2004.
6 . 7  c o n c l u S i o n
The stereotypes on LGBTI people may be clustered into three main 
groups, which do not cover all but most of the examples. Please note 
that most examples concern gay men. This is probably due to the 
prevalence of gay male applications.
The three main categories of stereotypes are:
 – Lacking the ‘real thing’: LGB persons are considered as having 
gender trouble: gays are not real men: they do not (want to) 
serve in the army, they do not marry nor have children, they do 
not dress in a masculine way; they do not have a relationship 
with only one man. Lesbians are not real women: they do not 
marry nor have children, they do not dress in a feminine way. 
The German classical-sexological presumptions are very much 
alive in many Member States. For example, same-sex sexual 
activity in an all-female or all-male environment, such as a prison, 
is considered no expression of being lesbian, gay or bisexual, 
because it does not reflect a ‘fateful and irreversible’ attraction to 
the same sex. Marriage or children establish that a person is not 
LGB.
 – A social group: LGB people form a coherent group, with common 
cultural tastes, common media, they share particular physical 
social spaces, patterns of behaviour, attitudes.
 – Coming out: LGB applicants are presumed to have found out 
about and dealt with their sexual orientation in a particular way: 
they are presumed to have had feelings of guilt, to have a stable 
sexual orientation about which they have deep feelings.
These stereotypes are based on the idea that sexual orientation is 
strictly ordered according to a set of categories with heterosexuality 
as the obvious and stable central category. This allows for gays 
and lesbians as equally stable peripheral categories of identity; for 
trans and intersex people as medical categories; and for bisexuals 
as people who might count as lesbian or gay when they have 
finally succeeded in making up their minds. In this way, lesbians 
and gays are shaped in the image of heterosexuals – reassuringly 
peripheral identities which mimic the stability of heterosexuality. 
Trans and intersex people are confusing for this categorisation, and 
are comfortingly labelled as medical problems. Bisexuals have no 
problem because they can ‘choose’ between assuming the position 
of lesbians/gay men or that of straight people. This orderly way of 
dealing with non-straight sexualities reinforce heterosexuality and 
cisgender as the dominant norm.
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(where are gay meeting places; what is the criminal provision for 
lesbian sex; what position were you in when you were discovered) is 
counterproductive (a) because they may disturb the trust an asylum 
interview requires, and (b) because they reflect presumptions which 
may be incorrect or not applicable in the particular case.
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n
•	 During the personal interview in the meaning of Article 12 
Procedures Directive, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex 
applicants should be given the opportunity to describe how 
their sexual orientation or gender identity has developed, 
including responses of the environment; experiences with 
problems, harrassment, violence; and feelings of difference, 
stigma, fear and shame.
64
65
l a t E  d i S c l o S u r E
new elements or findings relating to the examination of whether the 
individual qualifies as a refugee, have arisen or have been presented 
by the applicant. If new elements or findings arise which significantly 
add to the likelihood of the applicant qualifying as a refugee the 
application should be further examined.227 
Within the framework of the current recast of the Procedures 
Directive, the European Commission proposed to explicitly 
encompass sexual orientation and gender identity within the 
definition of “applicants in need of special procedural guarantees.”228 
The Commission also proposed that Member States should ensure 
that those applicants are identified in due time and that relevant 
provisions also apply “if it becomes apparent at a later stage of 
the procedure that an applicant is in need of special procedural 
guarantees”. Also “Member States shall ensure that applicants in 
need of special procedural guarantees” are “granted sufficient time 
and relevant support to present the elements of their application as 
completely as possible and with all available evidence.”229
The UNHCR Guidance Note states in this respect:
“The applicant will not always know that sexual orientation can 
constitute a basis for refugee status or can be reluctant to talk 
about such intimate matters, particularly where his or her sexual 
orientation would be the cause of shame or taboo in the country of 
origin. As a result, he or she may at first not feel confident to speak 
freely or to give an accurate account of his or her case. Even where 
the initial submission for asylum contains false statements, or where 
the application is not submitted until some time has passed after 
the arrival to the country of asylum, the applicant can still be able to 
establish a credible claim.”230 
227 Article 32 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum 
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing 
refugee status.
228 The proposed Article 2 (d) of the Procedures Directive: “‘applicant in need of 
special procedural guarantees’ means an applicant who due to age, gender, 
sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, serious physical illness, mental 
illness, post traumatic disorders or consequences of torture, rape or other 
serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence is in need of 
special guarantees in order to benefit from the rights and comply with the 
obligations provided for in this Directive.” Amended proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for 
granting and withdrawing international protection status (Recast), Brussels, 1 
June 2011, COM(2011) 319 final, 2009/0165 (COD).
229 The proposed Article 24: “1. Member States shall ensure that applicants in 
need of special procedural guarantees are identified in due time. (…) Member 
States shall ensure that this Article also applies if it becomes apparent at a 
later stage in the procedure that an applicant is in need of special procedural 
guarantees; 2. Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that 
applicants in need of special procedural guarantees are granted sufficient 
time and relevant support to present the elements of their application as 
completely as possible and with all available evidence.”
230 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims 
Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 21 November 2008, par. 38.
7  l a t E  d i S c l o S u r E 
In general, people applying for international protection are supposed 
to relate the reasons why they fear persecution immediately and in 
a clear, consistent and coherent manner. Raising the issue of sexual 
orientation or gender identity at a later stage (for example: during 
the appeal stage; or in a subsequent application) often casts doubt 
on the applicant’s credibility and therefore such late claims can easily 
be rejected. However, there may be several valid reasons why LGBTI 
asylum seekers may not have disclosed their sexual orientation or 
gender identity at the moment of their initial application, such as: 
 – Sometimes children seek asylum, while some years later they 
become aware of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 
 – Many LGBTI asylum seekers do not dare to talk about their 
sexual orientation or gender identity due to feelings of 
difference, stigma, shame or fear. These feelings can be based 
on internalised homophobia or transphobia and they might be 
reinforced by the necessity to disclose their sexual orientation 
or gender identity to an officer of the asylum authority, or 
by the fear of what could happen if their sexual orientation 
or gender identity became known in other settings, such as 
accommodation centres.
 – They may be in the process of ‘coming-out’: they may not have 
fully come out to others or even to themselves about their sexual 
orientation or gender identity.
 – Some LGBTI asylum seekers and their advisers are not aware that 
their sexual orientation or gender identity may be relevant for 
the assessment of their claim.
A German Court decided that the fact that a statement had 
been made more than three years after arrival in Germany did 
not disqualify an Iraqi claimant from refugee status: The claimant 
explained in a credible manner that he could only decide to 
publicly admit to his homosexuality after a lengthy inner process 
and a difficult inner struggle, the end of which was marked by the 
finding of his own sexual identity.226 
7 . 1  i n t E r n a t i o n a l  a n d  E u r o p E a n  S t a n d a r d S
The Procedures Directive states that a subsequent application for 
asylum shall be subject to a preliminary examination as to whether 
226 Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Kölln , 8 September 2006, 18 K 
9030/03.A, Informationsverbund Asyl & Migration M17466.
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declarations represent ‘new facts or circumstances’. If the answer 
is negative, the subsequent application will not be examined; the 
credibility of a sexual orientation claim submitted later is not even 
assessed or taken into account. We found clear examples of this in 
Austria and the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands, the lower courts have acknowledged that 
‘coming-out’ is a complex process that can take a long time, whereby 
various stages of awareness are distinguished (aware, but not fully, 
still searching, insecure and scared, not able to talk about it, still in 
the phase of acceptance, slumbering homosexuality, fearing the 
consequences, struggling etc.) and that people are sometimes 
not able to talk about their sexual orientation immediately upon 
arrival.232
The Dutch Council of State, however, applies a stricter criterion: 
someone who is (albeit slightly) aware of homosexual feelings 
should mention this immediately upon arrival, also when he or she 
has never expressed these feelings ever before. 
A Somali man always had been aware that he was different and 
only looked at men, but he expressed his sexual orientation for 
the first time some years after he came to the Netherlands. The 
Court of Assen ruled that because he only became fully aware of 
his homosexuality and acted accordingly after his first application, 
this was a new fact.233 In appeal the Council of State overruled this 
judgement: because he declared he had always been aware of his 
sexual orientation, he could and should have told about it at the time 
of his first application. The fact that he engaged in a homosexual 
relationship only after some years of staying in the Netherlands does 
not change this.234 This approach does not have regard to the fact 
that in this case late disclosure was due to the fact that he was only 
able to express his sexual identity for the first time in the Netherlands.
This formalistic procedural issue may stand in the way of the practical 
application of liberal substantive policies. Although the Netherlands 
has the policy of granting asylum to LGBTs from Iran, this very strict 
line in judicial practice concerning new facts and circumstances even 
results in rejections of late Iranian LGBT claims, not because their 
sexual orientation or gender identity is not believed, but because it is 
simply not taken into account.235 
232 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Zwolle, 26 September 2007, 06/55693 
(Afghanistan); Voorzieningenrechter (the provisional measures judge) 
Rechtbank (Regional Court) Groningen, 17 November 2006, 06/52447 (Iraq); 
Rechtbank (Regional Court) Haarlem, 7 December 2007, 07/44180 (Angola).
233 Voorzieningenrechter (the provisional measures judge) Rechtbank (Regional 
Court) Assen, 2 February 2006, nr. 06/54668, appeal allowed; the IND appealed 
against this judgement.
234 Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Judicial Division of the 
Council of State), 14 April 2006, 200601113/1, MigratieWeb ve06000557.
235 Iranians whose homosexuality was not regarded as a new fact: 
7 . 2  S t a t E  p r a c t i c E
The survey of LGBTI asylum practice in EU Member States shows 
that cases in which LGBTI asylum applicants disclose their sexual 
or gender identity as grounds for their asylum claim only later on 
during the asylum procedure face two kinds of problems:
 – their ‘coming out’ is not taken into account at all: some asylum 
systems apply a notion of res judicata in some form, which allows 
for a fresh examination only if the circumstances mentioned in a 
later stage constitute new facts
 – their ‘coming out’ is taken into account, but is met with mistrust; 
if circumstances are mentioned only in a later stage, they may be 
untrue, opportunistic and merely mentioned in order to improve 
the chances of being granted asylum.
7 . 2 . 1  m i n o r S
Some examples were reported of asylum seekers who fled as 
minors and only realised their sexual orientation some years later, for 
instance the following case:
A Somalian asylum seeker had entered the Netherlands as a child. 
His mother had submitted two subsequent asylum applications on 
his behalf. Eight years after the first asylum application he became 
aware of his sexual orientation and he submitted an application by 
himself, claiming he would face problems upon return to Somalia. 
This was considered as a sufficiently specific asylum motive, 
eminently personal and it had not been dealt with in the earlier 
procedures. For those reasons, it was considered a new fact justifying 
a fresh examination of his asylum claim.231
This is a refugee sur place situation and, if the claim is found credible, 
it will often lead to recognition. Examples of this type of claim, 
submitted by applicants who entered the country of refuge as 
minors, were also found in Austria, France, Italy, Norway, Poland 
and the United Kingdom, while country experts from the Czech 
Republic, Germany and Malta assumed that people in this position 
would have a good chance. 
7 . 2 . 2  r E S  j u d i c at a
Some countries have an asylum system which regards an asylum 
case about which a final decision has been taken as a res judicata 
(i.e. a case which has already been decided). The only thing that is 
to be decided upon in a subsequent application is whether later 
231 Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Judicial Division 
of the Council of State) 3 October 2003, 200305027/1, Jurisprudentie 
Vreemdelingenrecht 2004/3, Nieuwsbrief Asiel- en Vluchtelingenrecht NAV 
2003/310.
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applicant to a risk of persecution on the basis of sexual orientation or 
gender identity.
We do realise that efficient procedures are in the interest not only of 
states, but also of asylum seekers. But the capacity of LGBTI asylum 
seekers to make immediate declarations about their experiences 
may very well have been limited by those very experiences, and the 
lack of a ‘safe space’ to express themselves. They may find it hard to 
talk about intimate matters to complete strangers; they may have 
learnt to expect violence at the merest disclosure of their sexual 
orientation or gender identity; they may suffer from internalised 
homophobia or transphobia; they may not have had the occasion to 
overcome the shame which their socialisation has instilled in them. 
In asylum systems which require that all relevant facts are disclosed 
immediately, asylum should not be denied on the sole ground of late 
disclosure, when relevant reasons have been put forward to explain 
this. Such reasons should always be taken into account and should, 
where applicable, be considered an acceptable explanation for initial 
reticence.
We point out that, even within a strict res judicata system, there are 
options for doing this, for example by considering the moment at 
which an asylum seeker ‘came out’ to others as the relevant moment, 
i.e. at this moment the new fact occurred.
Although everything depends on how such options are applied in 
practice, the Austrian example shows that maintaining a res judicata 
system is not necessarily incompatible with an LGBTI sensitive asylum 
procedure.
7 . 2 . 3  c r E d i B i l i t y
Many LGBTI asylum applicants speak about their sexual orientation 
or gender identity later. Some of them are successful, for example 
when their late disclosure is considered as a phase in their coming 
out process, or their reasons to be initially hesitant are accepted and 
regarded as credible. Others are treated with suspicion for trying 
to ‘improve’ their asylum motives and as a result their claims are 
rejected for lack of credibility. 
We have found examples of such suspicion in almost all Member 
States. Some examples may give an impression of this practice.
In an Irish case, the Refugee Appeals Tribunal refused the appeal of 
a Pakistani gay man inter alia on the basis that he had not applied 
for asylum immediately upon arrival in Ireland but had entered into 
employment for a substantial period of time and only when he 
was arrested on suspicion of immigration offences, he applied for 
asylum. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s explanation that 
In Austria, a case was reported of a gay man from Iran, who came 
to Austria in 2001 as a minor together with his parents. Finally, 
in 2009, the application was rejected. A few months later he 
applied for asylum once more, because he had not mentioned 
his homosexuality before, although he had been aware of it for 
two years. The Federal Asylum Office rejected the application as 
a res judicata and denied a procedure in merits. The Asylum Court 
cancelled this decision and said that there had to be a detailed 
procedure in merits regarding the situation in Iran, and because 
the newly developed homosexuality was a new circumstance. The 
Asylum Court held:
“[T]hat for answering the question whether in the present 
case there is a new fact, relevant is not only that the applicant 
had purportedly already become aware of his homosexual 
orientation at a moment at which the previous procedure 
had not yet been formally ended; it should be considered 
as more decisive to clarify when the applicant disclosed his 
homosexuality to others for the first time, whether and at which 
moment the applicant has become homosexually active for 
the first time, or when the sexual inclination of the applicant 
has become publicly known; the asylum authorities have not 
inquired or otherwise established this.”236
This decision shows that an asylum system relying on res judicata 
is not necessarily inflexible. The normal circumstance of a new fact, 
is a fact which occurred after the preceding asylum procedure. The 
Asylgerichtshof decided that the moment at which this fact occurs is 
not necessarily the moment at which the claimant became aware of 
his homosexuality, but may be the moment at which he ‘came out’ to 
others, or the moment at which he became sexually active.
7 . 2 . 2 . 1  c o n c l u s I o n
In some Member States, the requirement that asylum applicants 
disclose all facts on which they base their asylum claim at the first 
possible occasion, results in denial of asylum on the procedural 
ground of res judicata. The reasons why the applicant ‘came out’ later 
are not considered at all. This can lead to a refoulement which would 
be contrary to the Refugee Convention, resulting in exposing an 
Voorzieningenrechter (the provisional measures judge) Rechtbank (Regional 
Court) Assen, 12 September 2008, 08/30179, Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak 
van de Raad van State (Judicial Division of the Council of State), 10 December 
2008, 200807075/1, Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 2009/85, MigratieWeb 
ve09000038; Rechtbank (Regional Court) Arnhem, 27 November 2009, 
09/40762, Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Judicial 
Division of the Council of State), 23 December 2009, 200909367/1/V2; 
Rechtbank (Regional Court) Haarlem, 8 December 2009, appeal allowed, but 
the IND appealed at the Council of State: still pending; Rechtbank (Regional 
Court) Zwolle, 17 June 2010, 10/18620, Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van 
de Raad van State (Judicial Division of the Council of State) 8 July 2010, 
201006033/1/V2.
236 Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court) 10 February 2010, E1 217.905-4/2010.
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because he feared that people in the reception camp would find 
out and he would suffer violence as a consequence. He was granted 
refugee status.241
The only LGBTI applicant who was recognised as a refugee in 
Slovakia was someone who revealed his bisexual orientation only in 
a repeat asylum procedure.
In France, the Asylum Court has noted that late submissions can 
be met with mistrust, but on the other hand, the authorities can 
grant asylum to applicants who have disclosed and/or assumed 
their sexual orientation only after they entered France, sometimes 
a long time after their arrival. Such decisions are motivated by the 
sincerity and credibility of the expressed fear of persecution, and by 
the fact that the situation of LGBTI people in the country of origin is 
particularly bad. 
In an Irish case an application was subjected to accelerated 
procedures on the basis of the failure to seek asylum as soon as 
possible after arrival. On appeal, the Tribunal overturned this finding 
having regard to the applicant’s explanation of the reason for his 
delayed revelation, namely the impact of the persecution suffered 
in the country of origin (Egypt), fear of arrest and disclosure of his 
sexual orientation in Ireland. The Tribunal held that he had a well 
founded fear of persecution arising from his sexual orientation and 
granted refugee status.242
7 . 2 . 3 . 1  G o o D  p r a c t I c e
The Swedish Guidelines on sexual orientation acknowledge that 
it can be difficult to disclose one’s sexual orientation directly.243 
However, according to our Swedish expert, the Swedish decision 
makers do not always follow their own guidelines.
The Swedish policy document about this subject acknowledges 
that it is not uncommon that sexual orientation is invoked later in 
the asylum procedure. In such cases the sole fact of late disclosure 
241 Commissione territoriale per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale 
di Crotone (Regional committee for the recognition of international protection 
of Crotone) decision 2009.
242 Refugee Appeals Tribunal, 2005.
243 “In certain cases, homosexuality is cited as a ground at a relatively late 
stage in the process. There may be several reasons for this, and this can be 
understandable. (…) An applicant can have powerful feelings of shame 
about his homosexuality. It is difficult for many applicants from countries 
with a great deal of repression to discuss their homosexuality with outsiders, 
and especially those in authority. (…) Sexual violence and insults due to 
homosexuality can be associated with powerful trauma and especially with 
feelings of guilt and shame. In the investigation, the individual homosexual 
often carries an image of himself coloured by these prejudices, and may 
choose, consciously or subconsciously, not to state his actual reasons until 
a later stage in the process.” Guidelines for investigation and evaluation of 
asylum cases in which persecution based on given sexual orientations is cited 
as a ground. Migrationsverket (Migration Board) 28 January 2002.
the reason for his delayed disclosure was that he had only begun to 
come to terms with his sexuality after his arrival in Ireland and after 
he had experienced his first homosexual relationship.237
In Denmark it is quite common that LGBT asylum seekers indicate 
their sexual orientation late in the procedure. This is always a 
problem, because it can be difficult to distinguish the genuine LGBT 
applicants from applicants who ‘add homosexuality’ to their claim to 
improve chances of refugee status.238 
In a Dutch case the Court found that the applicant should have 
referred to his sexual orientation during the interview, even if only 
summarily, for example by indicating that there is something he does 
not dare to declare about. He had been informed of the fact that he 
could speak freely and should not withhold information.239 
In Spain, a gay man from Cuba only told about his problems related 
to the Cuban dictatorship in his first petition before the Asylum 
Office. Only after the Appeal Court ordered his admission to the 
procedure, he explained the real reason of his asylum claim was the 
persecution he has faced in Cuba because of his sexual orientation. 
However, his claim was rejected by both the Asylum Office and the 
National Court due to non-credibility. They were of the opinion that 
he was an economic immigrant who did not deserve protection.240 
However, in some cases the suspicion is overcome:
In Romania, an Afghan asylum seeker based his asylum claim on 
conflicts with the Taliban and the insecurity in Afghanistan. His 
application was rejected by the Romanian Immigration Office and 
the First Court. During the procedure in front of the Second Court 
(Tribunal) he had the courage to speak up about his real reasons to 
fear persecution - being a homosexual and cross-dresser in a Muslim 
fundamentalist society. He was afraid to tell this earlier because 
of fear and shame towards the Afghan community in the asylum 
seekers centre. During the hearing the judge did not doubt the truth 
of his statement and considered his new reason for asylum a very 
serious one. He received subsidiary protection in December 2010.
Also in Italy, a case was found of a gay man who presented a first 
claim in 2007 based on other grounds. The claim was rejected. In 
2009, he presented a new claim based on sexual orientation: at the 
personal interview he explained that he did not mention this earlier 
237 Refugee Appeals Tribunal, 2009. 
238 Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Appeals Board) 1 June 2004.
239 Rechtbank (Regional Court) ‘s-Gravenhage 24 June 2009, 09/5070, appeal 
dismissed by the Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Judicial 
Division of the Council of State) 15 September 2009, 200905386/1/V2.
240 Audiencia Nacional (National Court) 28 November 2008, rec. nº 5265/2005.
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affect the truthfulness of the claims. Due to this, a negative credibility 
finding cannot be based solely on the late moment at which the 
applicant came forward with LGBTI related flight motives. In order to 
assess this, it is necessary that interviewers and decision makers are 
trained in sexual orientation and gender identity issues, including 
‘coming-out processes’.
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n S
•	 Reasons for late disclosure should be considered carefully with 
due attention to the relevant factors adduced by applicants.
•	 The notion of “new elements” in Article 32(3) Procedures Directive 
should not be interpreted in a highly procedural way but, on the 
contrary, in a protection-oriented manner. In this way, an unduly 
inflexible application of the res judicata principle can be avoided.
•	 A negative credibility finding cannot be based solely on the 
belated disclosure of the sexual orientation or gender identity.
should not affect the credibility of the claimant. Country information 
should be taken into account in the assessment of the late coming-
out and also whether the claimant has a valid reason for not stating 
sexual orientation earlier on. It should also be considered that a 
homosexual or bisexual orientation can be a taboo subject to talk 
about even in comparatively liberal societies.244
The United Kingdom’s policy document also accepts that a 
negative finding should not be made when there was non-disclosure 
at the screening stage.245
7 . 3  c o n c l u S i o n 
Minors who ‘came out’ for their sexual orientation or gender 
identity as adults in the country of refuge have a good chance 
of being recognised. However, we are of the opinion that, also 
regarding applicants who entered the country as adults, it is quite 
understandable if they do not speak about their sexual orientation 
or gender identity until later in the procedure, out of feelings of fear, 
stigma or shame resulting in not being able to fully ‘come out’. 
In some of these cases, late disclosure of sexual orientation or gender 
identity leads to an adverse finding on credibility, while in others, the 
reasons for late disclosure are accepted. It is remarkable that in some 
Member States, disbelief seems to be the general practice while in 
other Member States a much more nuanced picture is reported by 
our national experts. 
It is not to be considered per se unreasonable that late disclosure 
of sexual orientation or gender identity leads to caution on the 
side of asylum authorities, or that such cases are treated with 
greater scrutiny. However, the reasons for late disclosure should be 
considered carefully. 
Whether late disclosure of sexual orientation or gender identity 
during the asylum procedure contributes to a finding of lack of 
credibility is obviously a matter that is examined on a case-by-case 
basis. It cannot be excluded that asylum seekers at a later stage of 
the procedure formulate claims which are not truthful; however, it 
can equally not be excluded that such claims are truthful, and that 
the late moment at which they are formulated has to do with the 
applicant’s ‘coming out process’ or with other factors that do not 
244 Rättschefens rättsliga ställningstagande om förföljelse på grund av homo- 
eller bisexuell läggning, 12 October 2009 (RCI 04/2009), official statement 
of the Director of Legal Affairs at the Swedish Migration Board (http://www.
migrationsverket.se/include/lifos/dokument/www/091019101.pdf ).
245 See UK Border Agency Asylum Instruction on ‘Sexual Orientation issues in the 
asylum claim’, page 11 (6 October 2010, revised on 13 June 2011).
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appropriate examination should be carried out and to that end 
“member states shall ensure that precise and up-to-date information 
is obtained from various sources, such as the UNHCR, as to the 
general situation prevailing in the countries of origin of applicants for 
asylum.”249 
The European Parliament voted in 2011 to amend this article 
as follows: “Member states shall ensure that (…) the personnel 
examining applications and taking decisions are instructed and have 
the possibility to seek advice, whenever necessary, from experts on 
particular issues, such as medical, cultural, child, gender, religious or 
sexual orientation issues.”250
Furthermore, UNHCR’s Gender Guidelines acknowledge that it is 
important “to recognise that in relation to gender-related claims, the 
usual types of evidence used in other refugee claims may not be as 
readily available. Statistical data or reports on the incidence of sexual 
violence may not be available, due to under-reporting of cases, or 
lack of prosecution. Alternative forms of information might assist, 
such as the testimonies of other women similarly situated in written 
reports or oral testimony, of non-governmental or international 
organisations or other independent research.”251
8 . 2  S t a t E  p r a c t i c E
In our questionnaire we incorporated questions on the availability of 
COI and the way in which Member States deal with the (un)available 
information.
8 . 2 . 1  l a c k  o f  l G B t i  r E l E v a n t  c o i
We found many examples of decisions based on a lack of specific 
information as to the situation of LGBTIs in the country of origin. The 
dominant pattern is that a lack of information is taken to mean that 
LGBTIs have no problems. These examples include:
Two Vietnamese gay men applied for asylum in Romania. They 
invoked persecution by the communist authorities against 
249 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, 
Article 8(2)(b).
250 European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 6 April 2011, A7-0085/2011 
(amendment for Article 9(3)(d). However, in the Amended proposal of the 
Commission, this suggestion has not been incorporated, COM (2011) 319 final, 
Brussels, 1 June 2011, Article 10(3)(d). The refusal to incorporate this has not 
been explained by the Commission, COM (2011) 319 final ANNEX, Brussels, 1 
June 2011. 
251 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution 
within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees, 7 May 2002, par. 37. 
8  c o u n t r y  o f  o r i G i n  i n f o r m a t i o n
Country of Origin Information (COI) is significant to enable decision-
makers to relate a purported fear of persecution to the human 
rights situation of LGBTIs in the country of origin. For instance in 
cases in which LGBTI applicants report they have been persecuted 
or prosecuted by state parties, COI is important. Are homosexuality, 
transgender identity and other non-dominant sexual orientations 
or gender identities criminalised in the country of origin? What 
is the general attitude of the authorities towards LGBTIs? Acts of 
persecution vis-à-vis LGBTIs are often committed by fellow citizens, 
such as relatives, gangs, colleagues, neighbours and classmates. In 
these cases, which are numerous, it is crucial to have information 
about the incidence of persecution by non-State actors, as well 
as about the availability and effectiveness of State protection. 
Also, independent objective and reliable COI is crucial whenever 
the asylum authorities purport that the asylum seeker could find 
protection in another part of the country of origin (see also Chapter 
5). In these cases COI is required on the legal and social position 
of LGBTI people, on the availability of effective state protection for 
LGBTIs, as well as on the situation in different parts of the country.246
In 2004, a transwoman from Romania appealed before a Dutch 
court. With respect to the events experienced by the applicant, 
the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) concluded 
that, since nothing is recorded on the position of trans people in 
Romania, it must be assumed that this group does not experience 
any problems. However, the Court did not agree with this 
assumption. The Human Rights Watch Report 2002 showed that 
police officers in Romania often used violence and that lesbians 
and gay men were harassed by the police. According to the Court 
it was not clear why the position of transsexuals would be more 
favourable.247
8 . 1  i n t E r n a t i o n a l  a n d  E u r o p E a n  S t a n d a r d S
The EU Qualification Directive states that the assessment should 
take into account “all relevant facts as they relate to the country of 
origin at the time of taking a decision on the application; including 
laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in 
which they are applied.”248 The Procedures Directive adds that an 
246 See also N. LaViolette, ‘Independent Human Rights Documentation and Sexual 
Minorities: An Ongoing Challenge for the Canadian Refugee Determination 
Process’, International Journal of Human Rights 2009-13, p. 437–76.
247 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Amsterdam, 22 January 2004, 02/94109.
248 Council directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for 
the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as 
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted, Article 4(3)(a).
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that Ukrainian society is tolerant towards homosexuality. Therefore, it can 
be reasonably inferred that it is also tolerant towards transsexuality.256 
In Spain persecution by non-state actors is usually labelled as 
‘discrimination’ only, and no asylum is granted. For instance in the 
case of a transwoman from Nicaragua. She was discriminated 
against in the fields of education, health care, work as well as by her 
familiy. Then she became a prostitute, and was sexually abused by 
both clients and policemen. There was no possiblity to get effective 
protection from the authorities. However, the Asylum Office said 
that this was no persecution, only discrimination. The National Court 
agreed, and emphasized that there was no evidence of persecution 
and that “in Nicaragua there is no persecution or discrimination 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity.”257 
In Sweden, applications from Iranian trans asylum seekers have been 
rejected, because in Iran it is possible to undergo a sex reassignment 
operation. However, the situation of trans persons seems far more 
complex than that. As is noted in the report ‘Unknown people’: 
People who transgress gender norms in Iran are given the choice of 
living as criminals or go through sex reassignment surgery.258 
In the United Kingdom, there are only two reported cases on trans 
asylum claims. The Court of Appeal in 2006 in Rahimi fell into the 
same evidential trap as the Swedish case of basing a lack of risk on 
the existence of surgical procedures in Iran: 
“Homosexual acts clearly are criminal, but there is little to suggest 
that a person who is homosexual in orientation is subject to serious 
ill-treatment or persecution as a result. The position of transsexuals 
seems to be very similar. The condition is one that is recognised by 
the state and the state makes provision for appropriate treatment 
for those who wish to undergo it. There is little to support the 
suggestion that merely to be a transsexual in Iran will expose one to 
serious ill-treatment or persecution.”259 
256 Supreme Administrative Court (Czech Republic), 14 November 2007, No. 
6 Azs 102/2007. The Czech courts generally do not sufficiently distinguish 
between various groups covered by the term LGBTI; they tend to use “gays” 
as the relevant reference group for all LGBTI cases. In two bisexual cases, the 
SAC did not pay attention to the specific position of bisexuals but used the 
terms “homosexual” and “bisexual” interchangeably (see Decision of the SAC 
of 25 November 2008, No. 9 Azs 79/2008; and Judgment of the SAC of 1 April 
2009, No. 2 Azs 5/2009). Similar patterns exists in most lesbian cases as well. In 
these cases, the SAC tends to use the term “homosexual orientation” so as to 
encompass both gay and lesbian relations (see. e.g. Judgment of the SAC of 2 
August 2006, No. 3 Azs 268/2005 on lesbians in Armenia).
257 Audiencia Nacional (National Court) 13 May 2010, rec. nº 296/2009.
258 Elina Grandin and Anna-Maria Sörberg, Unknown people, The vulnerability of 
sexual and gender identity minorities and the Swedish Migration Board’s country 
of origin information system (‘Okänt folk, Om förståelse av genusproblematiker 
och utsatthet på grunden sexuell läggning och könsidentitet i 
Migrationsverkets landinformation’), Migrationsverket, January 2010.
259 Rahimi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 267, para 
homosexuals, and anti-gay government policies. However, according 
to the investigation by the documentation centre of the Romanian 
Immigration Office (BITO) on the ILGA website and the online 
magazine Gay Times, there was no information about criminal 
sanctions against same-sex conduct in Vietnam. The decision quoted 
a U.S. State Department Report 2008: “There is low public awareness 
of homosexuality and little evidence of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.” The decision concluded: “While the asylum 
seeker stated that homosexuals are persecuted by the Vietnamese 
police, according to Globalgayz.com (accessed January 2008) the 
police generally leaves gay people alone, at least in Saigon. Further 
information on treatment by the Vietnamese police could not be 
found among the sources consulted.” They were both rejected.252
In Spain, a lack of information is quickly taken by the asylum 
authorities to mean that there is no problem. For instance, the 
National Court, despite accepting the criminalization of homosexuality 
in the Algerian Penal Code, stated there was not persecution because 
“none of the consulted sources report whether somebody has been 
condemned in Algeria because of sodomy”.253 On the other hand, in 
the case of a Cuban gay the National Court argued that the Asylum 
Office had presented a document from the internet establishing that 
there is no persecution in Cuba – without, however, specifying the 
source more exactly than by a reference to “internet”.254
In Germany, a lack of information on persecution sometimes leads 
to the conclusion that there is a certain tolerance towards a gay/
lesbian scene in certain countries of origin, especially regarding 
North African countries.
In Italy a case was found of a gay man from Sierra Leone whose 
application was rejected at first instance with the reasoning that “the 
circumstances do not amount to persecution also because there is a 
lack of information on homosexuals in Sierra Leone.”255
The following four examples illustrate the lack of country of origin 
information concerning trans asylum seekers.
In the Czech Republic, the Supreme Administrative Court arrived at 
the conclusion that there is no difference between homosexuality and 
transsexuality for the purposes of assessment of the claim of the asylum 
seeker from Ukraine. The Court based this conclusion on COI, stating 
252 Decisions by the Romanian Immigration Office, dated February 2010 and June 
2010.
253 Audiencia Nacional (National Court) 7 November 2008, rec. nº 1563/2007.
254 Audiencia Nacional (National Court) 20 May 2005, rec nº 414/2003.
255 Commissione territoriale per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale 
di Milano (Regional committee for the recognition of international protection 
of Milan) Decision, July 2007. However, the claimant was granted protection 
on humanitarian grounds for reasons we were not able to identify.
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Since 2001 the Tribunal, now the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and 
Asylum Chamber) also decides cases on specific countries , called 
Country Guidance cases.264 Currently, the list includes with respect 
to LGB claims - Afghanistan (gay men),265 Albania (lesbians),266 Eritrea 
(gay men),267 Iran (gay men),268 Jamaica (gay men269 and lesbians270), 
Kenya (gay men),271 Macedonia (gay men),272 Serbia and Montenegro 
(Kosovo) (gay men),273 Turkey (gay men),274 Uganda (gay men),275 
Ukraine (gay men).276
264 Country Guidance cases are cases where the senior specialist Tribunal in the 
UK hears evidence on the country background evidence of a specific country 
to provide guidance on risk to a specific group.  Such guidance must be 
applied unless there is post-hearing evidence to depart from the findings 
of the Tribunal. The list of cases is correct as of 1 August 2011 <http://www.
judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Tribunals/tribunals-country-
guidance-list-updated-130711.pdf>>
265 AJ (Risk to Homosexuals) Afghanistan [2009] UKAIT 00001 (successful appeal 
of gay man where it was accepted that his boyfriend and family had been 
murdered by the Taliban following their knowledge that the appellant was gay, 
and this news would travel to Kabul if he were to relocate, and therefore this 
would not be a viable alternative and discretion would not be available to him).
266 MK (Lesbians) Albania CG [2009] UKAIT 00036 (unsuccessful appeal by lesbian 
in Albania as country background evidence did not corroborate real risk. 
Currently seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
267 YF (Risk – Stateless – Homosexual – Illegal) Eritrea CG [2003] UKIAT 00177 
(appellant had not come to the attention of the authorities prior to departure 
and therefore would not do so on return. There existed conflicting evidence 
on prosecutions and persecution of gay men).
268 RM and BB (Homosexuals) Iran CG [2005] UKIAT 00117 (gay men who come 
to the attention of the Iranian authorities will be at real risk of arrest and 
prosecution on return).
269 DW (Homosexual Men – Persecution – Sufficiency of Protection) Jamaica 
CG [2005] UKAIT 00168 (successful appeal of gay man who was found to 
have suffered persecution in the past. Secretary of State conceded that 
the authorities in Jamaica will not provide gay men with effective state 
protection.) 
270 SW (lesbians – HJ and HT applied) Jamaica CG [2011] UKUT 00251. Lesbians 
(actual or perceived) are subjected to curative rape and possibly murder, and 
will have to adopt a heterosexual narrative to evade persecution, i.e. have a 
boyfriend, children and possibly marry.
271 JMS (Homosexual – Behaviour – Persecution) Kenya CG [2001] UKAIT 00007 
(having accepted that the appellant was detained and ill-treated in the past, 
discrete homosexuals are not at risk of prosecution or persecution on return).
272 MS (Risk – Homosexuality – Military Service) Macedonia CG [2002] UKAIT 
03308 (no criminal law prohibiting sexual conduct of a gay man, and not 
disproportionate to remove on the basis of a “registered” one year long 
relationship with a UK national. Nevertheless, appeal allowed under article 3 of 
the ECHR on the basis that appellant would be imprisoned for one year on the 
basis of military desertion and prison conditions breached article 3 of the ECHR.
273 YK and RL (Kosovo – Risk to homosexuals) Serbia and Montenegro CG [2005] 
UKIAT 00005 (no country background evidence of persecution, even from 
lesbian and gay campaigning groups).
274 MS (Risk – Homosexual) Turkey CG [2002] UKIAT 05654 (appellant may face 
discrimination on return but this will not result in persecution, and the fact 
that he had been subjected to rape in the past by police officers only resulted 
in a fanciful risk of this occurring in the future).
275 JM (Homosexuality: risk) Uganda CG [2008] UKAIT 00065 (no evidence of 
actual arrests or prosecution of gay men and the appellant will act in such 
a way not to cause offence – approach affirmed by the Court of Appeal in 
JM (Uganda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ. 
1432, but distinguished by the Administrative Court in R (on the application 
of SB (Uganda)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC 338 
(Admin)) Upper Tribunal currently identifying possible new CG case to analyse 
current risk in Uganda.
276 UK (Risk – Homosexuals) Ukraine CG [2003] UKIAT 00005 (no real risk to 
homosexuals in cities as long as they do not “advertize (sic) themselves”).
A different view was taken by the Court of Appeal in 2007, when 
it allowed the appeal of a trans woman (incorrectly referred to by 
the Court as “he”) and remitting the case back to the Tribunal as her 
lawyers “had established the potential availability of objective evidence 
supporting the appellant’s case that transsexuals in Iran may face 
harassment and even persecution from, among others, the police.”260
8 . 2 . 1 . 1  G o o D  p r a c t I c e 
Courts sometimes consider that a lack of information is not sufficient 
to reject a claim. 
In several Austrian cases of gay applicants from Gambia there 
was a serious lack of information concerning homosexuality. The 
Federal Asylum Office decided negatively because of that lack of 
information, but the Asylum Court cancelled these decisions and 
ordered the Asylum Office to make detailed research about the 
situation of homosexuals in Gambia.261
The Dutch Country Report on Azerbaijan 2004 states that 
“Transsexuality is a taboo subject in Azerbaijan society. Therefore 
it was not possible to find information on the position of 
transsexuals in Azerbaijan.” From this information the Immigration 
and Naturalisation Service concluded that there was no recorded 
information on transsexuality in Azerbaijan. However, according 
to the Court, considering the wording of the Country Report, their 
position could be judged as alarming. The applicant won the case.262 
Since October 2010, the United Kingdom Home Office in their 
Asylum Instruction have accepted: “It is very important, however, to 
note that there may be very little evidence on ill-treatment of lesbians 
in the country of origin. It may be the case that if gay men are found to 
face persecution, then lesbians, as a corresponding group which does 
not conform to an established gender role, may also be at risk.”263
Some countries provide specific COI which is relevant to LGBTIs.
In the United Kingdom, since late 2005, there has been a specific 
section in all COI Reports with respect to risk to LGBTIs. These reports 
are then used as source documents on the UK Home Office’s policy 
approach to LGBTI claims from specific countries in documents 
called Operational Guidance Notes.
8, 15 February 2006.
260 AK (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ. 941, 8 
July 2008, para 28 Appeal allowed on remittal to the Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal.
261 Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court) 9 June 2010, A2 405.597-2/2010; 22 October 
2009, A2 409.086-1/2009; 14 September 2009, A2 408.439-1/2009.
262 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Roermond, 4 November 2005, nr. 02/20771.
263 UK Home Office, Asylum Instruction on Sexual Orientation issues in the asylum 
claim, page 12 (6 October 2010, revised 13 June 2011).
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of lesbian, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants.282 Another issue 
is the tendency to interpret available information selectively, or as 
indicating a lack of risk.
In the case of an asylum seeker from Kazakhstan the Lithuanian 
Migration Department based its negative decision on selective 
use of COI, ignoring information concerning gay discrimination 
in Kazakhstan, gay persecution in the workplace and educational 
institutions, the fact that gay organisations in Kazakhstan are not 
registered and that the police does not protect gay rights.
In cases of gay Iranians often the Iranian Penal Code is cited, for 
instance in a negative decision from Cyprus in 2009: “according to 
Iranian law, a sexual offence can only be proven if there were four 
witnesses present during the sexual act, if it occurred in a public 
space and offended the public sense of decency.” This decision 
ignored that according to Iranian law evidence might also be 
obtained through the personal knowledge of a Sharia judge. 
In an Irish decision refusing the refugee appeal of a Kenyan gay 
man, the Tribunal referred to country of origin information, stating 
“An article from the website ‘Behind the Mask’ mentions the recent 
creation of Minority Women in Action (MWIA), an organization 
advocating for the rights of lesbians and other minority and 
marginalized women in Kenya, which ‘aims to become a haven to 
many lesbians’ who are subjected to discrimination in Kenya because 
of their sexual orientation.” However, the relevance of this material in 
the context of the gay male applicant was not addressed.283
In Spain, the Law has been amended and provides that in LGBT cases 
decisions must take into account “the prevailing circumstances in the 
country of origin.” However, decision makers often do not take any 
COI into account, or the Court values the COI used by the Asylum 
Office much more than the COI presented by the asylum seeker or by 
NGOs supporting the case. For instance, the National Court rejected 
the COI presented by an applicant, because “it just reports general 
intolerance and repression in Algeria against people with a different 
sexual orientation, thus is not about the applicant.”284 While in other 
decisions the same Court did accept general information used by 
the government, despite the fact that the government did not cite 
the source, in addition to the fact that this information is most likely 
general and therefore does not concern the applicant personally.
282 As stated above, if only information about gays is available, and this 
information shows their position is problematic, then in the absence of further 
information about lesbian, bisexual, trans and intersex people their position 
must be presumed to be problematic as well. The problem is not in using 
information for one group to examine applications by applicants from other 
groups, but the often unconscious subsumption of LBTIs under gays.
283 Refugee Appeals Tribunal, 2010.
284 Audiencia Nacional (National Court) 10 December 2008, rec. nº 1592/2007.
In 2006 in the Netherlands, the Minister for Immigration stated that: 
“the Minister of Foreign Affairs shall try to investigate to what extent 
the authorities offer protection to homosexuals against persecution 
by third parties in countries that criminalise homosexuality or where, 
in practice, grave discrimination or punishment takes place.”277 But 
to date, in Dutch Country Reports, information on the availability of 
state protection for LGBT people is scarce. None of the reports gives 
information like “the state authorities are in general willing and/
or able to protect LGBTs”. The information that is reported is usually 
about the difficulties in obtaining protection, as in the reports on 
Armenia,278 Georgia279 and Turkey.280
We also found some examples in which national asylum authorities 
cooperate with LGBT NGOs.
In the United Kingdom the UK Lesbian & Gay Immigration Group 
(UKLGIG, an NGO) is involved in on-going meetings with the senior 
management in the COI section to highlight concerns with respect 
to the LGBTI sections in the reports. 
At the inititative of the NGO WISH (working group of international 
solidarity with LGBTs), the Belgian Office of the Commisioner 
General for Refugees and Stateless Persons281 cooperates with 
LGBT activists from certain African countries of origin to exchange 
information on the specific situation in these countries.
8 . 2 . 2  t h E  u S E  o f  c o i
If COI is available, it is crucial that it is used appropriately. Above, 
it was already noted that an absence of information cannot 
automatically be taken to mean that LGBTIs face no serious problems 
in the country of origin. Similarly, it was pointed out that information 
about gay men cannot automatically be applied to the situation 
277 Replies by Minister Verdonk of 28 November 2006 to the Parliamentary 
questions of Lambrechts of 3 October 2006 (Aanhangsel Handelingen II, 
2006/07 nr. 394).
278 Dutch Country Report Armenia (August 2010): If homosexuals ask for help 
and protection from the police, there is no guarantee that they will get it 
in an adequate way and therefore they rarely turn to the police for help. 
Homosexuals could find themselves in a vulnerable position, if they come 
into contact with the police, because of the risk that police officers will take 
(financial) advantage of the situation by threatening to publicly ‘out’ them. In 
the past, there were reports on police officers who visited gay meeting places 
in order to blackmail men.
279 Dutch Country Report Georgia (December 2009): A transsexual person who 
turns to the police for protection, does not run the risk of being prosecuted 
for the sole fact that he or she is a transsexual.
280 Dutch Country Report Turkey (September 2010): The Turkish law and the 
Turkish authorities do not offer sufficient protection to LGBTs. In general LGBTs 
do not dare to ask for protection. Many LGBTs do not trust the police due 
to existing prejudices. Insofar as LGBTs report cases of discrimination and/
or threats to the Turkish authorities, their reports are generally not taken into 
consideration.
281 Commisariat Général aux Réfugiés et aux Apatrides (CGRA)/Commissariaat 
Generaal voor de Vluchtelingen en de Staatlozen (CGVS).
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LGBTI organisations, as well as from UN agencies, complemented 
by information gathered by Member State diplomatic posts, and 
alternative forms of information288 should be put together. Guidance 
about the assessment of information from different sources 
(including the limitations which adhere to information gathered 
through diplomatic representations) has been given by the European 
Court of Human Rights.289 As one of the main tasks of the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) is to collect country of origin 
information, EASO should give priority to collecting this particularly 
problematic type of COI.
As long as little or no reliable COI is available on the situation of 
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, trans or intersex people in a particular 
country, this should not be considered as a sign that human rights 
violations of LGBTI people do not occur in that country.
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n S
Pertinent country of origin information 
•	 In the light of Article 4(3)(a) Qualification Directive, for all 
countries of origin, information pertinent to lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, trans and intersex applicants must be gathered and 
disseminated.
•	 Country of origin information must be based on reports of 
human rights organisations, UN agencies, complemented by 
information from Member State diplomatic posts as well as 
local lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex organisations - 
where these exist. This information should be supplemented by 
alternative forms of information, such as the testimonies of other 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex people similarly situated 
in written reports or oral testimony, of non-governmental or 
international organisations or other independent research.
•	 In the light of Article 4(3)(a) Qualification Directive, country of 
origin information should include information about direct and 
indirect criminalisation of sexual orientation or gender identity.
•	 In the light of Article 4(3)(a) Qualification Directive, country 
of origin information should include precise and up-to-date 
information as to the position of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and 
intersex people, in particular:
288 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution 
within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees, 7 May 2002, par. 37.
289 ECtHR 17 July 2008, NA v the United Kingdom, appl. no 25904/07, para. 118-122.
Apart from information on criminalisation of homosexuality, reliable 
information considering the situation of LGBTIs in countries that 
(recently) abolished the criminalisation of homosexuality is needed. 
It seems that asylum authorities do not always sufficiently realise that 
decriminalisation does not necessarily mean persecution by society 
and police has ended.
For instance, in Spain the Asylum Office waited until the Nicaraguan 
penal code changed to deny all applications from that country. 
Despite this change in law the situation of LGBTI people in Nicaragua 
did not improve: the homophobia and discrimination/persecution 
remained the same as before. 
In Denmark, immediately after decriminalization of homosexuality in 
Russia in the mid-90s, LGBTI applications were rejected, while there 
was still evidence of discrimination and assaults from private parties 
and lack of protection by the Russian authorities.
8 . 2 . 2 . 1  G o o D  p r a c t I c e
In 2003, the Dutch Secretary of State was of the opinion that 
meeting places for homosexuals exist in Jerevan, Armenia, resulting 
in Jerevan being a good protection alternative for two lesbian 
applicants. The Court, however, did not agree with this view, finding 
this insufficient indication for the availability of protection for 
lesbians.285
In Norway, there were some examples in which the asylum seekers 
were granted asylum because there was doubt about the situation 
of LGBTIs in the country of origin, for instance in cases from Northern 
Iraq and Iran. 
8 . 3  c o n c l u S i o n
We found many examples that indicate a substantial lack of COI 
concerning human rights violations of LGBTIs in most countries from 
which people flee. The information that is available mainly deals with 
gay men. Information on risk to lesbians and trans claimants is very 
scarce, while information on bisexuals and intersex persons seems 
non-existent. In order for the decision makers to “take into account all 
relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin”286 and to obtain 
“precise and up-to-date information”287 on the situation of LGBTIs 
in the countries of origin, LGBTI relevant COI should be collected. 
For all countries from which LGBTI asylum seekers originate, the 
information available from human rights organisations, including 
285 Rechtbank (Regional Court) Groningen, 18 March 2003, 02/43135, 02/43145.
286 Article 4(3) Qualification Directive, see above.
287 Article 8(2) Procedures Directive, see above.
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are not mentioned explicitly in criminal law, it should be 
assumed that lesbian, bisexual, trans and intersex persons risk 
persecution too, until it has been established that this is not the 
case.
•	 Considering countries where sexual orientation is criminalised, 
while gender identity is not mentioned explicitly in criminal 
law, it should be assumed that trans and intersex people risk 
persecution too, until it has been established that this is not the 
case.
 – the occurrence of state and non-state persecution
 – homophobia and transphobia in government institutions 
and agencies such as the police, prisons, education 
 – homo- and transphobia in daily life (on the street, the 
workplace, schools, housing)
 – the willingness and ability of the authorities to provide 
effective protection against homophobic and transphobic 
violence, and whether lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and 
intersex people have access to such protection
 – the availability of effective state protection in different parts 
of the country, with a view to the possibility of internal 
protection.
•	 Country of origin information should be specific about the 
situation of lesbians, gays, bisexual women and men, trans 
(including trans women and men and transvestites) and intersex 
people.
Appropriate use of available country of origin information
•	 As long as little or no reliable country of origin information 
is available on the human rights situation of lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals, trans or intersex people, this should not be considered 
per se as a sign that human rights violations against these groups 
do not occur. Decision makers and the judiciary should keep in 
mind that homophobic and transphobic violence may be under-
reported in certain countries. The principle of the benefit of the 
doubt is of particular importance in such situations.
•	 Scarcity of information about enforcement of the criminalisation 
of sexual orientation or gender identity should not be taken as 
an indication that enforcement does not take place.
•	 When relying on country of origin information pertinent to 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or intersex applicants, information 
about one subgroup should not automatically be presumed 
to be applicable to the other subgroups as well, unless there 
are good reasons to make this presumption. At the same time, 
the absence of information on one subgroup should not be 
understood as evidence that there is no risk for the members of 
other subgroups.
•	 Considering countries where gay sexual orientation is 
criminalised, while lesbian, bisexual, trans and intersex persons 
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with minor children and persons who have been subjected to 
torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or 
sexual violence. (emphasis added)”
The latest version of the European Commission's proposes a new 
Article 22 on the identification of the special reception needs of 
vulnerable persons:
“Member States shall establish mechanisms with a view to 
identifying whether the applicant is a vulnerable person and, 
if so, has special reception needs, also indicating the nature 
of such needs. (…) Member States shall ensure that these 
special reception needs are also addressed, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Directive, if they become apparent 
at a later stage in the asylum procedure. Member States shall 
ensure adequate support for persons with special reception 
needs throughout the duration of the asylum procedure and 
shall provide for appropriate monitoring of their situation.”292
Though we are not of the opinion that all LGBTI asylum seekers are 
always vulnerable persons in the sense of the Directive, many of them 
should be considered as vulnerable, due to the nature of the acts of 
persecution suffered, which in LGBTI cases often include torture, rape, 
serious psychological, physical or sexual violence, possibly leading to 
post-traumatic disorders. At the same time, LGBTI asylum seekers may 
face a high level of discrimination and taboo in reception centres. For 
this reason they will often have special reception needs.
In addition, to make the paragraphs more inclusive, ILGA-Europe 
supports amendments to mention sexual orientation and gender 
identity explicitly, as well as other forms of biased violence.293
9 . 2  S t a t E  p r a c t i c E
Homophobic and transphobic incidents towards LGBTI asylum 
292 European Commission, Amended proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, laying down standards for the reception of 
asylum seekers (Recast) COM (2011)320, 2008/0244 (COD) 1 June 2011.
293 Article 18 (3): Member States shall take into consideration gender, sexual 
orientation, gender identity and age specific concerns and the situation 
of vulnerable persons in relation to applicants within the premises and 
accommodation centres referred to in paragraph 1(a) and (b). Article 18 
(4): Member States shall take appropriate measures to prevent assault and 
violence based on ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, 
religion or belief, age, including sexual assault, within the premises and 
accommodation centres referred to in paragraph 1(a) and (b). ILGA Europe, 




9  r E c E p t i o n
The present research has focused on refugee and subsidiary 
protection status and the asylum procedure, to the expense of issues 
concerning LGBTIs in reception centres, accommodations centres 
and in detention. Therefore, we can only outline some issues here. 
However, we do want to stress that the national reports make it clear 
that homophobic and transphobic harassment and violence against 
LGBTI applicants is a widespread and serious issue in most European 
countries. The situation of LGBTI applicants in reception centres, 
accommodations centres and in detention should be subject to 
further enquiries, and merits separate and profound attention.
9 . 1  E u r o p E a n  S t a n d a r d S
With respect to preventing violent incidents in reception and 
accommodation centres, Article 14(2)(b) of the current Reception 
Directive states: 
Member States shall pay particular attention to the prevention of 
assault within the premises and accommodation centres (…).290 
The recent recast proposal of the European Commission makes 
the wording of this paragraph more explicit regarding gender and 
gender based violence: 
Article 18 (3): “Member States shall take into consideration 
gender and age specific concerns and the situation of vulnerable 
persons in relation to applicants within the premises and 
accommodation centres (…).” (emphasis added)
Article 18 (4): “Member States shall take appropriate measures 
to prevent assault and gender based violence including sexual 
assault, within the premises and accommodation centres 
(…)” (emphasis added).291
The current version of the Directive contains provisions for persons 
with special needs also referred to as “vulnerable persons”. Article 17 
(1) of the current Reception Directive contains an open definition of 
vulnerable persons:
“Member States shall take into account the specific situation of 
vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, 
disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents 
290 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum 
standards for the reception of asylum seekers.
291 European Commission, Amended proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, laying down standards for the reception of 
asylum seekers (Recast) COM (2011)320, 2008/0244 (COD) 1 June 2011.
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 – In Italy, one deportation-centre has a separate section for trans 
asylum seekers (Milano). To the extent that they are safe from 
harassment and violence, this may contribute to the safety of 
trans men and women.
 – Finland has a reception centre for minors and families with 
children, where information meetings are held on sexuality and 
sexual diversity.
 – In Sweden, the national LGBT organisation RFSL distributes 
information flyers in asylum centres, including on the right to 
obtain asylum, based on sexual orientation or gender identity.
 – In Belgium, there is a LGBT network of asylum seekers in 
reception centres which holds monthly meetings (Rainbows 
United and Oasis). Their travel costs are paid by the Belgian 
government.
9 . 3  r E c o m m E n d a t i o n S
•	 Reception authorities in Member States should pay particular 
attention to the special needs of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and 
intersex asylum seekers in reception, accommodation and detention 
centres, and should develop appropriate procedures, guidelines and 
training modules in order to address their special needs.
•	 Since many homophobic and transphobic incidents are reported 
in reception, accommodation and detention centres, relevant 
special needs relating to sexual orientation and gender identity 
should be explicitly addressed in the drafting of a new Reception 
Directive, while prevention and protection from homophobic 
and transphobic assaults should be ensured in reception centres.
•	 Member States must put in place proper and effective complaint 
systems for dealing with harassment and violence against 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants in reception, 
accommodation and detention centres.
•	 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants must be 
given the possibility of moving to a single room or to another 
accommodation if they are facing harassment or violence in 
the original location; or the perpetrators must be transferred to 
another accommodation.
•	 Member States should facilitate lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and 
intersex organisations to work in reception, accommodation and 
detention centres.
seekers in reception centres, accommodation centres and in alien 
detention occur in most EU countries, as is clear from the replies of 
the national experts to our questionnaire. 
Often there is social exclusion, verbal and physical harassment, and 
sometimes even sexual abuse, mostly by other asylum seekers, in 
particular people from the same country of origin. Also incidents by 
staff members and by guards and police officers in detention are 
reported. 
In some countries asylum seekers are housed in the countryside, 
were the local inhabitants have a low tolerance towards LGBTIs and 
from where it is not possible to reach LGBTI NGOs in the capital (this 
was reported from Austria and Ireland). Sometimes LGBTI asylum 
seekers are so afraid of other asylum seekers that they do not dare 
to mention their sexual orientation or gender identity to the asylum 
authorities; as a consequence they cannot be granted refugee or 
subsidiary protection on that ground. In some cases trans or gay 
people were moved to a single room. This may provide a quiet and 
safe environment. In many countries asylum seekers are allowed to 
find their own private accommodation, although in most countries 
they lack the financial means.
Whenever there is a complaint system, in the majority of countries 
this does not work effectively, partly because LGBTI asylum seekers 
often fear disclosure of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 
In some countries it is common to place asylum seekers in detention 
for varying periods of time (Greece, Hungary, and Malta). In Malta, 
for example, the person will only be released if the procedure lasts 
longer than twelve months. In these countries, the precarious 
position of LGBTIs in detention is particularly acute.
Good practices that were reported on this point are: 
 – After the first six months asylum seekers in Portugal receive 
the same social allowance as Portuguese citizens. They also 
receive an accommodation subsidy in order to arrange private 
accommodation and they are allowed to work. Provided the 
housing market is not hampered by homo- and transphobia, this 
may allow LGBTI applicants to find accommodation where they 
feel safe. Comparably, in Cyprus it is possible to receive money in 
order to arrange private accommodation.
 – In Belgium and in Finland the perpetrator of harassment can be 
transferred to another centre, instead of the victim (which is the 
usual ‘solution’).
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•	 The persecution ground element of the refugee definition 
should be applied in such a way that, for a sexual orientation or 
gender identity based particular social group to exist, the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, trans or intersex applicant is not required to have 
already disclosed her/his sexual orientation or gender identity in 
the country of origin.
i n t E r n a l  p r o t E c t i o n
•	 Article 8 of the Qualification Directive should be applied in such 
a way that internal protection is deemed unavailable in cases 
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants from 
countries which criminalise sexual orientation or gender identity.
•	 In all other cases, the decision-making authorities should make a 
careful assessment of the situation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans 
and intersex people in the proposed internal protection area, 
including whether it is possible to live openly as lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, trans or intersex persons there and whether effective 
state protection is available for them. 
•	 Applicants should not be required or presumed to hide their 
sexual orientation or gender identity in the internal protection 
area in order to be protected against persecution.
c r E d i B i l i t y
•	 As a general principle, establishing sexual orientation or gender 
identity should be based on self-identification of the applicant. 
•	 Medical and psychiatric expert opinions are an inadequate and 
inappropriate method for establishing an applicant’s sexual 
orientation or gender identity.
•	 Interviewers, decision makers, the judiciary and legal aid 
providers need to be competent and capable of taking into 
account the sexual orientation and gender identity aspects of 
asylum applications, including the process of ‘coming-out’ and 
the special needs of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex 
applicants. To this end, they should be professionally trained, 
both in a specific basic training module and during general 
permanent education modules. 
•	 The fact that an applicant lacks familiarity with lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, trans and intersex organisations or venues cannot 
in itself be considered as an indication that the applicant’s 
purported fear of being persecuted on account of sexual 
orientation or gender identity is not credible.
r E c o m m E n d a t i o n S
This text puts together all recommendations put forward in the 
different chapters. 
G E n E r a l
In the light of Article 3 of Regulation 439/2010 establishing a 
European Asylum Support Office, the Office should give priority to 
promoting and coordinating the identification and pooling of good 
practices regarding the examination of applications of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, trans and intersex asylum applicants.
c r i m i n a l i S at i o n
•	 Article 4(3)(a) Qualification Directive should be applied in such a 
way that it leads to refugee status for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans 
and intersex applicants originating from countries where sexual 
orientation or gender identity are criminalised, or where general 
provisions of criminal law are used in order to prosecute people 
on account of their sexual orientation or gender identity.
•	 Countries of origin which criminalise sexual orientation or 
gender identity cannot be considered as ‘safe countries of origin’ 
for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants.
S t at E  p r o t E c t i o n  a G a i n S t  n o n - S t at E  p E r S E c u t i o n
•	 Article 7 of the Qualification Directive should be applied in such 
a way that lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants 
are only required to turn to the authorities for protection, if it has 
been established that effective protection of a non-temporary 
nature would generally be available for lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
trans and intersex people in that country.
•	 Article 7 of the Qualification Directive should be applied in such a 
way that, when sexual orientation or gender identity is criminalised 
in the country of origin, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or intersex 
applicants are not required to invoke the protection of the authorities. 
•	 Article 7 of the Qualification Directive should be applied in such 
a way that when potential actors of protection are likely to be 
homophobic/transphobic, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or intersex 
applicants are not required to have invoked the protection of the 
authorities. 
t h E  d i S c r E t i o n  r E q u i r E m E n t
•	 The well-founded fear element of the refugee definition should 
be applied in such a way that lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and 
intersex applicants are not required or presumed to hide their 
sexual orientation or gender identity upon return to the country 
of origin in order to avoid persecution.
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information as to the position of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and 
intersex people, in particular:
 – the occurrence of state and non-state persecution
 – homophobia and transphobia in government institutions 
and agencies such as the police, prisons, education 
 – homo- and transphobia in daily life (on the street, the 
workplace, schools, housing)
 – the willingness and ability of the authorities to provide 
effective protection against homophobic and transphobic 
violence, and whether lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and 
intersex people have access to such protection
 – the availability of effective state protection in different parts 
of the country, with a view to the possibility of internal 
protection.
•	 Country of origin information should be specific about the 
situation of lesbians, gays, bisexual women and men, trans 
(including trans women and men and transvestites) and intersex 
people.
Appropriate use of available country of origin information
•	 As long as little or no reliable country of origin information 
is available on the human rights situation of lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals, trans or intersex people, this should not be considered 
per se as a sign that human rights violations against these groups 
do not occur. Decision makers and the judiciary should keep in 
mind that homophobic and transphobic violence may be under-
reported in certain countries. The principle of the benefit of the 
doubt is of particular importance in such situations.
•	 Scarcity of information about enforcement of the criminalisation 
of sexual orientation or gender identity should not be taken as 
an indication that enforcement does not take place.
•	 When relying on country of origin information pertinent to 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or intersex applicants, information 
about one subgroup should not automatically be presumed 
to be applicable to the other subgroups as well, unless there 
are good reasons to make this presumption. At the same time, 
the absence of information on one subgroup should not be 
understood as evidence that there is no risk for the members of 
other subgroups.
•	 The fact that an applicant is or has been married or cohabiting 
in a heterosexual relationship, possibly with children of that 
relationship, should not in any way rule out the fact that he or 
she may be lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or intersex.
•	 During the personal interview in the meaning of Article 12 
Procedures Directive, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex 
applicants should be given the opportunity to describe how 
their sexual orientation or gender identity has developed, 
including responses of the environment; experiences with 
problems, harrassment, violence; and feelings of difference, 
stigma, fear and shame.
l at E  d i S c l o S u r E 
•	 Reasons for late disclosure should be considered carefully with 
due attention to the relevant factors adduced by applicants.
•	 The notion of “new elements” in Article 32(3) Procedures Directive 
should not be interpreted in a highly procedural way but, on the 
contrary, in a protection-oriented manner. In this way, an unduly 
inflexible application of the res judicata principle can be avoided.
•	 A negative credibility finding cannot be based solely on the 
belated disclosure of the sexual orientation or gender identity.
c o u n t r y  o f  o r i G i n  i n f o r m at i o n
Pertinent country of origin information 
•	 In the light of Article 4(3)(a) Qualification Directive, for all countries 
of origin, information pertinent to lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and 
intersex applicants must be gathered and disseminated.
•	 Country of origin information must be based on reports of 
human rights organisations, UN agencies, complemented by 
information from Member State diplomatic posts, as well as 
local lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex organisations - 
where these exist. This information should be supplemented by 
alternative forms of information, such as the testimonies of other 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex people similarly situated 
in written reports or oral testimony, of non-governmental or 
international organisations or other independent research.
•	 In the light of Article 4(3)(a) Qualification Directive, country of 
origin information should include information about direct and 
indirect criminalisation of sexual orientation or gender identity.
•	 In the light of Article 4(3)(a) Qualification Directive, country 
of origin information should include precise and up-to-date 
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•	 Considering countries where gay sexual orientation is 
criminalised, while lesbian, bisexual, trans and intersex persons 
are not mentioned explicitly in criminal law, it should be 
assumed that lesbian, bisexual, trans and intersex persons also 
risk persecution, until it has been established that this is not the 
case.
•	 Considering countries where sexual orientation is criminalised, 
while gender identity is not mentioned explicitly in criminal 
law, it should be assumed that trans and intersex people risk 
persecution too, until it has been established that this is not the 
case.
r E c E p t i o n
•	 Reception authorities in Member States should pay particular 
attention to the special needs of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans 
and intersex asylum seekers in reception, accommodation and 
detention centres, and should develop appropriate procedures, 
guidelines and training modules in order to address their special 
needs.
•	 Since many homophobic and transphobic incidents are reported 
in reception, accommodation and detention centres, relevant 
special needs relating to sexual orientation and gender identity 
should be explicitly addressed in the drafting of a new Reception 
Directive, while prevention and protection from homophobic 
and transphobic assaults should be ensured in reception centres.
•	 Member States must put in place proper and effective complaint 
systems for dealing with harassment and violence against 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants in reception, 
accommodation and detention centres.
•	 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex applicants must be 
given the possibility of moving to a single room or to another 
accommodation if they are facing harassment or violence in 
the original location; or the perpetrators must be transferred to 
another accommodation.
•	 Member States should facilitate lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and 
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